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FOREWORD
Price controls have a long history and were used particularly 
widely in post-war Britain and the United States. They have 
long been studied by economists and, typically, are regarded by 
economists as one of the worst forms of intervention in markets. 
Price controls can arbitrarily prevent many welfare-enhancing 
transactions from taking place when other forms of interven-
tion, such as subsidies, would have less pernicious effects. The 
problems of price controls can be especially acute because they 
are typically imposed in property and labour markets and thus 
affect whether people can work or where they can live: their ef-
fect may be to prevent young or low-skilled people from getting 
jobs or from obtaining a roof over their heads. The regulation of 
prices can also prevent market participants from finding new 
ways to solve the very problems that price controls purport to 
solve. For example, if controls on the price of energy reduce 
investment in exploration or new sources of energy, in the me-
dium term those controls may lead to higher energy costs. Sim-
ilarly, limits on fees in higher education – especially if they are 
combined with regulation of the sector – may lead to reduced 
innovation so that low-cost alternatives to current models of 
provision do not develop.
It may be thought that price controls are uncommon in post-
1980, so-called deregulated economies. It is true that they may 
not be as crude as they used to be; and perhaps their effects 
are not as pernicious. However, price controls are alive and 
well in several major industries which cover a huge percentage 
of national output. University fees are limited to £9,000 per 
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annum; railway fares are capped; short-term consumer finance 
and also pension products are to be subject to a charge cap; 
there are proposals at different stages in different parts of the 
UK for the minimum pricing of alcohol; and the UK also has a 
national minimum wage. The minimum wage is currently set 
with the aim of minimising its employment effects, but both 
major parties have indicated a desire to set it according to po-
litical considerations. Furthermore, two of the battlegrounds 
in the general election will be price controls on energy and the 
introduction of some form of rent control. In recent UK politi-
cal history, the less interventionist political parties have soon 
adopted the price-control proposals of the more interventionist 
parties, so the fact that the two main parties currently disagree 
on these two matters might turn out to be irrelevant.
The impact of price controls is not trivial, even if their effects 
can be masked by complex design and methods of implementa-
tion. For example, even the government believes that controls 
on prices in the finance sector could reduce competition. And 
a similar fear is so great in relation to the minimum pricing 
of alcohol that the measure may well be illegal. Maximum 
prices can have the effect of creating price stickiness so that 
competition does not lead to falling prices. In energy markets, 
companies can respond to the threat of future price freezes by 
buying energy in forward markets so that, if energy prices sub-
sequently fall, companies will not be able to pass on the benefits 
to consumers. If so-called ‘second-generation’ rent controls are 
introduced, we might avoid the wholesale destruction of the 
rental market that happened between 1918 and 1988, but we 
cannot avoid the inevitable trade-off between the rent paid and 
quality of accommodation.
The impact of price controls is often most acutely felt by 
the least well off – though, it should be noted that many of the 
gainers might be on low incomes too. With regard to minimum 
wages, while some people may benefit from higher pay, others 
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are likely to become unemployed. Their skills may then deterio-
rate so that their productivity falls further below the minimum 
wage level and short-term unemployment can turn into long-
term unemployment.
Given that there can be so many problems arising from legis-
lated price floors and ceilings, why are they ubiquitous?
The answer may well lie in the ‘economics of politics’ or ‘public 
choice’. organised interest groups often gain from price control: 
those interest groups might be incumbent firms that wish to 
see markets oligopolised because entry into markets becomes 
more difficult if prices are controlled. Certainly, once a control 
exists, it becomes difficult to remove because the losers from its 
removal can easily identify their losses while the gainers would 
be dispersed and may not realise that they could benefit from 
the removal of a price control. Also, politicians often like to gain 
approval from groups of voters who are, rationally, not well in-
formed about economic issues and do not understand the second- 
and third-round effects of price regulation. If we are to change 
policy, we not only need to understand the effects of the policy, 
we also need to understand the political-economic process by 
which the policy came about.
This collection is very well timed, especially in the British 
context. The issues are being discussed widely and new pro-
posals for price controls are brought forward with great regular-
ity. The editors, both experts in the field of the study of markets, 
Christopher Coyne and Rachel Coyne, have put together chap-
ters from leading authors that cover the subject to great effect. 
The authors examine the detailed problems of price control in 
their particular areas while explaining the basic concepts very 
effectively. The historical context is also given, together with an 
introduction to the basic economic ideas that is ideal for high 
school and first-year university students. As such, this publica-
tion makes an excellent contribution to the IEA’s educational 
mission.
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• Price controls damage markets by preventing the supply of 
products rising to meet demand. They can cause significant 
welfare losses, a deterioration in product quality, a reduction 
in investment and, in the long run, higher prices. Price 
controls also encourage black markets and illegal economic 
activity.
• In the labour market, minimum wages can reduce 
employment. This is especially so among the most vulnerable 
groups. Minimum wages can also lengthen unemployment 
terms and create labour markets in which ‘lucky’ insiders 
gain at the expense of ‘unlucky’ outsiders.
• Rent controls in the UK were disastrous in terms of their 
effect on the private rented sector. In the period of control, 
the private rented sector fell from three quarters to one 
tenth of the total housing stock. Since liberalisation, private 
renting has rebounded to around one sixth of all housing 
provision.
• Although the form of rent control currently being proposed 
by politicians would not have the same devastating effects 
as the controls used in the 20th century, ‘second-generation’ 
rent controls would damage choice, reduce quality of 
accommodation, raise the costs of investment and hence 
could increase rents in the long run. Rent control is a typical 
example of the use of price control to suppress the symptoms 
of mistaken policies: fundamentally, the reason why the cost 
of housing is so high in the UK is because of highly restrictive 
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land-use planning laws. No attempt to reduce rents by 
regulation can alleviate this problem.
• The proposed freeze of energy prices comes after a number 
of years in which governments have been retreating from the 
policy of liberalisation which was very effective in reducing 
prices. Specifically, the energy regulator has reduced the 
number of tariffs that companies can offer and prevented 
some forms of discounting. one result has been higher profit 
margins for providers. In the short run, a pre-announced 
price freeze is likely to lead to higher prices as companies 
take action to raise the base level at which prices are frozen. 
In the long run, such interventions raise the cost of capital 
and are likely to reduce investment. We need to return, 
instead, to the policy of liberalisation that was so effective in 
creating competition and reducing prices.
• Price controls currently cover large parts of the rail sector. 
These controls benefit some rail travellers, though taxpayers 
and other rail travellers bear the costs. It is mistakenly 
assumed that there is a monopoly in rail travel when rail 
is simply one small part of a vibrant market for transport 
services. Fare caps artificially encourage overcrowding 
at peak times and on particular lines and reduce the 
incentive to invest in the network. They also prevent product 
differentiation in transport such as the development of low-
cost, short-haul trains with more basic seating facilities or 
luxury commuter coaches.
• Until recently, UK financial products markets have been 
free of price controls for a number of decades. However, the 
government has recently brought in caps on the cost of short-
term consumer finance (payday loans). The government had 
previously rejected such price control for good reasons. The 
evidence from overseas suggests that restricting consumer 
credit can drive the market underground or lead vulnerable 
consumers to complete financial breakdown and thus make 
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all credit and financial services difficult to access in the 
future.
• The UK government is introducing controls on pensions 
charges. Again, this is happening after such controls were 
rejected and despite evidence that the market was working 
effectively. The government concedes that it is likely that 
price controls will inhibit new entry and competition in the 
industry. one government agency suggests that the price cap 
might become a ‘target’ for providers who might otherwise 
have priced their products lower than the cap. It is clear 
from the development of the charge capping agenda that the 
proposed regulation will be driven by political rather than 
economic considerations.
• Controls on university fees are very common around 
the world. However, the systems of student finance that 
governments have introduced prevent the competitive 
process operating in higher education that would otherwise 
help ensure that many students received a much lower 
cost education. The caps on fees, combined with the way 
student finance is provided, prevents a differentiated market 
developing which would provide different types of courses 
at different fee levels appropriate for a highly diverse student 
body.
• The Scottish government has passed legislation to implement 
a price floor in the market for alcohol. Such a measure 
remains under consideration in the rest of the UK. The 
health benefits of minimum pricing for alcohol are likely 
to be very small and the costs will be heavy and borne 
disproportionately by the low paid. It is likely that the main 
effect of minimum pricing will be that companies will move 
towards producing more expensive products and spending 
more on marketing. It is with good reason that the EU 
normally regards minimum price regulation as illegal.
xx
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11 INTRODUCTION
Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Coyne
Introduction
Price controls refer to government-imposed restrictions on 
what can be charged for a good or service in the market. There 
are two types of price controls. A price ceiling restricts prices 
from exceeding a maximum price determined by government: 
an example would be rent controls of residential living spaces 
which set a legally mandated upper bound on the price that can 
be charged to tenants. A price floor, in contrast, prohibits the 
charging of prices below a predetermined minimum: an example 
would be a minimum wage law which sets a legal lower bound on 
what employers must pay employees.
The use of price controls by governments has a long history 
spanning thousands of years (see Schuettinger and Butler 1979). 
In ancient Rome, for instance, the government imposed price 
controls to attempt to combat inflation due to the debasement 
of currency. operating under the belief that the inflation was due 
to speculation, in the year 301 Emperor Diocletian imposed price 
controls on a wide range of goods and services which were en-
forced by the threat of execution (see Bartlett 1994). The controls 
had a devastating impact on Rome’s economy. In more recent 
times, government officials have continued to impose price con-
trols to address a variety of social and economic issues. The US 
government imposed price controls during both world wars, as 
well as during the Korean War, with the goal of rationing items 
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deemed as necessary by the government. Both the UK and US 
governments implemented general wage and price controls in the 
1970s. In 1971, President Nixon famously imposed wage and price 
freezes for a ninety day period to combat inflation. The result was 
a series of unintended consequences including long queues for 
petrol and shortages of basic items, such as toilet paper, while 
inflation increased. And even though this example from the US is 
decades old, it is important to realise that government-imposed 
price controls are not a relic of the past.
one more recent illustrative case, which has received media 
attention, is that of Venezuela. The Venezuelan government has 
engaged in an ongoing experiment, which has lasted for over a 
decade, of imposing new and additional price controls on a wide 
array of goods and services to combat inflation and shortages. 
The result has been further shortages of basic items such as food 
and paper products, including toilet paper and disposable nap-
pies. In general, the result of the price controls has been ‘frequent 
product shortages and the emergence of a thriving black market. 
Some farmers and retailers are skirting the rules or have stopped 
selling certain goods altogether rather than sell them at a loss’ 
(Millard and Gallegos 2006). The cost of these legally mandated 
controls has largely fallen on the backs of Venezuelan citizens, 
whose standards of living have been adversely affected.
In addition to the economic costs, price controls have led to 
increasing restrictions on the basic freedoms of Venezuelan cit-
izens. For example, in response to the food shortages created by 
prior price controls, the government introduced a mandatory bio-
metric tracking system in order to collect data on the purchases 
made by private citizens at supermarkets (see Rawlings 2014). 
The purpose of the system is to ensure that private citizens do not 
‘overbuy’ key staples that are in short supply. The shortages that 
led to this system are the cumulative effect of numerous price 
controls, which have resulted in the micro-management of the 
daily lives and purchasing decisions of Venezuelans.
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Although Venezuela is an extreme case in terms of the mag-
nitude of government-imposed price controls, they are not alone 
in their use. Globally, the governments of countries of all income 
levels currently maintain an array of price controls on a wide var-
iety of goods, services and factors of production, which typically 
include: education, energy, health care, labour, pharmaceuticals 
and water. As these examples show, price controls have long been 
used by governments in a variety of contexts to attempt to ad-
dress various economic, social and political issues.
Moreover, there is every reason to believe that price controls 
will remain a politically viable policy option for the foreseeable 
future. To provide just one example, consider that on 25 Septem-
ber 2013, the Financial Times published an article titled, ‘Labour 
leader Ed Miliband defends UK energy reform pledge’ (Parker 
et al. 2013). The article discusses Miliband’s proposed reforms, 
which include the introduction of energy price controls in the 
form of a 20-month freeze on gas and electricity prices. Miliband 
argues that his policy, if implemented, will address what he calls 
the ‘cost of living crisis’ in the UK.
Given the historical use of price controls, as well as con-
tinued calls for future price freezes, the crucial question is: are 
price controls an effective means to achieve the stated end of 
improving standards of living for a significant number of citi-
zens? The purpose of this book is to analyse various aspects and 
applications of price controls to answer this question. Although 
the main focus of the chapters is on the situation in the UK, the 
underlying analysis is applicable to any case of price controls. 
The economic analysis of price controls is straightforward, yet 
typically neglected by policymakers and citizens, who are too 
often seduced by the heartwarming rhetoric associated with 
controlling prices in the name of improving living standards. 
The authors point out the direct and indirect effects of imposing 
legally mandated controls on prices which can be significant. At 
a minimum such controls distort economic activity and harm 
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the dynamism of the market economy. At the extreme, such as 
in Venezuela, the imposition of price controls can have truly 
devastating effects on a country’s economy, the costs of which 
tend to fall on private citizens.
The contributors to this book explore the various aspects of 
government-imposed price controls across a variety of differ-
ent cases. In Chapter 2 we review the basic economics of price 
controls with an emphasis on both the seen and unseen costs of 
these policies. In the following chapter (Chapter 3), Robert Miller 
discusses four historical cases where governments implemented 
price controls with the goal of combating inflation. Among other 
things, his chapter demonstrates the frequency of price controls 
across different historical contexts, in this case over two millen-
nia. Miller also discusses how, in each instance, price controls 
were ineffective in combatting inflation. The subsequent chap-
ters apply the economic logic of price controls to an array of pres-
ent-day situations in the UK.
Chapter 4, by Stanley Siebert, provides an analysis of wage 
controls in the form of minimum wages. The discussion in this 
chapter is especially relevant, since governments around the world 
maintain a variety of wage controls which distort labour markets 
and affect broader economic activity. Indeed, if anything, such 
controls are becoming more common. In the subsequent chapter 
(Chapter 5), Ryan Bourne analyses the flaws of rent ceilings, which 
are price controls intended to foster affordable living. Bourne 
makes the important distinction between ‘first-generation’ and 
‘second-generation’ price controls. The former entails the imple-
mentation of a hard price ceiling, which prevents landlords from 
charging market rents. The latter is more complex and allows for 
some, government-approved, changes in rent, for example, when 
there are changes in tenants. Bourne’s discussion explores the per-
verse economic effects of both forms of control.
Energy markets are yet another area where government- 
imposed price controls are prevalent. Colin Robinson offers an 
I N T RoDUC T IoN
5
economic discussion of caps on energy prices in Chapter 6. In 
doing so he provides insight into the evolution of the UK mar-
ket as government regulators have repeatedly attempted to 
influence and manipulate energy prices through price controls. 
In Chapter  7, Richard Wellings analyses the regulation of rail 
fares in Britain. He notes that even though the railway indus-
try was privatised in the 1990s, the industry remains heavily 
influenced by government. The sources of government control 
include state subsidies, the mandated structure of the industry 
and controls on fares. His analysis traces the economic con-
sequences of this pseudo privatisation with an emphasis on the 
interaction of these three types of government influence over 
the railway industry.
Financial markets play a crucial role in almost all economic 
activity, either directly or indirectly. These markets are also 
among the most heavily regulated by governments around the 
world. Given this, in Chapter 8, Philip Booth and Stephen Davies 
explore one important aspect of the government regulation 
of financial markets: the imposition of caps on interest rates 
and on the charges associated with financial products, such as 
pensions, in the UK. Their chapter accomplishes two important 
things. Firstly, pensions have been a neglected area of study by 
academics in the area of finance: their contribution remedies 
this gap in the literature. Secondly, in demonstrating the costs 
of price controls in one segment of the financial market, Booth 
and Davies provide a glimpse into the significant costs of govern-
ment manipulation of broader financial markets which goes well 
beyond the caps they discuss.
Many countries are currently debating the best way to deal 
with the rising costs of higher education. one policy that is often 
proposed is the imposition of price controls to limit increases in 
these costs. In Chapter 9, Steven Schwartz discusses why uni-
versity price controls are ineffective in achieving this goal. His 
analysis explores the structure of higher education in the UK 
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and explains how the resulting incentives encourage behaviours 
that run counter to the stated goals of those who advocate for 
price controls to limit costs. Finally, in Chapter 10, Christopher 
Snowden analyses minimum unit pricing (MUP), a policy which 
imposes a price floor below which retailers cannot sell a unit of 
alcohol. His discussion explains why this policy is not effective 
in achieving the goals of its advocates, which include reducing 
excessive drinking and alcohol-related mortality, and why the 
predicted benefits of MUP are likely to be exaggerated.
Even this brief summary of the chapters that follows demon-
strates why a book exploring the economics of price controls is 
necessary. The use of government-mandated price controls is 
ubiquitous both historically and in the present. The chapters 
that follow are a reminder that simple economics is by no means 
 simple-minded economics. In stark contrast, the contributors to 
this volume demonstrate the power of basic economic analysis 
for understanding the full costs of public policies. It is our hope 
that this monograph will be of value to policymakers, citizens, 
and scholars, and that they will consider the seen and unseen 
costs of using price controls to address perceived policy prob-
lems. Given what is at stake in terms of human well-being, doing 
so is of the utmost importance.
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2 THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE CONTROLS
Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Coyne
The crucial role of prices in solving the economic 
problem
Prices are a commonly misunderstood concept. Many view prices 
as random numbers assigned by a seller. Related to this, many see 
prices as being an impediment to accomplishing their desired 
goals. For example, a young adult may desire to live in central 
London but quickly realises that they cannot to do so given the 
relatively high price of renting a flat in that area. The view of prices 
as impediments to achieving one’s goals is one reason why there 
are so often calls for politicians and regulators to place controls 
on prices. The belief, from the perspective of proponents of price 
controls, is that, if regulators impose controls, then people will be 
able to achieve goals that would otherwise be unachievable. For 
example, in order to assist younger citizens with their cost of living, 
a politician may propose some combination of rent controls and a 
living wage to make cities such as London more affordable. These 
views, however, misconstrue the fundamental nature and role that 
prices play in an economic system.
Prices are central to solving the core economic problem that 
all societies face: how are scarce resources to be (re)allocated to 
meet as many of the unlimited wants of consumers as possible? 
Answering this question is crucial for improving standards of 
living since the more consumer wants can be met, the better off 
people are. one of the main contributions of Nobel Laureate F. A. 
THE ECONOMICS OF 
PRICE CONTROLS
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Hayek (1945) was his clarification of the exact nature of the eco-
nomic problem. He noted: ‘The economic problem of society is 
… not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” resources – if 
“given” is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately 
solves the problem set by these “data”. It is rather a problem of … 
the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its 
totality’ (pages 519–20). Hayek’s point is that economic interac-
tions rely on dispersed knowledge, some of which exists for all 
to grasp but much of which is inarticulate, tacit knowledge that 
is difficult to make explicit and is not available to everyone (see 
Hayek 1945; Lavoie 1986). Such knowledge must be discovered 
through experience and experimentation (see Hayek 1978). Be-
cause tacit knowledge cannot be expressed in an objective man-
ner, it is not ‘out there’ for others to obtain in the same way as 
articulated knowledge in books lining library shelves (see Lavoie 
1985: 76–87; Boettke 2002). Part of the reason that markets are 
so effective in allocating resources is that they allow dispersed 
individuals to take advantage of the knowledge possessed by 
others to discover a solution to the economic problem. But how 
do markets do this?
At the core of the effectiveness of markets is the notion of 
‘economic calculation’, which refers to the decision-making pro-
cess of how to best allocate scarce resources among the array 
of feasible alternatives. Economic calculation refers to the de-
termination of the expected value-added of a potential course 
of action. For example, should scarce steel be used to construct 
a new office building, school building, hospital or some other 
structure? or should it sit idle because none of the possible al-
ternatives are profitable given the cost of steel and other inputs? 
By comparing the relative expected value-added across feasible 
alternatives, decision makers are able to choose the course of 
action with the highest expected social return. Crucial to this 
decision-making process are money prices and profit-and-loss 
accounting.
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Money prices, which serve as a common unit of calculation, 
capture the relative scarcity, or opportunity cost, of different 
goods based on context-specific conditions, and they commu-
nicate this information to others in the economy (see Mises 
1920; Hayek 1945; Thomsen 1992). This is powerful precisely be-
cause people are able to act on the context-specific knowledge 
reflected in prices without needing to actually possess any spe-
cific insight into the actual local conditions. For example, if a 
loaf of organic bread from a local baker costs £1.50, this reflects 
the costs of production and distribution of the bread (including 
the value of the time of the assistant serving in the shop) as well 
as reflecting the demand for organic bread relative to alterna-
tives by other consumers. It is not necessary for the buyer to 
know anything about the baker’s preferences for leisure versus 
working, how or why the ingredients cost the amount they do, 
or why other consumers may be willing to pay more for organic 
bread than other types of bread. Nor is it necessary for poten-
tial suppliers who are thinking of entering the market to know 
these things. This information is reflected in prices in a freely 
functioning economy.
The economist Thomas Sowell (1980) effectively captures 
this point when he writes: ‘Prices are important not because 
money is considered paramount but because prices are a fast 
and effective conveyor of information through a vast society in 
which fragmented knowledge must be coordinated’ (page 80). 
This information is crucial because it allows people to compare 
the prices of inputs, which reflect underlying scarcity condi-
tions, to the expected profitability of numerous alternatives, 
all of which are technologically feasible (see Hoff 1981; Boettke 
1998; Horwitz 1996, 1998). The resulting profit or loss – the 
difference between the cost of production and the sales price – 
provides feedback as to whether this estimate was accurate or 
not. A profit indicates that resources have been combined in a 
manner that generates value to others, while a loss signals the 
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opposite: it signals that resources could have been allocated 
to a higher-valued use that would increase welfare. A simple 
example will illustrate this logic.
Consider a scenario in which an entrepreneur produces a new 
product for a cost of £25 and sells it for a price £50. What does 
this £25 profit indicate? There are many other things that the 
producer could have made using the resources that cost him £25. 
Some would have led to a loss while others would have led to a 
smaller profit. The profit of £25 indicates that consumers value 
the good produced more than the alternatives that could have 
been produced with those same resources. This profit signals to 
the producer, as well as to other entrepreneurs, that they have 
allocated resources in a manner that consumers value relative 
to the alternatives and encourages them to supply more. A loss 
signals that consumers do not value the current allocation of 
resources. The loss provides an incentive for entrepreneurs to 
adjust by reallocating scarce resources to other uses.
This ongoing process has several effects. The profit will tend 
to draw other entrepreneurs into the market who will seek to 
capture customers by charging a lower price. Another important 
effect is that entrepreneurs face constant pressure to come up 
with new and cheaper means of producing the good so as to in-
crease their profit. If they cut production costs from £25 to £20, 
they keep these savings as additional profit – though other pro-
ducers will then be attracted into the market so that prices may 
then fall. The result is ever-present competition and innovation, 
which benefit consumers since producers must adjust to meet 
their demands in order to remain profitable.
It is the information and incentive provided by monetary 
prices and profit-and-loss accounting that makes markets so 
effective in solving the economic problem. The process of eco-
nomic calculation guides market participants in adapting their 
plans and reallocating resources to new and more highly valued 
uses to maximise the well-being of consumers. The lure of profit 
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incentivises innovation, and prices guide innovators in deter-
mining which projects are feasible and which are not. Mistakes 
are, of course, frequently made, but markets provide the informa-
tion and incentives to adapt accordingly.
Economic calculation is especially crucial as the production 
of goods and services becomes increasingly complex, which is a 
defining characteristic of economic progress and an advanced 
economic system. The economist Don Lavoie (1985) captures this 
point when he writes: ‘price information represents knowledge 
about a continually and rapidly changing structure of economic 
relationships’ (page 82). To understand this point, consider the 
complexity involved in the production of what is typically con-
sidered by those in developed countries to be a basic good – a 
toaster.
Thomas Thwaites (2014), a London-based designer, embarked 
on a fascinating project, the ‘Toaster Project’, in which he at-
tempted to build a simple toaster by hand and from scratch. He 
quickly found that the project was an extremely complicated 
one. The toaster required copper, iron, nickel, mica and plas-
tic, all of which Thwaites had to obtain from mines and other 
sources in a variety of geographical locations. After much 
travel and effort to extract and process the necessary materials, 
he constructed his (extremely ugly) toaster, which proceeded, 
upon being plugged into an electric socket, to burn out in a 
matter of seconds. His project is a perfect illustration of the 
importance of economic calculation as indicated by his reali-
sation that ‘the scale of industry involved in making a toaster 
is ridiculous but at the same time the chain of discoveries and 
small technological developments that occurred along the way 
make it entirely reasonable’ (2014). This chain of events was 
guided by the feedback provided by economic calculation cou-
pled with the adaptability of markets. The result is that toasters 
are readily available to consumers when they want them at a 
relatively low price.
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Further adding to the sheer complexity of advanced econ-
omies is the importance of what economists call complemen-
tary goods: goods and services that are consumed together. For 
example, cars require petrol, spare parts, repair equipment and 
trained mechanics in order to operate. Just like the construction 
of a basic toaster, most people living in relatively wealthy soci-
eties take the wide array of complementary goods available for 
granted. However, when one considers the level of coordination 
required for each of these various complementary goods not only 
to be produced but to be available and waiting when needed by 
consumers, these taken-for-granted goods and services are truly 
amazing phenomena. Someone, somewhere, has to anticipate 
the need for these complementary goods and services and make 
them available to consumers on demand.
In markets, consumers do not submit a master wish list to 
a central planner who then allocates resources accordingly. In-
stead, prices and profit-and-loss accounting guide entrepreneurs 
in discovering a (new) solution to the economic problem by 
producing and innovating existing and new goods and services 
that consumers value. This process is the essence of broader eco-
nomic progress as resources are reallocated, on an ongoing basis, 
to their highest-valued, welfare-maximizing use. It is precisely 
the fact that no one is in charge that makes markets so flexible 
and effective. Each individual who possesses unique skills and 
knowledge is able to engage in experimentation and discovery 
that benefits not only themselves but others as well. Market 
prices link individuals and markets together by communicating 
a vast amount of information. The lure of profit and fear of loss 
incentivise people to continually adjust their behaviour. Given 
this understanding of the market process and the central role 
played by prices, we are now in a position to understand the con-
sequences of imposing price controls. The next section illustrates 
the market process described above, as well as the effect of price 
controls.
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Illustrating the market process and the 
distortionary effects of price controls
The market process described above can be illustrated using a 
basic supply and demand framework as illustrated in Figure 1. 
The downward-sloping demand curve, ‘D’, represents the reality 
that, all else con-
stant, consumers are 
willing to purchase 
a greater quantity of 
a good or service the 
lower the price of each 
unit. Likewise, the 
 upward-sloping supply 
curve, ‘S’, represents 
the reality that, all else 
constant, producers 
are willing to supply 
a greater quantity of 
a good or service the 
higher the price they 
receive per unit.
The intersection of the market supply and demand curve 
represents an equilibrium price and quantity where the amount 
demanded by consumers is exactly equal to the amount supplied 
by producers. of course, in reality, this equilibrium point is never 
actually reached due to changing conditions on both sides of the 
market. However, this basic framework is useful in that it illus-
trates how markets and prices operate.
Consider what happens when the price is above the hypo-
thetical equilibrium price. Assume, for instance, that the price 
is £13 instead of the equilibrium price of £11. At a price of £13 
the quantity supplied by producers is 450 while the quantity de-
manded by consumers is 300. In other words, at a price of £13 
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there is a surplus of 150 units because the quantity supplied (450) 
is greater than the quantity demanded (300). The result will be 
downward pressure on the price as producers realise that their 
surplus inventory will remain unsold at a price of £13. As sup-
pliers lower the price, consumers are willing to purchase more of 
the good and less will be supplied. This process continues until 
the surplus is eroded.
The reverse happens when the price is below the hypothetical 
equilibrium price. Consider a scenario in which the price is £9. At 
this price the quantity supplied is 350 units, while the quantity 
demanded is 500 units, resulting in a shortage of 150 units. At a 
price of £9, consumers demand more than producers are willing 
to supply, resulting in a shortage. In the face of a shortage, there 
will be upward pressure on the market price as consumers bid up 
the price of the existing goods. This process will continue until 
the price rises to £11, where the quantity supplied is equal to the 
quantity demanded.
The basic supply and demand framework highlights the fact 
that, in an unhampered market, there is an inherent tendency 
for prices to adjust to align the different interests of consumers 
and suppliers. This is an ongoing and continual process, which is 
precisely why unhindered prices are so important. As discussed 
in the previous section, prices capture the context-specific real-
ities facing individual economic actors. These individuals do not 
have to have any working knowledge of economics or the market 
process but they act as if they do precisely because prices provide 
information and profit and loss provides the incentive to act on 
that information.
It now becomes clear why price controls are a problem. From 
an economic standpoint, price controls are problematic because 
they distort the price mechanism’s ability to allocate resources 
to their highest-valued uses through voluntary exchange. In un-
hampered markets, prices work to coordinate supplies and the 
demands of consumers and ration existing resources efficiently. 
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By legally manipulating the market price, price controls distort 
this process by preventing mutually beneficial exchanges which 
would have otherwise occurred in the absence of the legal restric-
tion. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the direct distortions resulting 
from the implementation of price controls.
A price floor is a legally man-
dated price that is set above 
the equilibrium price. The 
government mandated price is 
illustrated by the solid line (PF) 
in Figure 2. As discussed above, 
a price above the equilibrium 
price (PE) will result in a sur-
plus, where suppliers produce 
more than consumers demand 
(QS  > QD). In the unhampered 
market, the price would fall 
to erode the surplus. However, 
suppliers are unable to lower 
their price, by law, below the 
mandated price floor. The result is that the surplus persists.
To provide an illustration of this logic, suppose that the mar-
ket for labour is coordinated through genuine market prices. In 
this case supply and demand will tend to be brought into bal-
ance. Now suppose the government imposes a price floor in the 
form of a minimum wage, above the equilibrium price, with the 
goal of improving standards of living of low-skilled workers. At 
the artificially high price, the quantity of labour supplied will 
exceed the quantity of labour demanded, resulting in a surplus 
of labour. In other words, some workers who want to work at 
the artificially high price will be unable to find employment and 
people who want work doing will be unable to find people to do 
the work even though, without the legal price floor, there would 
be willing workers.
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A price ceiling is a legally mandated price that is set below 
the equilibrium price. This legally mandated ceiling is illustrated 
by the solid line (PC) in Fig-
ure 3. As discussed, a price 
below the equilibrium price 
(PE) will result in a shortage 
where consumers demand 
more than producers are 
willing to supply (QD  > QS). 
In the unhampered mar-
ket, the price would rise to 
remove this shortage. How-
ever,  con sumers are legally 
unable to raise their offer 
price and sellers are unable 
to legally raise their price 
above the mandated price 
ceiling. The result is that the 
shortage persists.
To provide an example of this dynamic, consider an unham-
pered market in energy where supply and demand is balanced by 
the free-functioning price mechanism. If the government impos-
es a price ceiling below the market price, the quantity of energy 
supplied will fall, while the quantity of energy demanded will 
increase. The result will be a shortage of energy. Some consumers 
will wish to buy energy, be willing to pay the cost to suppliers but 
it will be illegal for them to do so. There is a genuine welfare loss 
here.1
It is important to note that price controls do not make every-
one worse off. Those who are able to secure goods at the artifi-
cially low price – in the case of a price ceiling – or those who are 
lucky enough to obtain a higher price for their services – in the 
1 For another, classic, illustration of this logic, see Friedman and Stigler (1946).
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case of a price floor – are made better off. At the same time, those 
who are unable to secure the good they desire at the artificially 
low price or those who are unable to find a buyer for their goods 
at the artificially higher price are made worse off because of the 
price control.
It should also be noted that all sorts of subtle processes do 
not take place when there is a price floor. For example, when 
there is a price floor on rents, people have less incentive to econ-
omise on the amount of accommodation they use if they are 
the lucky ones who can obtain a flat or house. As a result, price 
floors can lead to markets with ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ with 
the lucky insiders having plentiful supply at a cheap price and 
others unable to obtain the good or service at all. Another im-
portant effect is that artificially capping prices can prevent the 
dynamics of the market operating in such a way that can bring 
forth new supply or bring about innovation to reduce demand. 
Imagine, for example, if there had been a price cap on oil as 
its price was increasing in the early 21st century. This would 
have reduced the incentive to research into new ways to exploit 
fossil fuels (such as shale gas fracking) and to conserve fuel and 
would have reduced investment in exploration. Exploration has 
the potential to move the supply curve out and new methods of 
conservation have the potential to move the demand curve to 
the left. These dynamics can then reduce prices below the floor. 
Without these dynamic market adjustments in uncontrolled 
markets, price ceilings, shortages and quality reductions may 
become permanent features of the market. In general, price 
controls generate a host of other costs which are often unseen 
and, therefore, overlooked.
Some overlooked costs of price controls
In addition to the direct and observable effects of price controls 
– shortages and surpluses – there is also a series of subsequent, 
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indirect costs which emerge. Perhaps the best source for under-
standing these overlooked costs is to look to those who were 
directly involved in designing and implementing past con-
trols. one such individual, G. Jackson Grayson Jr, served as the 
chairman of the Price Commission in the United States under 
President Nixon from 1971 to 1973. In this role Grayson was re-
sponsible for overseeing the implementation and enforcement 
of Nixon’s price controls. After leaving his post, Grayson (1974) 
wrote: ‘[a]s a result of my sixteen months as price controller, I 
can list seven ways that controls interfere (negatively) with the 
market system and hasten its metamorphosis into a central-
ized economy’ (page 10). Grayson’s list can be paraphrased and 
summarised as follows.
Price controls distort economic activity
Price controls distort the allocation of resources both directly 
and indirectly. As discussed in the previous section, the direct 
effect is to create persistent shortages or surpluses while reduc-
ing the number of mutually beneficial exchanges that would have 
otherwise occurred in the absence of controls. But the implemen-
tation of price controls leads to a series of subsequent, indirect 
distortions as well, as people respond rationally to the immedi-
ate and direct effects of the controls.
In the absence of the ability to use prices to ration scarce 
goods, alternative mechanisms emerge. For example, shortages 
lead to queues resulting from excess demand for the good or 
service in question. This dynamic was evident in the centrally 
planned economies of Eastern Europe as well as in the US in the 
1970s when the government imposed price controls on petrol. 
Long queues tend to lead to subsequent government interven-
tions with rationing schemes. For example, the US government 
reacted to long queues for petrol by limiting consumer purchases 
of petrol to every second day.
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The emergence of crime and black markets are another in-
direct negative effect of price controls. Unable to adjust prices 
legally, producers and buyers may move into the extralegal mar-
ket to engage in exchange. others, desperate to obtain goods for 
which there is a shortage, may engage in theft to obtain goods. 
To provide one illustration of black market activities, consider 
the case of farmers in the UK in World War II. Facing wartime 
meat rationing, many farmers under-reported animal births to 
the Ministry of Food and then sold the additional meat in the 
black market.
Yet another indirect effect of price controls is evasion, which 
can take on a variety of forms. For example, facing a price ceil-
ing, sellers may charge additional fees or tie-ins to compensate 
for the fact that prices are required to be artificially low. There 
is also likely to be deterioration in the quality of the product 
or service. This may include the substitution of low-quality for 
high-quality ingredients in the production of a good or, in the 
case of rent controls, maintenance and investment not being car-
ried out and poor-quality conditions being allowed to develop in 
accommodation.
Finally, a legal mandate on prices lowers the cost of buyers 
and sellers using non-monetary criteria – e.g. race, gender, reli-
gion, etc. – to allocate resources. Price floors will allow buyers 
to indulge their non-monetary preferences while price ceilings 
will allow sellers to do so. Consider an example of each to illus-
trate this. A minimum wage, which is a price floor, will create an 
excess supply – i.e. a surplus – of potential employees willing to 
work at the legally mandated wage. In this case employers, the 
buyers of labour, can indulge their non-monetary preferences in 
deciding who to hire. For example, they may decide to discrim-
inate against a certain group or type of person in making their 
hiring decisions. Due to the price control, they are able to indulge 
these preferences precisely because there is a surplus of potential 
employees from which to choose.
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Now consider the case of a rent control: a price ceiling. In 
this case there will be an excess demand – i.e. a shortage – for 
flats, which means that sellers can indulge their non-monetary 
preferences in choosing among potential tenants. Precisely be-
cause the price control creates an excess demand, landlords can 
discriminate and indulge their preferences without suffering 
a monetary cost for doing so. Turning away certain potential 
tenants based on non-monetary characteristics does not hurt 
the landlord because other potential tenants remain due to the 
artificially low price.
Price controls mask real changes to economic 
fundamentals
Price controls are often implemented with the goal of fighting 
inflation. But this, incorrectly, assumes that all wage-price in-
creases are the result of inflation. In an unhampered market 
economy, there are constant, genuine changes to supply and de-
mand conditions that will often lead to real price increases and 
relative price increases. The existence of price controls distorts 
the ability of the price mechanism to communicate this informa-
tion by treating all price changes as if they are the result of infla-
tion. The result is that scarce resources will not be reallocated to 
meet changes in the real, underlying economic conditions. Thus, 
due to persistent resource misallocations, standards of living 
will suffer.
During a period of price controls, the role of profit is 
neglected, if not entirely ignored
Initial calls for price controls – whether from the public or from 
policymakers – are often justified on the grounds of profits for 
certain industries being ‘too high’. By implementing price con-
trols, the logic follows, the government can limit profits while 
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passing savings on to consumers. The implementation of con-
trols reinforces the, incorrect, sentiment that profits come at 
the expense of consumers as opposed to the actual reality that 
profits flow from the successful satisfaction of consumer wants.
Moreover, the implementation of controls discourages 
long-term investments due to the artificially low prices and a 
weakened profit motive. We noted above how quality deterio-
ration under price controls will affect customers in the short 
term as producers respond to the implementation of controls. 
However, this is only part of the story, as quality deterioration 
will also affect consumers over the long term. In the face of 
price controls, suppliers will have a disincentive to invest in 
either expanding production or improving the quality of the 
controlled good in future periods. Indeed, the full impact of 
price controls may not be felt for many years and then become 
disconnected in the minds of policymakers from the original 
policy, so that there is little political pressure to reverse the 
controls. In general, supply is more elastic in the long than in 
the short run. An energy price control, for example, may lead 
to a relatively small reduction in supply immediately because 
the short-run marginal cost of production of energy may be 
lower than the controlled price. However, the long-run margin-
al cost will be higher than the short-run marginal cost because 
the continued production of energy involves investment in new 
plant and equipment. That new investment might not be forth-
coming in the controlled market. This is also problematic pre-
cisely because new investment would lower the price of energy 
in the future, the very end that proponents of price controls 
claim that they are seeking.
Thus, during control periods, the role of profits in rewarding 
producers for supplying a good that consumers value is weakened 
if not altogether removed. This discourages increased future pro-
duction, which only exacerbates the initial perceived problem of 
‘too little’ supply at ‘too high’ a price.
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Price controls replace market competition with political 
competition
The implementation of price controls does not change the fun-
damental nature of the economic problem. Decisions still need 
to be made about how to best allocate scarce resources among 
an array of feasible alternatives. In the absence of price controls, 
these decisions are made through the market process, which 
relies on true market prices reflecting the relative scarcity of re-
sources. However, with the implementation of controls, the mar-
ket process is distorted and political competition, at least partly, 
replaces market competition. Efforts are shifted from pleasing 
private consumers to attempting to influence the political pro-
cess, which ultimately determines how controls are implemented 
and enforced. The result is that price controls attract an array of 
political interests who seek to use controls for their own narrow 
pursuits at the expense of the broader interests of private con-
sumers. As Grayson (1974) writes, ‘wage-price controls provide a 
convenient stone for those who have economic and political axes 
to grind, particularly those interested in promoting a centralized 
economic system’ (page 11).
Price controls normalise attitudes of reliance on 
government
Price controls threaten the dynamism of markets, which rely on 
profit and loss to operate effectively. In the absence of controls, 
those in business must weigh the perceived risk and reward of 
alternative courses of action. Misjudgment by entrepreneurs re-
sults in losses and, at the extreme, bankruptcy. However, price 
controls change the decision-making calculus of entrepreneurs. 
Instead of having to weigh the true costs and benefits of their ac-
tions, entrepreneurs come to see government regulators as a po-
tential source of economic security that can insulate them from 
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the often harsh realities of competitive markets. The result is that 
‘[t]he controlled become dependent on the controllers and want 
regulations continued in preference to the competition of the 
dynamic market’ (Grayson 1974: 12). The cumulative effect is the 
replacement of profit and loss as the mechanism for determin-
ing winners and losers with an increasing reliance on political 
authorities for protection from the realities of consumer- driven 
market competition. Thus, the voices of private consumers are 
weakened as is the incentive for businesses to make consumer 
satisfaction a priority.
Price controls generate regime uncertainty
The implementation of price controls gives regulators the power 
to shape economic outcomes. In the unhampered market, busi-
nesspeople must attempt to forecast accurately the wants of 
consumers. Price controls add another element of uncertainty 
into the process. Now businesspeople must not only anticipate 
what their customers want but also forecast how regulators 
will act. This creates ‘regime uncertainty’, which refers to ambi-
guity surrounding the protection of property and the stability 
of rules and regulations in the future (see Higgs 1997). If busi-
nesspeople are uncertain about future regulations and controls, 
their ability to plan and forecast is hampered, which raises the 
cost of planning and investing. Further, entrepreneurs must 
shift at least part of their focus to attempting to anticipate what 
regulators will do in the future. This shift comes at the expense 
of private consumers who would otherwise be the main focus of 
for-profit business.
Price controls mask the true causes of economic problems
Price controls are typically framed as a response to some sup-
posed market failure. In this scenario, government regulators are 
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seen as the quick-fix solution to perceived problems inherent in 
markets, which are often, incorrectly, blamed on such things as 
‘speculation’ and ‘hoarding’. This overly simplified framing masks 
the true underlying cause of economic ills. In an environment of 
high inflation, for example, calls for government-imposed price 
controls completely neglect the role of monetary policy as a fun-
damental cause of inflation. In the case of wage controls, a min-
imum wage may raise the pay for some individuals while leaving 
other individuals unemployed. The policy may well, in effect, be 
masking the effects of low productivity caused, for example, by 
defective education policy. The low levels of productivity will 
manifest themselves in the form of higher unemployment rather 
than in the form of lower wages. The ultimate result is that price 
controls mislead private citizens regarding both the fundamen-
tal causes of perceived economic problems and the solutions to 
address those problems.
Conclusion
It is not hard to see why price controls are appealing. They 
offer what appears to be a quick and simple solution to rising 
prices and allow policymakers to provide short-term benefits 
to certain groups of people. It is true, by definition, that price 
controls will either raise (in the case of a price floor) or lower 
(in the case of a price ceiling) the price of the good or service in 
question. Further, it is true that not all people are made worse 
off by the implementation of price controls. Under a price floor, 
those who receive a higher price for their good or service than 
they would have in the absence of the control are made better 
off. Likewise, under a price ceiling, those who pay a lower price 
for a good or service than they otherwise would have are made 
better off. Economics, however, indicates that price controls 
are far from costless, and the associated costs are far reaching 
and potentially significant.
F L AW S A N D C E I L I NGS T H E E CoNoM IC S oF PR IC E CoN T RoL S
26
As we have emphasised, there are both direct and indirect 
costs to price control policies. While some of these costs are seen 
(such as a shortage or surplus) many are unseen: for example, 
long-term investments that would have taken place in the ab-
sence of controls may no longer take place because investors fear 
they will not be able to make an adequate return on their invest-
ment. When one appreciates the complexity of the market system, 
it becomes evident that understanding the full consequences of a 
price control is very difficult. What is clear is that price controls 
set in motion a series of unintended consequences as producers 
and consumers respond to the new incentives created by the 
introduction of controls. More often than not, these unintended 
consequences exacerbate the very problem that proponents of 
controls claim to correct.
The logic of the seen and unseen also helps to explain why, 
given the costs associated with price controls, they continue to 
remain popular among politicians and much of the public. Price 
controls are readily observable – i.e. seen – in that the public can 
readily observe the legally mandated price set by government. 
Given the difficulty of understanding and tracing the unseen 
consequences discussed throughout this chapter, it appears to 
many that these controls are pure benefit with little to no cost. 
But the economic way of thinking indicates this is wrongheaded. 
As Thomas Sowell (2007) writes, ‘[e]conomists have long been 
saying that there is no free lunch but politicians get elected by 
promising free lunches. Controlling prices creates the illusion of 
free lunches.’ Furthermore, price controls are a low-cost method 
for politicians to reward interest groups for their support at the 
ballot box. For example, in some countries, advocating higher 
minimum wage laws is a well-known method for politicians to 
reward unions for supporting their election efforts.
If the goal of policymakers is to improve standards of liv-
ing, policy must focus on incentivising improved quality and 
availability. This is accomplished by creating an environment 
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conducive to economic freedom and contestable markets where 
entrepreneurs can experiment and subject their conjectures to 
the market test. Price controls undermine economic freedom and, 
therefore, must be dismissed as a means for improving standards 
of living. The reality is that price controls harm the well-being of 
many while providing political gains to the few. Until the eco-
nomics of price controls is appreciated, legally mandated prices 
will remain a viable policy option despite their historical failure 
and the significant costs that they impose on the average citizen, 
who suffers under such policies.
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3 PRICE CEILINGS: ANCIENT AND MODERN
Robert C. B. Miller
Taking low inflation for granted
Many price ceilings are understandable only in the light of infla-
tion. Inflation does not currently appear to be the major problem 
it used to be. over the last ten years, inflation in the UK has been 
only 2.7 per cent a year on average (2004–13). Hence it is worth 
reviewing how and why some representative inflations have 
developed and why governments have tried so often and so un-
successfully to mitigate the effects with price controls and price 
ceilings. It is only possible to examine the logic and the temp-
tation of such controls in the circumstances which gave rise to 
them. This means examining why governments give way to the 
allure of inflation despite the damage that it does. In turn this 
will help explain why governments have resorted to price con-
trols as a means of mitigating the consequences of the inflation 
they have unleashed.
In what follows we take the examples of four historic infla-
tions and the price and wage ceilings which they provoked. These 
are not the only examples we could have taken, but they are suf-
ficiently divided in time and type that any conclusions drawn 
may have broad application. In particular they took place in dif-
ferent times and places and had different proximate causes. The 
selected inflations and the price controls they provoked are: the 
inflation in the Roman Empire which culminated in Diocletian’s 
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and during World War II; and the British inflation and experi-
ments with wage and price controls between the 1940s and the 
1970s.
The Great Roman Inflation
The Roman Empire founded by Augustus (Heath 2006) at the 
end of the Roman civil wars suffered from chronic inflation and, 
under the Emperor Diocletian, inflation accelerated sharply, pro-
voking one of the earliest attempts to contain inflation by means 
of direct controls. Inflation in the ancient world was dissimilar 
from the forms it can take today as it was primarily currency de-
preciation. In other words, the issuers of the currency increased 
the supply by reducing the precious metal content. There seems 
to have been no equivalent of inflation being caused in the mod-
ern way through a fractional reserve banking system, where an 
increase in bank reserves can cause an increase in the money 
supply. Such was the Roman Empire from the first century to the 
fourth century. Inflation first trotted then changed to a canter 
before accelerating to a hyper-inflationary gallop under the Em-
peror Diocletian at the end of the third century.
The explanation for the Great Roman Inflation is much the 
same as for later inflations. The Roman Empire’s initial success 
and apparent military and economic stability were the result of 
largely benign conditions on the empire’s eastern and western 
frontiers. The early empire reached a state of uneasy equilibrium. 
Thus the attempt to create a new province between the Rhine and 
the Elbe proved impossible after the destruction of three legions 
in the Battle of the Teutoburg forest in 9 AD. on the other hand 
the conquest of most of Britain was achieved following Claudius’s 
invasion in 43 AD. Frontier adjustments were evidently the result 
of nice judgements of military and economic advantage. There 
was no point in acquiring territory if it cost more to hold than 
the revenue it generated. Such adjustments included lowland 
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Scotland, occupied under Antoninus Pius for twenty years be-
tween 142 AD and 162 AD and the contested area between the 
Rhine and the Danube, which formed the mature continental 
European frontier of the empire.
An interesting (earlier) example of the unstable military– 
economic equilibrium of the Roman Empire in its high tide of the 
first century is the fate of Agricola’s attempt to conquer Scotland 
in 80 AD. A legionary fortress at Inchtuthill was established in 
Perthshire to dominate the glens to the north. But because of 
a crisis in Moesia caused by an invasion by the Dacians, one of 
the legions occupying Britain (Leg II Audiatrix) had to be with-
drawn (86 AD). The result was that the ambitious plan to subdue 
Scotland had to be abandoned and the fortress was demolished. 
The significance of this story is that the military and economic 
resources of the Roman Empire were limited and even in its hey-
day it was unable to both subdue Scotland and manage a crisis 
in Eastern Europe at the same time. Even at the best of times, 
the existence of the Roman Empire was somewhat precarious 
(Ward-Perkins 2005).
This unstable equilibrium helps explain the early Roman 
Empire’s steadily accelerating inflation. Taxation was often high 
and random in its effects. The economic historian Rostovtzeff re-
cords the devastation caused to a province when a Roman army 
passed through it even when the empire was at its most secure 
(and aggressive) under Trajan (Rostovtzeff 1957: 355ff). With 
limited resources available to meet each crisis, the easiest course 
was to finance the necessary additional spending by currency 
depreciation. Coinage was issued with a lower precious metal 
content with the same nominal value (see Figure 4).
But why did the depreciation of the currency increase so 
rapidly? According to Professor Peter Heath (2006), two devel-
opments led to increased military and economic stress and, it 
would appear, to inflation. The first development was an agricul-
tural revolution among the German tribes beyond the European 
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frontiers of the empire. This had a profound effect on their mil-
itary capacity – and hence their ability to threaten the Roman 
provinces.
The second development was the creation of a Persian super-
power in the third century on the eastern frontier of the Roman 
Empire. From around 230 AD the Sassanian dynasty formed Per-
sia into a military superpower to rival the Roman Empire. In com-
bination these developments posed threats to which the Roman 
Empire had no answer. The result was stretched resources and a 
gradually increasing use of currency depreciation to finance the 
necessary military spending.
A third development contributing to the stress on the econ-
omy of the Roman Empire was the ‘Crisis of the Third Century’ 
when, between 235 and 284 AD, emperor succeeded emperor in a 
series of usurpations. Between 258 and 274 AD, the empire split 
into three parts: Gaul, Britain and Spain forming one state; Syria, 
Palestine and Egypt forming another; the rest formed a rump 
state. The empire was only reunited by Aurelian in 274 AD. These 
tensions created a background of economic chaos, which led to 
the inflation illustrated in Figure 4.
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Diocletian’s price controls
Diocletian’s famous edict of 301 AD was designed to contain in-
flation and reinforce the effect of a re-coinage. The full text of the 
edict has not been found. But enough is known to reveal the fol-
lowing. The death penalty was imposed for breaches of the con-
trols and maximum prices were fixed for over 1,000 items. These 
included food, clothing, weekly wages and the price of transport 
by sea. There were reports of merchants withdrawing goods from 
sale. Diocletian combined his price controls with a reform of the 
currency. He established a new gold and silver coinage but con-
tinued to increase the copper coinage. The result was that the 
reduction in inflation was minimal.
The ancient world had no understanding of economic theory 
beyond the everyday understanding that good harvests meant 
low prices of foodstuffs. The Greeks and Romans also had no 
understanding of the concept of an economy – the aggregation 
and analysis of economic activity in a particular geographical 
area. As Finley explains, it is impossible to translate the title of 
Alfred Marshall’s book The Principles of Economics into Latin or 
Greek (Finley 1973: 21). This was not an intellectual failing but a 
conceptual one. The necessary concepts only emerged, as Finley 
points out, in the mid 18th century. It should thus be no surprise 
that the inflation and Diocletian’s Edict were seen as the result of 
the unchecked greed of merchants. Since there was no economic 
theory, there could be no economic explanation. Diocletian’s 
fury is an example of the natural reaction of people untainted by 
theory and faced with untoward economic events.
The Weimar Inflation
What could be more different from the fall of the Western Roman 
Empire than the hyperinflation that beset Germany after World 
War I? There are, though, underlying similarities. The Weimar 
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inflation was the result of the German government calling on re-
sources which it could not acquire through taxation. one serious 
difficulty was that the German Empire had a tripartite system of 
national, state and municipal taxation, which made it difficult to 
increase taxes easily (Bresciani-Turroni 1968: 48).
Putting the Weimar Inflation in historical context, the Ger-
man Empire had been far less successful than the allied powers 
in financing its huge war expenditures by taxation and genuine 
debt rather than money creation. Thus by 1919 only 12.5 per cent 
of total war expenditure had been met by taxation. No less than 
26 per cent had been met by increases in short-term debt that 
had to be continually refinanced (Bresciani-Turroni 1968: 47). It 
was calculated that, between 1914 and 1923, only 15 per cent of 
government spending, which had been much increased by the 
war, had been financed by taxation (Bresciani-Turroni 1968: 74).
After the war, the government of the new republic was unable 
to carry out the fiscal retrenchment that the victorious powers 
were able to achieve. The position was complicated by a number 
of other factors. First Germany had lost territory and population, 
for example, Alsace and Lorraine to France and large territories 
in the east to the new state of Poland. As a result the tax base was 
reduced. Further, the 1919 Versailles peace imposed large repara-
tions, which had to be met by the German government.
But the occupation of the Rhineland in early 1923 complete-
ly destroyed Germany’s fiscal stability. The government made 
no attempt to raise taxes to meet the deficiency and relied on 
money creation to meet the costs of the passive resistance to the 
occupation. The German government lost revenues from coal, 
foreign trade duties and railway receipts. In addition spending 
on subsidies to the Ruhr industries increased. The result was 
hyperinflation (see Figure 5).
Throughout the whole inflationary period beginning in 1914, 
the German government had sought to mitigate inflation by price 
controls. These included controls on the price of bread, rents and 
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railway rates. And these were combined with subsidies. Thus, at 
the end of 1922 just before the hyperinflation entered its extreme 
phase, rents amounted to only 0.4 per cent of (three- person) 
family incomes (Bresciani-Turroni 1968: 132ff). Indeed railway 
travel became so 
cheap that it was 
one of the very few 
luxuries which Ger-
man people could 
enjoy at the worst of 
times (Guttman and 
Meehan 1975).
At the time, Ger-
man economics was 
heavily influenced by 
the German institu-
tional school, which 
ascribed little signif-
icance to the money 
supply and consid-
ered inflation an ‘his-
torical process’. Many, 
if not most, contem-
porary explanations 
of the inflation centred on the weakness of the exchange rate, which 
it was argued was caused by reparations and the resulting balance 
of payments deficit.
The Nazi Inflation
The dystopian Nazi state had the elements of other inflations and 
control regimes in such extreme form that they illustrate the syn-
drome with great clarity. Driven by a bizarre ideology wielded 
by a charismatic personality, the Nazi state sought to achieve a 
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dominant position in Europe and the world from a position of 
perceived (and actual) weakness. Germany’s economic weakness 
was such that, at every step, Hitler’s career in office was beset 
by incipient economic crises (Tooze 2007). Thus, following the 
Munich triumph of 1938, the German economy was at a crisis 
point with threatening inflation and balance-of-payments crises.
The cause of Germany’s economic problems was the rearma-
ment programme, which meant that the state was seeking more 
resources than were available to it. This could not be achieved 
even with high rates of taxation – Germany was already one of 
the most highly taxed countries in Europe. Further, private con-
sumption was cut to the bone. Private mortgages were forbidden 
from the autumn of 1938; state house building ceased at the 
same time (Tooze 2007: 258).
Driven by geopolitical fantasies, Hitler’s regime sought to over-
take its adversaries by an accelerated rearmament programme 
so that it could launch a war before they caught up. The result 
was a series of increasingly risky ventures and crises in which 
successive new armament programmes were launched. Recent 
research has emphasised that the German economy was weak. 
Indeed, one of the perverted motives of the Nazi regime was to 
improve Germany’s economic position by military conquest. But, 
despite some military success, the acquisition of armaments, 
railway rolling stock and gold reserves, the improvement in Ger-
many’s economic position was never as great as was expected. 
As late as 1944, 47 per cent of Germany’s artillery was of foreign 
origin, mostly captured from the French, but, in economic terms, 
the conquests were not as productive as might have been hoped 
(Tooze 2007: 385). The difficulty was that the wealth of France 
and Belgium, for example, depended on foreign trade and once 
cut off from world markets they were impoverished ( Mazower 
2009: 260). Again Nazi Germany was always short of oil and 
sought by attempting to conquer the Caucasus to exploit the oil 
fields around Baku.
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one consequence of the enormous demands made on the 
German economy during the war was the gradual collapse of the 
price system and a move to the physical control of resources. The 
inevitable result at the end of the war was the collapse of the cur-
rency. Thus by 1944 inflation was accelerating in Germany and 
the occupied territories. And at the same time Nazi bureaucrats 
were troubled that further pressure on resources would lead to 
a breakdown of the price system. A memorandum with the om-
inous title, ‘Purchasing Power, Prices and War Finance’, from a 
German planning agency concluded: ‘The German economy is 
threatening to fall into anarchy, against which even an extended 
and improved system of economic controls will struggle in vain’ 
(Tooze 2007: 642).
In an interview after the war with the war correspondent 
Henry Taylor, Herman Goering declared that experience during 
the war had confirmed that price controls were unworkable and 
urged America not to follow Germany’s example (DiLorenzo 
2005). It scarcely needs to be added that the Nazi regime used 
draconian measures to ensure compliance.
The British Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s
Much of post-war British economic history until 1980 was 
marked by accelerating inflation and increasing unemployment. 
The solution that gained support from politicians, economists 
and informed opinion was an ‘incomes policy’ to use the jargon 
of the time. The idea was that prices were the result of ‘cost-push’. 
In other words, increases in wages were the cause of subsequent 
inflation. But this analysis is based on a simple mistake. Costs do 
not determine the prices of consumption goods; rather it is the 
value attributed to a consumption good that determines its price. 
In other words, the amount the consumer is prepared to pay for 
a particular good determines whether the producer can afford 
the resources of all kinds needed to produce the good in question.
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There was another more sophisticated rationalisation of 
incomes policies. It was argued that the role of incomes policy 
or ‘wage restraint’ was to prevent trade union power from 
increasing unemployment and hence reducing the need for 
stimulus to mitigate the unemployment caused. The idea that 
the government should legislate to reduce the wage-fixing, un-
employment-causing trade union monopoly power was deemed 








Feb 48–Oct 50 Cripps–TUC Labour Voluntary None
July 61–Mar 62 Selwyn Lloyd pay pause Conservative Voluntary None




Dec 64–July 66 Statement of Intent Labour Voluntary
National Board 
for Prices and 
Incomes (NBPI)
July 66–Dec 66 Freeze Labour Statutory NPBI
Jan 67–June 67 Severe Restraint Labour Statutory NPBI
June 67–Apr 68 Relaxation Labour Statutory NBPI
Apr 68–June 70 Jenkins Renewed Restraint Labour Statutory NPBI
Nov 70–Jan 73 Stage I Freeze Conservative Statutory
Feb 73–Oct 73















Mar 74–June 74 Social Contract Labour Voluntary
Aug 75–Jul 76 £6 pay rise limit Labour Compulsory (not statutory) None
Aug 76–Jul 77 4.5% pay rise limit Labour
Compulsory 
(not statutory None
Source: Brittan and Lilley (1977: 154).
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politically impossible. The period, it will be remembered, was 
when Rab Butler’s view that politics was the ‘art of the possible’ 
reigned. And politicians took a very cautious view of what was 
‘possible’.
In their study of British ‘incomes policies’ Samuel Brittan and 
Peter Lilley (Brittan and Lilley 1977) explain that, while Britain 
may have had limited economic success in the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s, it produced more different attempts to contain inflation by 
the control of incomes than any other country. Table 1 lists the 14 
different incomes polices between 1948 and 1977.
As the table shows there was a succession of policies, com-
missions, agreements, hectoring, and moral suasion. Elderly con-
noisseurs of the period may remember ‘The Guiding Light’, the 
‘Three Wise Men’, the ‘Social Contract’, the ‘Pay Pause’ and other 
compulsory or voluntary efforts to restrain wages.
But did the succession of incomes policies have any success? 
Figure 6 shows the steady rise of both inflation and unem-
ployment and the failure of all wage and price ceilings. They 
prevented neither the rise in inflation nor a steady increase in 
unemployment.























































F L AW S A N D C E I L I NGS PR IC E C E I L I NGS: A NC I E N T A N D MoDE R N
40
What unites these attempts to mitigate inflation 
with controls?
What do these four episodes of inflation, which provoked gov-
ernments to attempt to mitigate the effects by wage and price 
controls, have in common? They cover nearly two millennia, 
spanning widely different times, political circumstances, civi-
lisations and economic understanding. As we have seen, in the 
ancient world there was no understanding of economics as it 
is understood today. This had to wait until the Enlightenment 
and the development of economic theory in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. The Weimar and Nazi experiences with inflation can 
be seen as the direct effect of catastrophic loss of the tax base 
and in the Nazi response to imaginary strategic threats. The 
great Roman currency depreciation, which culminated in the 
Diocletian price controls, was the result of strategic threats that 
the Roman Empire did not have the resources to meet. Can the 
British multi-decade experience of accelerating inflation and 
income policies have the same explanation as the other historic 
inflations that we have reviewed above?
Despite the substantial differences, the Roman and Weimar 
experiences have very similar causes. Governments were seeking 
to acquire more resources than they could easily obtain through 
taxation. But this account appears not to explain the British 
inflation of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s when there was no signif-
icant stress on British governments leading them to seek more 
resources from the economy than were available from taxation. 
The explanation here is a little different. It was believed that 
unemployment could be kept lower by a high level of aggregate 
demand. In other words, successive governments tried to keep 
unemployment low by artificial means – they tried to bring in 
to the economy more resources than was feasible, just as hap-
pened in the earlier periods in a somewhat different context. The 
British multi-decade experiment with wage and price controls 
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was driven by mistaken economic theory. It was believed that, 
without burgeoning aggregate demand, high unemployment at 
an intolerable level would emerge. The result was as if Britain had 
lost a large proportion of its tax base or was under severe and 
immediate military threat requiring massive military spending. 
Unfortunately, workers soon began to bargain in terms of real 
rather than nominal wages and the ability of increased monetary 
demand to reduce unemployment even temporarily was steadily 
eroded. The British experience is different because the stress put 
upon the economy was self-imposed.
The key to explaining all these examples of currency depre-
ciation or inflation is that governments maintain demand for 
resources that are greater than those that are, in fact, available 
to them. Sometimes the temptation to do this is very great and 
perhaps even the only practicable option is to inflate. But such 
circumstances will be very rare – the immediate prospect of in-
vasion might be an example. Furthermore, price controls cannot 
be an effective way of dealing with the problems caused by rising 
prices.
Wage and price controls are ineffective
The most obvious conclusion from the analysis of these different 
experiences with inflation is that price controls and their little 
brother, wage controls or ‘restraint’, were unsuccessful. Despite 
the severest of threats, and it is hard to imagine anything more 
severe than treatment meted out by the Gestapo, there was no 
escape from inflation except by monetary continence. In each 
case, except for the British case, price and wage controls did not 
stop the abandonment of the currency and its replacement. As 
we saw, there was some evidence that price controls could for a 
time slow the pace of inflation but they could never bring it to 
an end. They also produced alarming and damaging side-effects, 
which are outlined below.
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It is interesting to speculate on the cause and structure of 
the controls. If, as we have argued, inflation and currency de-
preciation is the result of excessive pressure by governments on 
available resources, then inflation is just a convenient tax that is 
cheap to impose. Its other advantage is that it is a tax that can be 
raised rapidly without interference from the legislature, if such 
exists. However, it is a crude tax, which is regressive: there are no 
tax exemptions for those on low incomes. It follows that one of 
the aims of price controls can be to mitigate the regressive char-
acter of the inflation tax. Thus price controls are usually focused 
on necessities such as food, rents and fuel. This can be seen in the 
disparate inflations of Rome and Weimar.
Price controls can also be seen as a reversion to a primitive 
face-to-face morality, which is inappropriate in the extended 
order of an abstract society. Thus Diocletian was wrong to as-
cribe the inflation of the 290s to the greed of merchants rather 
than the expansion of the money supply. But, as we have seen, 
without any concept of an economy and, consequently, without 
economic theory, it was very difficult for him to do otherwise.
Repressed inflation and price distortion
As we have seen, the most obvious effect of inflation is that it 
operates as a proportionate tax on all incomes, not just those of 
the better off. This prompts governments to seek to treat these 
symptoms with controls on the prices of necessities. one of the 
most damaging effects of sustained inflation is the need for 
re-pricing. Businessmen and consumers are forced continual-
ly to re-price their goods and services to adjust their business 
plans to each new monetary disturbance. Inflation forces par-
ticipants to spend resources on price discovery and price ad-
justment which otherwise would be unnecessary, thus adding 
‘static’ to the system, to use George Selgin’s term (Selgin 1997: 
33).
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But the attempt by governments to suppress the effects of in-
flation is even more destructive. Prices play an important role in 
revealing where resources are needed most and least and in indi-
cating to participants how to shift resources from one use to an-
other. Price controls weaken this mechanism and hence result in 
inefficiencies, which are often extreme. one of the consequences 
is that price controls can produce shortages. Prices enforced at 
an unprofitable rate cause businessmen to withdraw goods from 
the market. In turn this leads to barter and transactions in the 
black market and the loss of the advantages of money.
Even if price controls are all-embracing and are aggressively 
enforced, prices cease to function and individuals are reduced 
to barter and governments turn to expropriation as they can ac-
quire the resources in no other way. Thus both before and after 
Diocletian’s experiment with price controls, the Roman admin-
istration expropriated resources and paid its soldiers in kind. 
Similarly, in the final years of the Nazi regime, physical controls 
of resources were used as the basis of the planning system.
one consequence of effective all-embracing price controls is 
that goods are withdrawn from the market and people have noth-
ing on which to spend their money. Cash balances accumulate until 
the controls are removed when they are immediately exchanged for 
physical property. The result is that the currency in question imme-
diately and dramatically falls in value and rapidly becomes useless.
Conclusion
Price and wage controls have been tried in a number of radically 
different economies and eras. The context has been currency de-
preciation or inflation and the consequences have been depress-
ingly similar. Inflation may sometimes have been interrupted 
temporarily but it has never been eliminated or contained by 
such means. Inflation or currency depreciation tend to lead to 
price controls which are intended variously to mitigate some of 
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the regressive character of the inflation tax and to contain in-
flation itself. Controls are often the result of a reversion to the 
‘ethics of small groups’ where someone’s economic gain is always 
seen as someone else’s loss. Hence the discomfort of those ill- 
affected by inflation is supposed to be the result of the actions of 
merchants, property owners and others who gain. The obvious 
solution, it appears, is to restrain the actions of the merchants 
and property owners. But this approach is flawed as it is based 
on a mistaken understanding of the mechanism of inflation. Not 
surprisingly, the approach also fails, except for short periods, to 
mitigate inflation or its ill side effects.
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4 THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF WAGE FLOORS
W. S. Siebert
My daughter’s ambition is to get a job in an office. She has 
Down’s syndrome. She thinks that, if she works hard, someone, 
somewhere will give her a job. At £6.50 per hour, it’s never going 
to happen. But at £2 per hour? Maybe.
Letter from Candice Baxter to 
the Daily Telegraph, 17 october 2014 
There is now no sizeable lobby in the UK campaigning for the 
abolition of the minimum wage…. In a poll of experts by the In-
stitute for Government the minimum wage was voted the most 
successful UK government policy of the past 30 years, ahead of 
the Northern Ireland peace process.
Manning (2013: 65)
Introduction
A wage floor such as the minimum wage makes payment of low 
wages illegal. Such a floor clearly tends to reduce unskilled job 
opportunities, yet it is only one example of floors under work-
ing conditions placed by regulation. other floors on terms and 
conditions of employment relate to requirements for protection 
against unfair dismissal, or discrimination and the provision of 
THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS 
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pensions through ‘auto enrolment’. Moreover, we must remember 
that high welfare benefits also place a type of floor under wages, 
since for many it is not worth working for a wage lower than the 
welfare payments they could receive. The adverse effects of these 
floors can compound each other, particularly in a high tax en-
vironment, as we will show. High floors can also be imposed by 
union power, especially via extended collective agreements as in 
France.
The minimum wage from the beginning has been justified 
by the Low Pay Commission (2000: 18) as a means of achieving 
‘equity in the workplace’. But, in most private sector businesses, 
equity is already achieved, in the sense that wages approximate 
the revenue product of the marginal worker. Private sector com-
petition drives this result though the public sector of course does 
not fit into this model so easily. If low wages are made illegal, 
then what happens is that the least productive workers cannot 
be employed. This result is demonstrated most clearly in the case 
of disabled workers, as shown in our opening quotation above. 
As Candice Baxter points out in her letter, her daughter could 
gain employment at £2 per hour, but certainly not at £6.50. one’s 
heart goes out to her. The celebrations of the politicians in the 
Institute for Government, shown in our second quotation from 
Professor Manning, are premature.
Wage floors and other regulations of working conditions 
grow together with centralised government and are a part of 
the EU dirigiste tradition. The 1989 EU Charter on Fundamen-
tal Social Rights of Workers marks a watershed (see Addison 
and Siebert 1994), and has subsequently become the Social 
Chapter of the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and the 1997 Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The Social Chapter sets floors to most aspects 
of employment conditions, including ‘fair remuneration’, 
working hours, freedom of association/unionisation, training, 
equal treatment for men and women (and others), compulso-
ry worker consultative councils, and health and safety. In EU 
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terms (Commission 2006:  5) ‘the purpose of labour law is to 
offset the inherent economic and social inequality within the 
employment relationship’. In other words, decent wages and 
conditions are due to the efforts of politicians. Thus, the role of 
free markets and freedom of movement in defending the under-
privileged is misunderstood.
Setting minimum wages is easy, but this deals with the 
symptoms of low pay and not the causes. The political payoff 
from minimum wage laws is immediate: the dispersion of 
wages is reduced and, since more women are low paid, so is the 
difference between male and female average pay (another mis-
leading statistic). Yet nothing is done about the real problems 
in the labour market and the education system (see Kristian 
Niemietz 2012). The low level of skills acquired by children from 
our many single-parent families is ignored, as is the workless-
ness among these families.1 As for really disadvantaged groups 
such as the disabled, the minimum wage may do much harm. 
opportunities may also be reduced for students who may be 
prevented from taking low-paid internships (and may have to 
volunteer instead), and for those whose main work is in the 
home but who would like to obtain some work to supplement 
household income or to obtain the benefits of socialising in 
the workplace. The best that can be said of the minimum wage 
policy is that it is irrelevant to real problems of inequality and 
worklessness. More likely, it is part of a package combined with 
other floors on working conditions which make matters worse 
– as exemplified by Greece.
This chapter begins by considering the research into the UK’s 
national minimum wage, which is difficult given the lack of 
1 26% of dependent children aged 0–18 live in single-parent families in the UK, which 
is almost twice as high as in France and Germany. The proportion of children being 
brought up in jobless families is consequently also high, around 20% (see oECD 
2011a, Tables 1.1 and LMF1.1A), which reduces these children’s education and em-
ployment prospects.
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regional variation and the confounding effects of high levels of 
welfare payments. Then we will look at the evidence from Canada 
and the US, where variation in the minimum across both coun-
tries gives a more suitable design for minimum wage evaluation. 
We will also discuss the interesting case of South Africa, where 
minimum wages were, for a time, used as a weapon in the strug-
gle for white supremacy. We will also discuss results from oECD 
country panels, which arguably give the best design for mini-
mum wage evaluation. Finally, we will extend the discussion to 
consider effects of minimum wages set by collective agreement: 
such minima are more detailed and intrusive, as shown by the 
study by Martins (2014) of the ‘30,000 minimum wages’ set by 
collective agreements in Portugal.
UK evidence on employment effects
The UK is the worst place conceivable to test for minimum wage 
employment effects. Changes in the minimum have been quite 
small, they are country-wide (so there is no clear counterfactual), 
and they are carefully tailored to the unemployment situation so 
as not to exacerbate unemployment unduly (the economists on 
the Low Pay Commission are apolitical and well aware of negative 
employment effects). Compounding the problem is the changing 
welfare system, which also affects employment. We should re-
member that, in 1999, at the same time as the minimum wage 
was implemented, the government introduced Working Family 
Tax Credits, which were designed to encourage work and which 
would obviously tend to counteract minimum wage effects in 
the opposite direction. However, the UK research does need to 
be considered, if only to show that we need to be careful before 
concluding (see, for example, Leonard et al. 2014) from small 
measured UK minimum wage effects that conventional labour 
market models do not work.
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 Minimum wage floor
The minimum wage and the welfare floor
The confounding effect of movements in welfare entitlements is 
shown in Figure 7. Here simple demand (D) and supply (S) curves 
are drawn for the unskilled labour market. If a minimum wage is 
imposed, equilibrium moves from point E to point A. However, if 
welfare benefits are brought in, or raised above the minimum, then 
employment falls further, to point B. If welfare benefits are pre-ex-
isting, then the impact of the minimum wage on employment will 
be muted. The diagram is a simplification, because apprentices 
and trainees will continue working for less than welfare benefits, 
as we discuss later. Also, welfare benefits – certainly in the UK2 – 
may vary with income from employment so that people receive 
some benefits even if they are earning a wage below the welfare 
floor. But the tendency remains – there is an interaction between 
the welfare system and the effects of minimum wages. Moreover, 
2 The Working Tax Credit is effectively a job subsidy and is conditional upon work, 
though the much bigger Child Tax Credit provides an effective welfare floor.
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if welfare benefits are reduced or reformed in other ways, employ-
ment will increase, confusing minimum wage effects.
Table 2 shows welfare trends, including the housing assistance 
component. Unfortunately, this series on net replacement rates is 
not available prior to 2001; however, we can analyse most of the 
period since the introduction of the minimum wage. As can be 
seen, replacement rates have declined in France and Germany 
(the Hartz reforms), increased for single people in the US, and in-
creased for families but not for single people in the UK. In fact, the 
UK’s family replacement rates are now among the most generous 
in the oECD (Niemietz 2012: 46). However, some of the welfare is 
contingent on working at least 16 hours, and so encourages some 
work. In fact, Gregg et al. (2012: 22) estimate that employment of 
single women rose by 4 per cent when tax credits were introduced: 
this worked against minimum wage effects on employment.
Payment below the minimum
Figure 8 demonstrates two important points about the progress 
of wages after the minimum was introduced. We see that a 
Table 2 Net benefit replacement rates as a per cent of income from 
work over 60 months unemployment

















2001 60.3 70.3 59.6 73.5 15.2 43.0 55.0 64.9




–6.7 –7.1 –9.7 –3.0 09.6 –0.2 –4.0 07.5
Source: OECD Benefits and Wages Statistics. http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesstatistics.
htm (accessed 10 March 2015).
Notes: Replacement rates are calculated based on incomes after any tax and social security 
contributions have been deducted, and any cash benefits received. It is assumed that the family 
qualifies for cash housing assistance and social assistance ‘top ups’. The figures give unweighted 
averages relative to full-time earnings levels of 67 per cent and 100 per cent of mean worker 
earnings.
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Figure 8 Effects of the minimum wage on earnings: 1998 and 1999 
compared
















































































substantial number of people were freely working for low wages 
in 1998 prior to the implementation of the minimum. About 6 
per cent of the workforce is in that lower tail which grades slowly 
down to zero, reflecting the alternatives and productivity levels 
of the individuals concerned. Here Mrs Baxter’s daughter would 
have found her job.
Secondly, we see that, even after the minimum was introduced, 
many wish to be paid below it. Low pay is a continuing phenome-
non, with currently about 200,000 adults (21 and over, i.e. 1 per cent 
of the adult workforce) paid below the minimum (LPC 2014: 133). 
In fact, the real total is probably double this figure (Kay 2010: 35) 
when we add the large number of under 21s. Much of this non-com-
pliance occurs with apprentices, who are quite happy to receive 
low wages while training, as do students in general. In fact, about 
70 per cent of 18–20-year-old hairdressing apprentices (LPC 2014: 
134) currently refuse to accept the minimum wage, for which of 
course the Low Pay Commission and trade unions wrongly blame 
the employer. A further group comprises unpaid interns and vol-
unteers, who do not enter wage distributions like Figure 7 at all, 
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but whom the Commission sees as unfairly avoiding its system. 
The important point is that many people see it worthwhile to work 
for low or no wages. This is particularly so for students and people 
training in order to raise their future wages.3
Adverse employment effects
A good study of adverse employment effects is provided by Dick-
ens et al. (2012), who focus on part-time women where cover-
age by the minimum is about 10 per cent, twice as high as for 
full-timers (LPC 2014, Fig. 2.1). They establish a counterfactual by 
comparing part-timers whose wages are raised by the minimum 
to those paid just above that level (10 per cent above). This com-
parison group will have similar skills and welfare benefit options. 
They find that the introduction of the minimum in 1999 caused 
the year-on-year probability of part-time women retaining a job 
to fall from around 0.70 to 0.65. Another way of putting this find-
ing is that before the minimum wage, median job duration was 
about 1.9 years for part-time women earning around the mini-
mum, falling to 1.7 years after the minimum wage, that is, a fall of 
around 10 per cent. They do not find employment effects caused 
by the up-ratings since 1999 as they have been too small to have 
much effect. For example, the recent up-rating from £6.31 to 
£6.50 gives a maximum uplift of 1.5 per cent to about 5 per cent 
of the workforce. As well as being small relative to welfare benefit 
changes, minimum wage increases have been lower in times of 
recession. overall, this means that it is difficult to detect effects 
of changes in the minimum wage, but this result does not mean 
that higher increases in the future will be harmless.
3 See Gorry (2013: 72) for a good paper on how the minimum wage obstructs training: 
‘Inexperienced workers are unable to pay for their training through reductions in 
their wages. To gain experience, they must maintain employment in a segment of 
the labour market characterized by high job separation rates’ – their probability of 
unemployment consequently rises.
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While minimum wage increases so far have been small, a 
further piece of research by Riley (2013) brings out the negative 
effects of the altogether larger change that the introduction of a 
minimum wage equal to the ‘living wage’ could have (see also 
Siebert 2014). Currently, the ‘living wage’ is calculated to be £7.65 
outside London, and £8.80 in London (Living Wage ‘Commission’ 
2014). Such a change would mean wage increases for about 25 per 
cent of the workforce, and raise labour costs of young unskilled 
(non-university) workers by as much as 14 per cent in sectors 
such as hotels and catering and retailing. Riley shows not only 
that the demand elasticity for labour is negative, but also that 
cross-price elasticities are generally positive, precisely in accord-
ance with conventional economic theory. In other words, when 
the wage of young inexperienced and unskilled people rises, 
their employment falls and the employment of substitutes such 
as educated workers and older workers increases. Thus, 300,000 
young unskilled workers would lose their jobs, but some skilled 
and older workers would gain employment, with the overall 
loss of jobs reduced to 160,000. Increasing the minimum wage 
to the living wage would therefore enable older, better educated 
workers to gain at the expense of unskilled youth, as happens in 
France, but of course with serious long-term consequences for 
those trapped outside the labour market.
Britain’s unskilled youth
The current dark situation for Britain’s unskilled youth is shown 
in Tables 3 and 4, covering the period since the minimum wage 
began. Table 3 shows that labour force participation has declined 
for all the disadvantaged groups except the disabled (whose par-
ticipation remains low). Admittedly, it appears that our youth 
participation rate is better than that in France. However, the 
UK lags France on another measure, which is shown in Table 4, 
the percentage of 15–19-year-olds in the NEET (not in education, 
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employment and training) group. Here we see that the UK’s 
percentage has been growing and at 9.5 per cent is the worst of 
the five major economies shown, and worse than the oECD aver-
age. In summary, Tables 3 and 4 show that the inequality of life 
chances has been growing, despite the Low Pay Commission’s 
mission to reduce ‘inequity in the workplace’.
People who reject the orthodox explanation for the small UK 
minimum wage effects need an alternative. They bring forward 
the ideas of single buyer power (i.e. ‘monopsony’: see Manning 
2013) or of ‘efficiency wages’ (Leonard et al. 2014) to explain the 
perceived market failure. Ironically, these two theories have 
diametrically opposed views of what happens in free markets. 
The monopsony theory implies that wages are too low: firms 
operate with unfilled vacancies, because raising wages enough 
to eliminate the backlog would require pay increases for all. But 
Table 4 NEETs – country trends (% of 15–19-year-olds not in education, 
employment or training)
France Germany Italy US UK
OECD 
average
1997 2.9 –5.0 15.2 7.1 8.0 –9.2
2012 6.9 –3.0 12.0 7.7 9.5 –7.6
Change 
2012–1997 4.0 –2.0 –3.2 0.6 1.5 –1.6
Sources: OECD Education at a Glance (2014, Chart C5.3), and OECD Doing Better for Families (2011a, 
Figure 1.15).
Table 3 Adverse changes in employment for unskilled workers: labour 













2000 71.7 50.8 37.7 61.2 69.7 35.6
2013 71.6 42.6 42.1 47.0 61.7 37.6
Change 
2000–2013 –0.1 –8.2 04.4 –14.2 –8.0 02.0
Sources: Commission (2014, Table 2.11) and OECD Employment Outlook (2014).
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the efficiency wage theory implies that wages are, in a sense, ‘too 
high’: wages are above the market-clearing rate because paying 
well is a cheap way to help supervisors generate extra employee 
effort.
In fact neither theory fits well with the UK firm size structure, 
which is shown in Table 5. We see that the UK has 3.6 million 
enterprises which only employ the owner, and obviously have 
no monopsony power or difficulty with supervision. There are 
also 1.2 million enterprises which employ workers, but the vast 
majority of these (97 per cent) employ fewer than 50 workers, 
and again can have no monopsony power or supervision issues. 
In fact, it is only the 6,000 firms that employ more than 250 to 
which these theories might apply. However, these firms tend to 
Table 5 Firm size and employment, UK 2009





Enterprises without employees 3,620 0
Enterprises with employees 1,220 18.20
Enterprise sizes: 1–4 1,795 1.8
5–49 1, 390 4.6
50–249 1, 030 2.6
250–499 , 003 1.0
500 or more , 00 3 8.1
Central and local government , 00 5 5.4
Non-profit , 0084 1.9
Source: BIS, Enterprise Directorate (2010). https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
department-for-business-innovation-skills/about/statistics (accessed 10 March 2015).
Notes: An enterprise is the smallest group of legal units which has autonomy. It is based on the Inter-
departmental Business Register (IDBR) formed from VAT or PAYE records collected by HMRC. Since 
the VAT threshold (£67,000 in 2009) excludes small firms, estimates of their numbers are then added 
using Labour Force Survey figures of the numbers of self-employed (4.1m). Private households and 
temping agencies are excluded.
 There is no lower bound for inclusion as an enterprise, hence the smallest amount of enterprise 
activity counts – hence there are many ‘no employee’ enterprises which have only working proprietors 
in the business. ‘Employees’ have a contract of employment, and include part-timers. Working 
proprietors are self-employed (but working directors of companies are counted as employees).
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pay higher wages in any case and so the minimum wage is broad-
ly irrelevant for them. It is much more likely that unskilled and 
inexperienced workers lose from the minimum, and indeed their 
unemployment rises more than proportionately as the minimum 
rises, as shown in Gorry’s (2013) elegant model. Monopsony and 
efficiency wage theories would seem irrelevant.
International evidence on the minimum wage
It is fair to say that the UK evidence on the minimum wage does 
not find large employment effects. It does find some disturbing 
trends. However, the background to the UK’s minimum wage en-
sures that any statistical analysis is likely to lead to inconclusive 
results. For a more thorough analysis, we need to look at coun-
tries where there is variation of the minimum either for regions 
within a country (as in Canada or the US) or we need to look at the 
variation provided by cross-country panels. A country with low 
welfare payments (for example, the US) is also easier to analyse. 
Let us first consider Canadian and US results, and then examine 
South Africa, which starkly underlines how minimum wages can 
be misused by skilled workers to cut out unskilled competition.4
Canada
Canada provides some of the best conditions for research into the 
effects of minimum wages since the ten Canadian provinces have 
4 Another interesting country to consider could be France with its exceptionally 
high minimum (Gorry 2013). But France presents the same problems as the UK: 
lack of within-country variation, plus the confounders of high welfare payments 
and high taxes. China is also a possibility, with good variation provided by different 
minimum wages in different cities. Fang and Lin (2013) provide evidence of strong 
negative minimum wage effects using city data, which are better than the province 
data used by Wang and Gunderson (2012), who find inconclusive effects at least for 
Eastern China. However, it is too early to draw conclusions from China, since it is 
so large and heterogeneous with complications to the analysis caused by migrant 
labour and a large state-owned sector.
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different minimum wage policies, sometimes with considerable 
bite. Good time series data are also available. A convincing body 
of Canadian literature has thus built up, starting with Baker et 
al.’s (1999) study of nine provinces from 1975 to 1993. This study 
finds that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces 
teenage employment by 2.5 per cent and that it takes six years 
for the full effect to be revealed. Canadian data are also used in 
the recent study for 1997–2008 by Campolieti et al. (2014: 587), 
who find a short-run elasticity of –0.16 for the 15–24-year-old 
group. Importantly, they note that their method cannot capture 
long-run minimum wage effects (since they follow individuals 
for only six months); they recommend doubling this elasticity 
to derive the full picture in the long run. That would lead to a 
long-run elasticity of demand for labour of about –0.3, leading a 
10 per cent increase in the minimum wage to increase unemploy-
ment by about 3 per cent of the workforce among the affected 
group. A similar finding for teen employment is made by Sen et 
al. (2011). Interestingly, older workers’ employment appears to 
increase with minimum wage increases (Fang and Gunderson 
2009), suggesting they are substituted for less productive youths, 
as we have already seen for the UK. The minimum’s adverse effect 
using good data thus becomes clearer.
A possible reason for the clarity of the Canadian effect is 
that Canada’s minimum wage workers tend more to be in the 
tradeable goods exporting sectors. In this situation, the higher 
minimum wage undermines competitiveness and causes em-
ployment reduction. The position is different if minimum wage 
workers are concentrated in non-tradeable activities such as 
retailing or construction (as in the UK). In this case, a rise in 
the minimum wage simply ‘takes wages out of competition’ and 
this result can even be advantageous, especially for large firms 
(see Cox and oaxaca (1982) and, more recently, Neumark and 
Wascher (2008)). Costs go up, but the increase is faced by every-
one, and prices can increase to offset this given the absence of 
F L AW S A N D C E I L I NGS T H E SI M PL E ECoNoM IC S oF WAGE F L ooR S
58
overseas competition. This factor might account for the weaker 
disemployment results found in the US studies of the restau-
rant sector noted below (e.g. Addison et al. 2012). Magruder’s 
(2013) study of minimum wages in Indonesia emphasises the 
importance of whether the sectors mainly affected are in the 
tradeable or non-tradeable sectors.
The United States
Turning to research on the US, there is now much technical con-
troversy raised by the work of Allegretto et al. (2011) and Dube 
et al. (2010), well summarised in the recent work by Neumark et 
al. (2014). The key problem is how to specify control groups when 
policy changes. Still, Neumark et al.’s exhaustive analysis (2014: 
627) concludes that, when the time trends are correctly specified, 
the elasticity of teen employment to the minimum wage remains 
in or near the –0.1 to –0.2 range. In other words, an increase in 
the minimum of 10 per cent would reduce employment by 1–2 per 
cent. Elasticity of employment in the restaurant sector is lower, 
but still negative and significant at around –0.05 or –0.06 (2014: 
644). Thus the adverse effect remains.
We cannot leave US minimum wage research without men-
tioning the famous but weak Card and Krueger (1995) studies of 
the response of fast-food restaurant employment to increases in 
minimum wages. The best-known of these studies is the contrast 
of New Jersey with Pennsylvania, the latter having no increase in 
its minimum wage. This research is the basis for stating that the 
conventional economic view that minimum wages cause unem-
ployment is a ‘myth’. But the New Jersey versus Pennsylvania study 
is only based on four data points. The fact that there are many res-
taurants in the four samples (New Jersey before and after, and the 
control, Pennsylvania, before and after) does not help increase the 
power of the test since the same minimum wage regime applies 
in each. It is also worth noting again that the restaurant sector is 
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always likely to suffer less from a minimum wage because it is shel-
tered from international competition. The work is sold as ‘a power-
ful new challenge to the conventional view’, but this is misleading 
– it is a very specific challenge and a weak one at that.
South Africa
The evidence from South Africa shows what happens when min-
imum wages really go wrong. South Africa under white control, 
before 1994, had what it described as a ‘civilised labour policy’ 
aiming to favour white employment (Van der Horst 1942: 250; 
also Siebert 1986). A pillar of this policy was high minimum 
wages and extended collective agreements, which meant that 
only white workers, who were generally better educated than 
non-whites, could gain employment. Minimum wages were thus 
used as a weapon against the majority. The higher costs that 
resulted were not so much of a problem when it came to employ-
ment because tariff barriers prevented imports competing with 
domestic businesses. (However, the minimum combined with 
the trade regulation raised costs to consumers – including poor 
consumers.) The high minimum wage system continues to this 
day, with extended collective agreements in particular support-
ing a strongly unionised African labour elite (Schultz 1998). For 
example, a union worker in manufacturing receives 70 per cent 
more than a non-union worker (Schultz 1998: 700). The system has 
since been extended to agriculture and domestic service. In agri-
culture the increase in pay has been large at 17 per cent (Bhorat et 
al. 2012), and employment has contracted considerably, by 14 per 
cent. In domestic service, again protected from international 
competition, the effects might not have been so bad (Dinkelman 
2012; Hertz 2005), but only 25 per cent of households appear to 
comply. Thus, we see a policy originally designed to hurt African 
workers is now being carried forward by African politicians and 
unions themselves, and still hurting African workers.
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International studies
Finally, we will consider the evidence from international 
cross-country panels. This research design gives the most var-
iation in minimum wages and thus helps create more robust 
studies. Negative employment effects from minimum wages are 
clear in all the studies. Admittedly there are some difficulties of 
comparability. In particular, countries such as Germany, Italy, 
Denmark and Sweden have no national minimum wage as such, 
but use legally enforceable extended collective agreements. Still, 
such agreements are effective minima (see below). There is also 
the difficulty of allowing for widely different welfare regimes, 
and these studies typically use the oECD’s index of gross ben-
efit replacement rates, which leaves out housing benefit, which 
is important in the UK.5 However, it is hoped that the gross re-
placement rates capture the trends, and in any case the studies 
all control for country and time fixed effects.
Neumark and Wascher (2004) provide the first comprehensive 
treatment, analysing 17 oECD countries over the period 1975–
2000. Their main finding (2004: 243) is that the minimum wage 
elasticity of teenage (15–19) employment is significantly neg-
ative, in the –0.2 to –0.4 range. In other words, the implication 
is that an increase of 10 per cent in the minimum would cause 
a 2–4  per cent fall in employment in the affected group. More 
recently, there have been oECD-based international studies by 
Dolton and Bondibene (2012) of youth employment, and Addison 
and ozturk (2012) of female employment. Dolton and Bondibene 
(2012) also find a large negative effect of minimum wages on 
youth employment, with an elasticity of –0.3 to –0.4, most of this 
result coming in recession as might be expected. Addison and 
ozturk (2012, Table 4) find a negative effect for the adult female 
5 Hence in Addison and ozturk (2012, Table 2b) the replacement rate for the UK aver-
ages only 20 per cent, much lower than the actual 60 per cent shown in Table 2.
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employment-to-population rate, with an elasticity of –0.14 in the 
short run, and more in the long run when lagged effects are taken 
into account. Interestingly, there is an indication in this study 
(2012, Table 7) that the elasticity is larger (–0.34) in countries and 
time periods when employment protection law (EPL) is strict, as 
we would expect (see below). Thus, there is an unambiguous pic-
ture of strong negative minimum wage effects on lower-produc-
tivity groups in the international panel-based literature, which 
provides arguably the best foundation for research.
Collectively set minimum wages
Collectively set minimum wages arise when a collective agree-
ment is extended by law to third parties within an industry or 
sector. A detailed set of minimum wages (and conditions) cov-
ering many job types and levels is thereby established for the 
industry or sector. Martins (2014) shows how the process works 
in the case of Portugal. Such extensions are the result of so-called 
‘erga omnes’ (towards others) regulations, and have the aim of re-
ducing non-union, low-wage competition. They are common (see 
Murtin et al. 2014) in countries where the unions are politically 
powerful – for example, are part funded or privileged by the state 
as in Greece or France or South Africa – but where local union 
power is low (again, France and Greece).6 In these circumstances, 
unions have the power to bring about these regulations and also 
need to do so if they are to exercise their monopoly powers, since 
non-union firms are so prevalent. The picture is given in Table 6, 
where we see that France, Spain, Germany and Italy all have high 
use of extension arrangements. The important point is that erga 
6 The UK used to have an erga omnes arrangement for unions to petition for exten-
sion of their agreements, but Thatcher dismantled it (see Addison and Siebert 2000) 
with the 1980 Employment Act. The ‘fair wages resolution’ requiring government 
contractors to observe terms no less favourable than those obtaining under collec-
tive agreements was also dropped at this time.
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omnes regulations enable the setting of detailed minimum wage 
floors, floors that are determined by big business and labour in 
the capital cities – Athens, Rome, Paris – with little concern for 
conditions in the provinces. Hence, a net of various minimum 
wages is thrown over the country.
Research on this type of minimum wage setting builds on 
the literature of union power raising unemployment, which of 
course has long been controversial because a number of factors 
that influence unemployment can be correlated. Recent work is 
reported in the oECD’s (2011b: 152) study of inequality using the 
oECD panel of countries over 1984–2007. Here there is shown 
to be a well-determined negative effect of collective bargaining 
coverage on employment rates. High tax rates and employment 
protection legislation hurt too. The most recent work using the 
oECD panel is by Murtin et al. (2014) with a more extensive 
Table 6 Collectively set minimum wages, early 2000s
Canada Denmark France Germany Greece Italy Norway 
Coverage extension 04 00 79 48 30 46 15
Use of erga omnes 
clauses No No High High High High Some
Union density 31 75 09 28 30 34 56
Government 
revenue % GDP 40 55 50 45 38 47 57
Portugal South Africa Spain Sweden UK US
Coverage extension 49 10 57 01 09 04
Use of erga omnes 
clauses High Some High No No No
Union density 25 25 15 81 34 14
Government 
revenue % GDP 40 27 36 54 40 31
Sources: Murtins et al. (2014), Industriall Global Union (2014). http://www.industriall-europe.eu/
committees/CB/2014/Increasing%20cover%20rate-EN.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).; Visser (2013), 
Godfrey (2007), OECD Government at a Glance (2013, Table 3.11).
Notes: Coverage extension measured as collective agreement coverage minus percentage 
unionisation.
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model, this time of unemployment. Their main innovation is 
to use collective agreement coverage extension, as shown in 
Table 6, which they find interacts with taxes (also shown in 
Table 6 as government revenue) to raise unemployment. Their 
minimum wage variable also raises unemployment, again more 
so when taxes are high.
These interaction results can be explained with the aid of Fig-
ure 9. Again we have the conventional demand (D) and supply (S) 
curves for unskilled labour, and start with a no-tax equilibrium 
at E1. Now, assume a tax is imposed, so that the net demand curve 
for labour shifts inwards to D|net tax as shown. Without the min-
imum wage or collective agreement floor, the new equilibrium 
would be at E2 with a lower wage, and less employment (but no 
disequilibrium unemployment). However, if there is a wage floor, 
the wage cannot fall so much, and the employment fall to B is 
greater. At B there is also disequilibrium unemployment. There-
fore, according to this simple model, a rise in tax sweeps more 
into the minimum wage and extended collective agreement net, 
causing more unemployment; the empirical results support this 
theoretical observation.
F L AW S A N D C E I L I NGS T H E SI M PL E ECoNoM IC S oF WAGE F L ooR S
64
There are also instructive results from two country case stud-
ies of Portugal and Greece involving extended agreements. As 
can be seen from Table 6, both of these countries have used such 
agreements extensively, though they are now restricted by recent 
debt bailout agreements.7 Martins’s (2014) analysis of Portugal 
over 2007–11 links unemployment to extensions of agreements 
to non-parties, and shows that average employment levels in 
affected sectors drop by 2 per cent in the four months following 
extensions, as firms stop hiring and close down. Since the wage 
increase is 2–4 per cent, the implied elasticity is between –0.5 
and –1 (Martins 2014: 14). Peripheral employment of temporary 
workers and subcontractors meanwhile increases, as we would 
expect. This temporary worker result is the same as that for the 
Greek study (Anagnostopoulos and Siebert 2015), based on a 
survey of 200 provincial firms, which finds that low-paying firms 
near the minimum are more likely to employ temporary workers. 
The Greek study also shows that these effects persist even though 
many Greek firms do not in fact pay the minimum – they remain 
small so as to avoid the attention of the labour inspectorate. The 
minimum wage and extended collective agreements coupled 
with high taxes thus not only reduce employment, but push firms 
to be too small.8
7 In Greece, for example (see Commission (2014: 49) and LABREF database), the 
government in 2011 and 2012 agreed to reduce minimum pay rates by 22 per cent 
(32 per cent for young people). It also agreed to suspend extension of occupational 
and sector collective agreements, and to allow firm-level agreements which could 
be less favourable than the sector-level agreement. According to IndustriALL 
(2014), measures such as this caused Greek sector agreements to fall from 65 to 
14 in 2013, and in Portugal (Martins 2014), coverage fell from 1.8 million in 2008 to 
290,000 in 2012.
8 Thus in Greece and Portugal firms are too small, with over 95% employing fewer 
than 10 people, compared with an oECD average of about 85% (see oECD 2011c). 
Alternatively, if policing of the extended agreements is effective, as in South Africa, 
small firms can be prevented from growing enough (see Magruder 2012). The point 
is, regulation breeds regulation.
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Conclusions and thoughts on real help for 
the unskilled
Minimum wages do have adverse employment effects broadly in 
line with conventional economic models. UK studies generally 
find small effects, but the UK environment is poorly suited to 
measure such effects given the changes in welfare benefits and 
the lack of regional variation. Matters become clearer when we 
turn to more suitable empirical settings, which provide clear 
evidence of an adverse effect of minimum wages on employment.
Better ways to help the poor would involve raising skills or, 
in the shorter term before such policies took meaningful effect, 
the provision of some kind of employment subsidy through the 
welfare system. When it comes to raising skills, the family is cru-
cial, as is education. Encouragement of stable families and better, 
less unionised and more competitive school systems is difficult, 
but they are important policy priorities. High welfare simply 
makes these problems worse in the long term, as well described 
by Charles Murray (1984, 2012).
A quick and well-targeted way of helping the working poor 
is by subsidising low-paid work, a policy which contradicts the 
minimum wage. People have their earnings topped up by the 
taxpayer, and are therefore prepared to work for less, which ex-
pands their job opportunities. In fact, such a policy has been in 
place in the UK ever since 1999 when the Working Families Tax 
Credit was introduced (Azmat 2006), modelled on the US Earned 
Income Tax Credit (Hotz and Scholtz 2000), and since expanded 
with Working Tax Credit. Reforms to the system would be desir-
able, but the idea of not removing benefits entirely when people 
work in low-paid jobs is an important one. Tax credits condi-
tional on work currently encourage about 2.5 million workers 
into work (see Browne and Hood 2012), but they only account for 
about 5 per cent of the amount paid out to working-age welfare 
recipients, and are dwarfed in particular by child tax credits 
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and housing benefits. Reform of this whole system is needed (see 
Bourne and Shackleton 2014).
In conclusion, there is no need for analysts (e.g. Holmlund 
2014; Schmitt 2013) to worry about ‘discernible effects’ of min-
imum wages on employment. The effects are discernible, when 
properly measured. Hence it is indeed probable that the UK’s 
dismal youth labour market performance since 1999 is partly 
attributable to the imposition of the minimum wage interacting 
with high tax rates. This is also the case with the poorly func-
tioning youth labour markets of Portugal and Greece, and others 
such as France and South Africa. Moreover, the way in which 
more skilled workers displace the less skilled, and temporary 
workers displace permanent workers is in line with conventional 
economic models. obviously, in a political world which denies 
productivity differences – including skills, gender, age and disa-
bility differences9 – the differential effects of minimum wages are 
politically unwelcome This is all the more reason for economists 
to stick to their guns and look for real, not fake, ways to help the 
poor.
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5 THE FLAWS IN RENT CEILINGS
Ryan Bourne
Introduction
Rent controls refer to government restrictions on the amount a 
landlord can charge a tenant for accommodation. They are the 
best researched and understood form of price control in econom-
ics, though the type of controls implemented by governments has 
undergone various mutations over the past century (Arnott 1997; 
Jenkins 2009).
Simple controls on rents were implemented in many countries 
during and after periods of war in the 20th century to prevent 
alleged profiteering by landlords (Heath 2013). Unsurprisingly, 
they proved more difficult to abolish than to implement.
These ‘first-generation’ rent controls in effect create ‘rent ceil-
ings’ beyond which landlords are unable to increase rents. As 
such, they only create shortages of rental accommodation if they 
are set below the market-clearing rent level. A wide range of the-
oretical and empirical evidence suggests that in practice they did 
just that, with many other negative unintended consequences 
(Jenkins 2009).
over time, these crude controls were therefore abandoned. 
More recently ‘second-generation’ controls have been proposed. 
These are more complex, limiting increases in rent levels along-
side other forms of regulation of the landlord–tenant relationship 
(Arnott 1997). Such controls are often referred to using the more 
benign sounding phrase ‘rent regulation’. Though less damaging 
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than ‘first-generation’ rent controls, they still have harmful 
consequences.
The most recent manifestation of this type of regulation has 
been so-called ‘tenancy rent controls’. In the UK, these have 
recently been proposed by the Labour Party. Under this frame-
work, rent increases would be limited within tenancies but could 
adjust between tenancies. It is also proposed that the length of 
the tenancy will be fixed – in the UK case, at three years. While 
not having as devastating consequences as cruder rent controls, 




In a recent survey, 95 per cent of economists disagreed with 
the proposition that rent control had a positive impact on the 
amount and quality of broadly affordable rental housing.1 This is 
a rare consensus among academic economists. Lindbeck (1971) 
once went as far as saying: ‘In many cases rent control appears 
to be the most efficient technique presently known to destroy a 
city – except for bombing’.
A ceiling on rents below the market-clearing level leads to a 
fall in the quantity of rental property available and a reduction 
in the quality of the existing stock. Unlike in a competitive mar-
ket, rent controls negate the ability of the price mechanism to 
allocate supply given the level of demand – resulting in shortages 
when rent controls are binding (see Figure 3 in Chapter 2). Hold-
ing down rents both increases demand and decreases supply, 
thus creating a shortage.
1 IGM Economic Experts Panel. http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts 
-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_6upyzeUpI73V5k0 (accessed 10 March 2015).
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However, many have argued that a competitive market frame-
work is the wrong way to think about the private rental market 
(Dillow 2013). Instead it is suggested that landlords have a degree 
of market power given the very specific demands of tenants and 
strongly differentiated properties. This could mean that it is more 
accurate to think of the rented sector as having monopolistic 
tendencies (Arnott 1997). Rents would then be set above the mar-
ginal cost of supplying the property in a free market – creating a 
monopoly rent for the landlord. If landlords of rentable property 
believe that withholding supply would increase the price, then 
a well-designed rent control programme could actually increase 
the supply of rentable properties by removing the connection 
between the price achieved in the market and the amount of ac-
commodation supplied by the landlord.
Determining which framework is closer to the truth is ulti-
mately an empirical question. Academic work has suggested that 
some rental markets can be uncompetitive when viewed through 
the traditional prism of market concentration or examining the 
elasticity of supply of rentable accommodation. We might expect 
the supply of rentable accommodation to be more responsive to 
changes in price in a competitive market. But the fact that it is 
not may not be due to monopolistic market practice, but because 
of regulatory restrictions on land use reducing the housing sup-
ply more broadly (Saiz 2008; oECD 2011). Indeed, Malpezzi and 
Maclennan (2001) show that supply is much more elastic in the 
US relative to the UK. In the former, land-use planning is much 
less restrictive. To the extent that rental markets are uncompeti-
tive then, this is often down to policy-induced regulations.
Given this, it is difficult to see how rent controls would help. 
If the rents obtained by owners of an artificially constrained re-
source are due to regulation, then the owners might still be oper-
ating in a competitive environment in the sense they are unable 
to determine the market price. Even if land-use planning regu-
lations prevent building in general and keep rents and property 
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prices higher, capping increases in rents just provides landlords 
with an incentive to sell property that they otherwise might have 
let or convert properties so that their tenure type falls outside 
the rent control framework.
Furthermore, when reviewing the literature on first-generation 
rent control, Arnott (1997) concluded that the ‘cumulative evi-
dence – both quantitative and qualitative – strongly supports the 
predictions of the textbook [competitive] model’ and, it might be 
added, leads to a host of other negative unintended consequences. 
If rent controls bind, theory would tell us that landlords would have 
the option to react by cutting investment in the property market, 
shifting investment into areas where there are no rent controls or 
allowing properties to fall into disrepair. We would also expect 
that a sustained suppression of rents below market clearing levels 
would lead to a progressively deteriorating rental property market. 
This is exactly what economists have found.
Shortages of rental property
A clear example of the damage caused by rent control can be 
seen from Britain’s experience. Rent control was first introduced 
in Britain during wartime (1915). Far from being a temporary 
measure, however, rent controls in some form or another were 
maintained right through to 1989. In the 1920s landlords were 
depicted as ‘bloodsuckers, profiteers and despots’ (Kemp 2004) 
and, following slight relaxations, the Rent Act 1939 reintroduced 
full rent control to virtually all rented housing.
By the 1950s rents were fixed either by the 1915 or by the 1939 
acts, while tenants could not legally be required to leave. This left 
many landlords with little incentive to maintain their properties. 
Yet, for tenants, there was every incentive to remain in their prop-
erties given the cheap rents (even when their economic or family 
circumstances may have made it desirable for them to move on). 
This was a direct cause of the behaviour of the infamous landlord 
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Peter Rachman, who would use intimidation, noise and neglect 
of the upkeep of his accommodation in order to attempt to drive 
tenants out of properties he wished to sell (Bartholomew 2004). 
By incentivising tenants to leave, he could sell the property ‘with 
vacant possession’. Unsurprisingly, the amount of rentable ac-
commodation under rent control collapsed.
There were various small changes to the regulations in the 
post-war period. In 1965 the Rent Act introduced regulated 
tenancies (with long-term security of tenure) and ‘fair rents’ as-
sessed by independent officers for tenancies with non-resident 
landlords. These ‘fair rents’ were decided by rent officers based 
on the characteristics of the property. The officer had to explicit-
ly ignore the scarcity of comparable accommodation in the area 
and the personal characteristics of the tenants. The rent was not 
based on any economic or rate of return considerations and was 
very vulnerable to high inflation (Coleman 1988). This exacer-
bated shortages by keeping rents below market levels in areas 
where there was already high demand for property, perhaps be-
cause of binding land-use planning constraints.
The system was eventually deregulated in 1989. The private 
rented sector had collapsed from over three-quarters of the 
housing stock in 1918 to close to one-tenth by the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (Coleman 1988). This trend can be seen in Figure 10.
Though this is likely to have been in part due to rising incomes 
and the demand for owner occupation, the advantages in the tax 
system for mortgage-financed home ownership and the huge ex-
pansion of social housing after World War II, it is striking that, 
after deregulation in 1989, since when new private lettings have 
generally been somewhat deregulated, the private rented sector 
has rebounded. In 2013 it comprised 16.5 per cent of the housing 
stock.
Similar case studies of the negative effects of rent control on 
the quantity of controlled private rented accommodation have 
been found in Israel (Werczberger 1988) and Vienna (Hayek 1930). 
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Figure 10 Trends in tenure (proportion of total households)














































Friedman and Stigler (1946) perhaps outlined the clearest ex-
ample when examining San Francisco. In 1906 (when there was 
a free market in rents), they said, ‘the San Francisco Chronicle 
listed three “houses for sale” for every 10 “houses or apartments 
for rent”. In 1946, under rent control, about 730 “houses for sale” 
were listed for every 10 “houses or apartments for rent’’ ’.
While, theoretically, rent controls could lead to an increase 
in the supply of low-quality property for poor people, due to de-
terioration of higher-quality properties, most of the literature in 
this area agrees that rent controls reduce the incentive to build 
by holding down the potential profits from development – and, 
coupled with the other regulations associated with rent control, 
increases the cost of capital for investors. This sometimes led to 
conversion of existing rentable properties to individually owned 
flats or office space, thus reducing the supply of rentable accom-
modation further (Mengle 1985).
Empirical evidence on the effects of controls on the stock 
of rentable housing is unambiguously negative. Two studies 
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on Massachusetts, for example, found that the share of renter- 
occupied private units in the total housing stock in Cambridge 
fell from 75 per cent in 1970 to 66 per cent in 1980 under rent 
control, while in Boston the end of rent control increased the 
probability that a unit would be a rental unit by 6 percentage 
points (Navarro 1985; Sims 2007).
Quality and extent of disrepair
Economic theory would also suggest that rent control over a sus-
tained period of time would lead to a deterioration in the quality 
of rental property (Kutty 1996). After all, there is little incentive 
for a landlord to maintain a high-quality property if it is let below 
its market price. one might expect them to allow the quality of 
property to deteriorate to compensate for the lower rent. This 
prediction is more difficult to test empirically because of the 
compensatory impact of self-maintenance by tenants and other 
regulations which seek to protect tenants against maintenance 
failure, but there is some evidence. Work on New York’s old rent 
control system, for example, found that there was almost a 9 per 
cent higher probability of an older or smaller building being in 
unsound condition in Manhattan if it was in the rent-controlled 
sector (Gyourko and Linneman 1988). In the UK the long-term 
effect of rent controls was severe disrepair – with 18 per cent of 
rentable accommodation defined as unfit and needing repair 
(Todd et al. 1982). International evidence also shows that coun-
tries with more restrictive rent controls have a higher proportion 
of tenants living in accommodation with a leaky roof (oECD 
2011).
Misallocation
The under-supply of rentable properties is a key consequence of 
rents being held below market rates over a period of time. But any 
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analysis in this area is not complete without considering the cost 
of the misallocation of property. In the absence of a price mecha-
nism to allocate the rental property to those who value it highest, 
the allocation of property becomes economically inefficient.
Glaeser and Luttmer (1997) outline three mechanisms 
through which rent control has economic costs as a result of the 
misallocation of resources. Firstly, rent controls can distort the 
relative prices of renting accommodation so that, for example, 
the cost of luxury accommodation is reduced to a greater extent 
than that of poor quality accommodation. Secondly, the meth-
ods used to allocate apartments, given the excess demand when 
rents are held below market rates, can be inefficient: because of 
the potential economic gain associated with securing a property 
at below market rents, tenants end up searching for longer for 
accommodation which has an economic opportunity cost. Final-
ly, rents below market levels create significant moving costs and 
incentives for tenants to stay for longer in properties than they 
would have done in their absence. In addition, under rent control 
there is less incentive for families to reduce their accommoda-
tion demands, therefore exacerbating the shortage of properties 
for others.
These misallocation effects are significant. For example, 
Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) find that 21 per cent of rent-con-
trolled renters in New York live in properties with more rooms 
or fewer rooms than they would let in a free market. Those living 
in rent-controlled accommodation are found to be much less 
mobile than those in non-controlled accommodation (Gyourko 
and Linneman 1989; Nagy 1995). And more recent analysis even 
shows that those in rent-controlled sectors are willing to endure 
much longer commutes to work (Krol and Svorny 2005), suggest-
ing – as theory would predict – that charging below market rents 
creates a lock-in effect. Indeed, many argued this was a signif-
icant structural problem in the UK during the high unemploy-
ment period in the 1980s (Minford et al. 1987).
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Other considerations
‘First-generation’ rent controls were often justified as being pro-
poor measures that made renting ‘more affordable’ and often to 
prevent segregation of rich and poor families. Yet these arguments 
do not stand up to scrutiny. There is no obvious evidence that rent 
levels are lower in countries with stricter rent controls (oECD 
2011). Whether rent controls are good for the poor depends on how 
property is allocated in the absence of the price mechanism. There 
is simply no guarantee that the people who will obtain the benefit 
of the below-market rent will be poor, and some evidence from 
Boston and New York suggests the effects were not well-targeted 
(Sims 2007; Ault and Saba 1990). In fact, with rent control, land-
lords have greater incentives to search for tenants who will make 
their properties more attractive in other ways. This might lead to 
a pro-rich bias, as landlords seek tenants considered ‘easier’ to 
deal with. The queuing effects created by below-market rents may 
also lead to cronyism, extensive use of existing contacts, or maybe 
discrimination, side payments and bribes, which could actually 
worsen segregation between rich and poor (Glaeser 2002). In the 
UK system, students were favoured because they were less likely to 
abuse security of tenure provisions. Furthermore, arrangements 
that also provided board (food) were not included in the framework 
and thus the provision of such services was artificially encouraged.
Second-generation rent controls
Introduction and theory
Unsurprisingly, few commentators now advocate the sort of 
crude controls that were seen in Britain and elsewhere (though 
some do: see Dorling 2014). Instead there are calls for ‘second- 
generation’ rent controls, in particular in the form of ‘tenancy 
rent controls’.
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Second-generation controls encompass a wide range of dif-
ferent regulatory requirements. They most often entail rules gov-
erning increases in rents (rather than the level of rents). Increases 
may be linked to a rate of inflation or to the average increase in 
market rents for a particular locality, and they often involve al-
lowing rent increases under certain conditions where it is neces-
sary for landlords to pass through cost increases or undertake 
investment in a property.
UK proposals for tenancy rent controls
The most recent mutation, as advocated by the Labour party in 
the UK, is for what could be referred to as ‘tenancy rent controls’. 
These have all the features of second-generation rent controls but 
allow the landlord complete freedom to adjust rents between 
tenancies. As such, some suggest they are not really rent controls 
at all, but could be better described as longer-term, fixed-price 
contracts. Since rents would be free to adjust between tenancies, 
they do not have the same consequences as first-generation rent 
controls. Ultimately, rents will be determined by supply and de-
mand, at least at the beginning of a tenancy. This means that they 
do not lead to the progressively worsening outcomes seen with 
‘first-generation’ rent controls over time (Arnott 2003). Instead 
it is best to think of them as protection for tenants against the 
possibility of large, unforeseen rent increases within a tenancy. 
This explains why tenancy rent controls are often accompanied 
by security of tenure arrangements.
Earlier, David Lammy MP had pressed for rent controls along 
German lines. In Germany, rents are free to be set according 
to market conditions between tenancies, but tenants enjoy in-
definite tenancies during which rents can only be increased by 
a maximum of 20 per cent in any three-year period (Lammy 
2013). Too many renters in London, according to Lammy, were 
faced with uncertain and unaffordable rents within the current 
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framework. The homeless charity Shelter and other campaigning 
organisations such as Generation Rent have expressed similar 
concerns about the uncertainty of renting, and have thus called 
for moves to make tenancies more secure. Indeed, the Secretary 
of State for the Department of Communities and Local Govern-
ment, Eric Pickles MP, while not proposing statutory implemen-
tation, had proposed to work with the industry to draw up more 
secure ‘model contracts’ with inflation-linked rents – suggesting 
that even the coalition government had begun thinking along 
these lines (DCLG 2013).
The figures on annual rents in the UK are indeed stark. Aver-
age rent levels across the country for those in the private rented 
sector are equivalent to 41.1 per cent of weekly gross household 
income (oNS & DCLG 2013). Even among local authority and 
housing association homes, the figure is 29.6 per cent. This is 
after taking into consideration state assistance in the form of 
housing benefit as part of gross weekly income, the annual bill 
for which now stands at £23.9 billion (DWP 2014). Excluding this 
benefit, the average proportion of the remaining weekly house-
hold income going on rents from private and ‘social’ renters 
would be as much as 50.7 per cent and 40.4 per cent respectively 
(oNS & DCLG 2013). London has extraordinarily high rent levels. 
The Valuation office Agency calculates that the median monthly 
rent for two-bedroom accommodation in London is £1,387: more 
than double the average for England. Annual incomes in London 
are only 39 per cent higher.
The homeless charity Shelter has proposed that regulations 
for more secure tenure would be good for both tenants and land-
lords, particularly in difficult economic times. With over 1.3 mil-
lion households in the UK now renting, Shelter’s polling claims 
that 66 per cent of private renters would like to have the option 
to stay in their tenancy longer and 79 per cent would like to know 
that their landlord/letting agents would not be able to raise their 
rent above a certain rate while they were living in the property.
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This is perhaps unsurprising – tenants will always value flex-
ibility. But those in favour of longer tenancies underpinned by 
state legislation also claim that the sorts of assured shorthold 
tenancies that dominate the UK rental market are only so preva-
lent because both landlords and tenants are trapped in a market 
norm, from which they would both prefer to move away. Long-
term contracts are held up as being more successful and it is 
argued that more security of tenure would be good for landlords, 
who would enjoy lower vacancy risk.
The actual proposals put forward by the Labour Party did not 
go as far as the rent control model seen in Germany. Rather than 
indefinite tenancies, Labour proposes new fixed three-year tenan-
cies during which a landlord can evict a tenant only for breach of 
contract (such as arrears or anti-social behaviour) or because the 
landlord needs the property for their family or to sell. While there 
would be complete freedom for landlords to set rents between ten-
ancies, rents within tenancies would be benchmarked so that in-
creases will be linked to average increases within a locality, some 
measure of inflation, or both.2 These changes would give an option 
to tenants, who would still be able to terminate their contract after 
the probationary period with one month’s notice.
Do tenancy rent controls improve affordability or security?
Tenancy rent control cannot improve the affordability of renting 
in general but only in the short term. They can protect existing 
tenants from large rent rises within tenancies, and as such from 
landlord attempts to drive someone out of a tenancy by increas-
ing rents (sometimes called ‘economic eviction’).
At its least harmful, tenancy rent control is just likely to change 
the timing of the overall rent cost within a tenancy (Nagy 1997). 
2 The party has asked The Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors to review the most 
appropriate benchmark.
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Since landlords know they cannot adjust rents each year to fully 
reflect market conditions, they are likely to set rents at the start 
of the tenancy according to their judgement as to the expected 
market rents over the lifetime of the tenancy. If they expect that 
the market rent will increase by more than the average used to de-
termine the rent control, they will front-load the rent level to com-
pensate for their future loss. When landlords expect market rents 
to bind, new tenants are likely to face higher rents initially than 
they would in a free market in order to compensate for forecast 
lower future rents than there would otherwise have been.
Since the major effect on returns to the landlord from tenancy 
rent control is to change the timing within a tenancy, we should 
not expect the same dramatic effects on investment in rental 
housing construction and the supply of rentable property as we 
had from rent control in the 20th century.
Nevertheless, there will almost certainly be a fall in invest-
ment in the private rented sector if tenancy rent control is viewed 
as a precursor to even more regulation in future. In addition, 
given that any form of rent control restricts the landlords’ abil-
ity to manage their risks, in all probability there is likely to be 
a small negative effect on investment due to an increased cost 
of capital and/or a small rise in the overall rents to reflect the 
greater risk. This means the overall market rents are likely to 
increase slightly if tenancy rent controls are introduced. In effect, 
an option is being given to the tenant (if market rents increase 
rapidly, the tenant will not face rent increases as high as mar-
ket rent increases and if market rents fall or increase slowly, the 
tenant can expect a reduction in rent). Such options come with a 
cost and with risks to landlords.
Many people claim that tenancy rent controls are necessary in 
order to improve the security of tenure for tenants, which is said 
to have desirable economic consequences. The implicit assump-
tion here is that there is some sort of market failure in the rental 
property market whereby both landlords and tenants would 
T H E F L AW S I N R E N T C E I L I NGS
85
benefit from regulation to ensure that tenancies are more secure. 
The vision often painted is of a young family with children who 
would like the security of knowing they have a guaranteed fixed-
term rental contract limiting exceptional increases in rent and 
the threat of economic eviction. From the landlord’s perspective, 
it is assumed that the threat of vacancy is a significant consid-
eration, and that by changing the market norms via fixed-term 
contracts, this vacancy risk can be more effectively managed.
Is this justified? And to what extent do tenancy rent controls 
affect tenure security? In the UK there is very little evidence that 
tenure security is unavailable when tenants are willing to pay 
for it (Ball 2013). Longer-term tenancies with more stability and 
predictable rents do exist, but are not widely taken up. Shelter 
and other campaigners use evidence that tenants say that they 
would like more security of tenure to justify their market failure 
arguments. But the truth would appear to be that tenants are 
unwilling to pay for increased security.
From the perspective of the landlord, an additional problem is 
the asymmetric nature of the tenancy agreements that have been 
proposed. For example, the proposals would mean that tenants 
could leave a property with one month’s notice while landlords 
could only evict tenants for breach of contract within the three-
year period.
In a free market, with no regulated fixed-period agreements, 
a landlord could seek to impose penalties within a contract for 
early termination by the tenant to compensate him for vacancy 
risk. Indeed, contrary to the narrative that secure tenancies dis-
sipate vacancy risk for landlords, these types of controls actually 
force landlords to bear the vacancy risk – and do not allow them 
to use market mechanisms currently in operation when the pref-
erences of landlords and their tenants align (Ball 2013). on top 
of this, landlords in a secure tenancy framework would face the 
prospect of problem tenants enjoying greater security of tenure, 
making the management of risk through turnover more difficult.
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As has been noted, it is unclear that there is a significant 
security of tenure problem in the UK. Although survey data do 
suggest people would like more secure arrangements, the fact 
that the private rental market is dominated by the young, mobile 
and childless demographic groups 
suggest that security of tenure might 
not be a huge problem in practice 
(see Table 7). Not only is there little 
evidence that private renting tenants 
are unhappy with their accommoda-
tion per se (according to the English 
Housing Survey, overall satisfaction 
rates were at 91.2 per cent in 2011–12) 
or that many people move involun-
tarily, but there is also little evidence 
that even parents with children are 
substantially less mobile than other 
renters (Ball 2013). For example, the 
English Housing Survey shows 18.9 
per cent of households with depend-
ent children moved within the last 
year, compared with 23.7 per cent 
without. At least part of the reason for 
this is because many rent as a step-
ping stone to owner occupation: 24.8 
per cent of new owner occupiers over 
the past three years were households 
with dependent children who were 
previously in rented accommodation.
The existence of controls may 
also affect decisions of landlords 
and tenants in the allocation of 
rental properties, both prior to and 
within a tenancy. Since landlords 
Table 7 Economic and 
demographic characteristics 
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Source: English Housing Survey (2013), 
Table FA3101 (S418): Demographic and 
economic characteristics of social and 
privately renting households, 2011–12.
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with properties who expect the rent controls to bind are likely 
to front-load their rent levels, landlords face an incentive to 
seek out tenants who are likely to be mobile, such as students or 
young people (Arnott 2003). This is because the early years of the 
tenancy are when the landlord makes the highest profit.
Within tenancies, landlords are likely to have an incentive to 
speed up a tenant’s departure the longer the tenant stays in the 
property if the rent control binds. This might express itself as 
being less cooperative to the tenant as time goes on, or by being 
less willing to undertake maintenance. The opposite incentives 
apply for the tenant. If a tenant’s situation changes, for example, 
as a result of a job offer, he is less likely – all else given – to move 
given the benefit of a lower real rent later in the existing tenancy 
relative to starting a new tenancy. This might mean either a 
longer commute or a reduced likelihood of the tenant taking the 
job. Tenancy rent controls therefore benefit less mobile house-
holds to the detriment of more mobile households and are likely 
to have a negative effect on mobility.
The existence of tenancy rent controls and contracts is also 
likely to change the timing of when maintenance occurs. Land-
lords are much more likely to undertake maintenance between 
tenancies than within them. This is particularly true if market 
rents increase more quickly than the landlord expected prior to 
the tenancy agreement. Tenants are also likely to have to under-
take more self-maintenance on a property than they would in an 
uncontrolled market within a tenancy (olsen 1988). With ten-
ancy rent control inevitably comes an expansion of bureaucracy 
too – and this will also have a vested interest in more regulation.
But don’t rents controls work in Germany?
Many advocates of tenancy rent controls argue that they work 
in other countries such as Germany (Lammy 2013). In Germany, 
rents are set by the market initially but then can be raised within 
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tenancies with reference to inflation or increases in the land-
lord’s costs. Rents cannot increase by more than 20 per cent in 
any three-year period. Tenants have indefinite tenancies and 
can only be evicted for non-payment of rent (over a number of 
months), for breach of contract arising from damage to the prop-
erty, for unauthorised subletting, or to allow the landlord or a 
member of his family to live in the home or to allow the landlord 
to sell the home.
Attributing the success of the German rental market to ‘ten-
ancy rent controls’, however, ignores huge structural differences 
in the housing market more broadly compared with the UK. In 
particular, the fact that there is a much more elastic supply re-
sponse to changes in the demand for housing in Germany due 
to more liberal land-use planning regulations, means that both 
rents and house prices are much lower relative to income than in 
the UK (Niemietz 2014). Figure 11 shows that affordability of Ger-
man housing has continually improved since 1980, whereas for 
the UK the reverse is true. This is largely caused by significantly 
higher levels of dwelling completion per 10,000 inhabitants in 
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Table 8 Comparison of rent levels in UK and German cities, 2014
Rent per month London Munich Manchester Frankfurt
Apartment (1 bedroom) in city 
centre £1,502.28 0,£699.54 0, £636.22 0, £530.63
Apartment (1 bedroom) outside 
of centre 0, £945.41 0, £558.66 0, £468.33 0, £351.79
Apartment (3 bedrooms) in city 
centre £2,837.50 £1,395.04 £1,155.00 £1,061.48
Apartment (3 bedrooms) outside 
of centre £1,720.18 0, £997.13 0, £836.00 0, £762.44
Average monthly disposable 
salary (after tax) £2,100.08 £1,880.02 £1,253.48 £2,518.04
Rent per month Birmingham Berlin Oxford Hamburg
Apartment (1 bedroom) in city 
centre 0, £632.14 0, £477.11 0, £987.50 0, £526.83
Apartment (1 bedroom) outside of 
centre 0, £432.86 0, £344.20 0, £768.00 0, £407.30
Apartment (3 bedrooms) in city 
centre £1,150.00 0, £992.74 £1,638.80 £1,381.71
Apartment (3 bedrooms) outside 
of centre 0, £700.00 0, £698.89 £1,283.33 0, £717.85
Average monthly disposable salary 
(after tax) £1,755.62 £1,458.67 £1,700.00 £1,660.30
Source: Numbeo, Property prices comparison between Berlin and London, averages.
Germany compared with the UK (Niemietz 2014; Ball 2013). Un-
surprisingly then, rent levels are lower. Table 8 shows rent levels 
in UK and German cities according to the cost-of- living compar-
ison website Numbeo.
The structural differences which make rent levels much higher 
in UK cities make every other consideration relatively trivial – it 
is unsurprising that the effects of tenancy rent controls in Ger-
many look benign when other factors are making renting much 
more affordable compared with the UK.
That said, some recent studies have suggested problems 
developing in the German rental property market in terms of 
low levels of investment in new development, with rents rising 
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as a result (Ball 2013). In fact, in many cases where long-term 
contracts and tenancy rent controls operate, the rental markets 
suffer from low levels of investment. This has led to other policy 
responses such as more support for new development, allow-
ances and tax breaks. Any comparison must take into account 
these different frameworks. The oECD also suggests that the 
proportion of rentable accommodation with a leaky roof is 
much higher in Germany (over 7 per cent) than the UK at 1.5 
per cent (oECD 2011).
Conclusion
Rent control is back on the agenda, particularly in the UK, be-
cause of the cost-of-living squeeze, structurally high rent levels 
and a large housing benefits bill. The sort of crude controls of 
nominal rents implemented and maintained by many Western 
countries following periods of war in the 20th century have long 
been abandoned as a policy ambition. These are recognised to 
have devastating consequences on the supply and maintenance 
of rentable property, while having large economic costs associ-
ated with resource misallocation and reduced labour mobility.
Instead, many policymakers now advocate a variation of ‘sec-
ond-generation’ rent controls, known as tenancy rent controls, in 
which landlords are free to adjust rent levels between tenancies 
but are restricted within them. In the UK, for example, the La-
bour party wants fixed three-year tenancies where rents can only 
be raised by an as yet unspecified ‘average’ rental increase.
Tenancy rent controls by construction cannot improve afforda-
bility and they may raise market rents. Their use entails a trade-off 
between providing more secure tenure for existing tenants against 
the economic inefficiency caused by reduced labour mobility, and 
the potential for lower investment in the rentable housing stock.
As such, though not as damaging as first-generation rent 
controls, it is unlikely that rent controls will achieve the desired 
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aims of improved affordability and substantial security for ten-
ants. The real problem here is the affordability of housing. A more 
flexible supply enabled by a liberalisation of planning is the type 
of policy we should be following, rather than imposing new con-
ditions on a market which has been a relative success story since 
liberalisation in 1989.
Indeed, planning liberalisation would clearly be a welfare en-
hancing policy, while tenancy rent controls would not. As with 
most price ceilings, if they are effective in reducing tenants’ costs 
and/or increasing security (which is highly unlikely), they will do 
a great deal of damage. If they do not do much damage, they will 
not reduce costs or increase tenant security noticeably. of course, 
these proposed price ceilings – as with more radical measures 
implemented in the 20th century – do provide a readily observ-
able policy to show that politicians are ‘acting’ on the concerns 
of interest groups with any negative consequences likely to be 
opaque. The policies are more likely to be in the interests of those 
who propose them than in the interests of those whom they are 
purported to benefit.
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6 ENERGY PRICE CAPS
Colin Robinson
Price controls have often been applied in energy markets, 
whether under state or private ownership, by legislators or by 
government-appointed regulators. They are back on the political 
agenda in the UK after a statement by the leader of the Labour 
Party in autumn 2013 that, if Labour were elected in 2015, it 
would impose a two-year freeze on gas and electricity prices. Mr 
Miliband’s proposal is only the latest intimation of a profound 
change in the UK energy market, which, ten years ago, could 
claim to be the most liberalised in the world. Subsequently, com-
petitive forces have weakened and government and regulatory 
controls have tightened. Not only is political action on prices 
threatened but, over the last few years, the gas and electricity 
regulator, ofgem, has been tampering with retail tariffs in the 
interests of ‘fairness’ and ‘simplicity’.
This chapter considers the consequences of substituting 
prices determined by politicians or regulators for those that 
would otherwise have appeared through the free interaction 
of consumers and producers. It begins with some observations 
on the price mechanism, considers past attempts at price con-
trol in the UK before and after privatisation, and discusses, 
within the context of recent changes in the UK energy mar-
ket, the likely consequences of attempts by governments and 
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Markets and price controls
The price mechanism
The price mechanism has a vital role in all forms of markets. As 
a decentralised system, it incorporates and processes very large 
amounts of information without the need for any central guiding 
hand, and it provides signals to producers and consumers which 
permit scarce supplies to be allocated among competing uses at 
any point in time.1 It is a sophisticated adaptive system which 
incorporates views about the future, providing (via variations in 
prices and price expectations which lead to supply and demand 
changes) for constant adjustment over time to incipient short-
ages and surpluses. Without the price mechanism there would 
be no competitive markets, which provide the driving force for 
the process of competitive discovery that stimulates innovation 
(Hayek 1948) and which, by permitting choice of suppliers, are 
the prime means of protection for consumers. Given the funda-
mental nature of the price mechanism, attempts by governments 
and regulators to fix prices are clearly likely to have profound 
consequences. Prices themselves can be controlled, at least for 
short periods, but the market effects of controls cannot be so 
easily managed.
Price controls and the price mechanism
Prices may be capped by a regulator or a government because 
suppliers are thought likely to exploit a monopoly. or the cap 
may be because a government wants to keep down the rate of 
inflation as measured by published consumer price indices. or a 
government may want some key products to be provided at low 
prices for consumers, as for instance in oil-producing countries, 
1 The characteristics of capitalist systems, including the role of the price mechanism, 
are particularly well set out in Seldon (1990).
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where governments have sometimes used subsidies to hold down 
oil product prices so that their citizens feel they are obtaining 
benefits from local resources.
Price caps may be justified when there is clear evidence that 
an organisation is exploiting market power, though a better 
corrective is to undermine that market power by removing bar-
riers to entry to the relevant activity. Nevertheless, the funda-
mental problem with using price controls as a ‘remedy’ is that 
it involves tampering with one of the basic mechanisms of the 
economy even though the government or regulator involved 
can have very little relevant knowledge of what prices ‘should’ 
be. Attempts to fix prices invariably upset the allocative and 
signalling functions of markets and lead to unforeseen conse-
quences (which may not greatly concern politicians and regula-
tors because they may not appear in the short term). Compared 
with the situation that would otherwise have existed, a price 
cap that is effective will, in any likely circumstances, result in 
increased demand and reduced supply at the controlled price 
level, thus creating a situation of excess demand in which prices 
try to rise but are prevented from doing so by government or 
regulatory action. In the short run, some kind of rationing will 
be required since the market will not be in balance at the frozen 
price level.
Less obviously, the imposition of controls will reduce the 
incentive to invest: profit expectations will be lowered, both be-
cause of the direct effect of lower expected prices and because 
of increased political uncertainty caused by the intervention. 
The threat of a price cap (even if the cap is never imposed) will 
have much the same effect. In other words, an unintended and 
perverse consequence of actual or threatened price controls will 
be to induce shortages, both in the present and in the future, by 
boosting future demand and restricting future supply. This per-
verse effect will persist as long as the controls (or the threat of 
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controls) remain: indeed it may persist longer if perceived politi-
cal and regulatory risk is increased.2
Past attempts at price control
Before privatisation
In the UK during World War  II, the price mechanism was sup-
pressed in many markets and administrative rationing was sub-
stituted to deal with the associated shortages. It was well into the 
1950s before these controls were eased. Subsequently, given the 
then consensus about macroeconomic policy and the high rates 
of inflation that developed, governments of both major political 
parties tried, with little success, to intervene in markets to hold 
down prices and incomes. Prices and incomes policies, which 
attempted to persuade unions to rein back wage demands and 
employers to minimise price increases, were particularly popu-
lar with governments in the 1960s and 1970s.
In the case of energy prices, governments had a degree of con-
trol since the gas, electricity and coal industries were national-
ised just after the end of World War II. Conflicts between nation-
alised corporation boards and government about objectives and 
actions to achieve those objectives (including price setting) were 
common (Heald 1980) and governments frequently intervened by 
backdoor means to influence or even fix prices in the energy and 
other state-owned industries. Since so much of this activity went 
on behind the scenes, its scale is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, 
at times, it came out into the open. For example, in the 1970s, 
2 A further damaging effect of price caps in energy markets could occur if a number 
of countries capped prices at the same time. In those circumstances, the effects 
could feed into markets for depletable primary energy products where producers 
might well assume that they should hold back supplies until prices rose in the 
future. The relevant theory of depletable resources is explained in Krautkraemer 
(1998). The rest of this chapter assumes that the UK is alone in capping prices.
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Harold Wilson’s government discussed and determined gas and 
electricity prices in Cabinet, holding them below the levels the 
nationalised corporations wished to charge because of concern 
about the impact of increasing gas and electricity prices on the 
retail prices index. It was not only Labour governments that in-
terfered with nationalised industry prices. Before privatisation 
of the major utilities began in 1984,3 Margaret Thatcher’s gov-
ernment intervened, but on that occasion it was (indirectly) to 
raise prices higher than the industries concerned wanted rather 
than to cap them. When government borrowing was soaring in 
the early 1980s, the 1983 Autumn Statement increased repay-
ments by the nationalised gas and electricity industries to the 
government, making them raise the prices they charged their 
consumers (Marshall and Robinson 1984).
By the later 1980s, however, as the old consensus about cen-
tralised direction of the economy faded and monetary policy 
was recognised as the main instrument in controlling inflation, 
prices and incomes policies disappeared from the policy agenda. 
Furthermore, once many of the nationalised corporations were 
privatised and independent regulators were established, direct 
government interference in their pricing decisions became more 
difficult so that one favoured conduit for government price inter-
ference was blocked.
Post privatisation
However, price controls of a different sort then became popular. 
Along with privatisation of the utilities came a new form of regu-
lation, including price controls, which was fortunately relatively 
benign because it was operated by regulators with duties to pro-
mote competition (Robinson and Marshall 2006). As far as prices 
were concerned, the regulators of the newly privatised utilities 
3 The first was the sale of 50 per cent of British Telecommunications in 1984.
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used a price cap based on general movements in retail prices but 
with a specific element for each industry. The RPI-X formula tied 
prices in an industry to the change in the general retail prices 
index (RPI) but minus a specific deduction for efficiency improve-
ments (X) (Beesley and Littlechild 1983).4
The underlying idea of these controls, which were advocated 
by those who wished to liberalise markets, was that an RPI-X 
price cap was justified in either one of two sets of circumstances. 
one was that the regulators, in pursuit of their duties to promote 
competition, needed to cap prices temporarily in ‘pre-competi-
tive markets’: that is, markets which were potentially competi-
tive but which were not yet actually so. These controls were to 
be transitional, aimed at curbing temporary market power, and 
would be dropped as soon as effective competition had been 
achieved. In Beesley and Littlechild’s phrase, RPI-X was intended 
to ‘hold the fort’ until competition arrived.
Another justification for controls was in ‘naturally monopolis-
tic’ sectors of the industries – in the case of energy, the networks 
of pipes and wires that carry energy from where it is produced 
to where it is consumed – where it was thought unlikely, short of 
some unexpected technological change, that competition would 
be feasible and efficient. These price caps on natural monopoly 
areas were conceived as permanent and necessary to prevent 
beneficiaries of a natural monopoly from exploiting their market 
power to the detriment of others. RPI-X was expected to provide 
better efficiency incentives than the main alternative which was 
US-style cost-plus regulation, which had a tendency to inflate 
costs and promote investment-intensity.5
4 In the case of water, prices were allowed to rise faster than RPI.
5 Under the US system, regulated companies were permitted to earn a percentage 
rate of return on their allowable costs (the ‘rate base’). Thus they had an incentive 
to inflate the rate base to increase their money return (Averch and Johnson 1963). 
The UK regime has problems of its own, as does any regulatory intervention (see, for 
example, Crew and Kleindorfer 2006).
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In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the energy regulators6 
pursued a successful policy of separating the natural monopoly 
networks from the potentially competitive sectors (a separation 
which had not been done at the time of privatisation in gas and 
not fully done in the case of electricity), as a precondition for the 
introduction of effective competition in all potentially compet-
itive sectors. At the same time, barriers to entry to potentially 
competitive markets were removed and, as competition began to 
flourish, price controls were removed. All had gone by 2002, leav-
ing RPI-X as a cap on prices in the natural monopoly networks.
In some other utility markets, the energy regulator’s policy 
of opening markets to competition where feasible and removing 
price controls was unfortunately not followed. In the water in-
dustry in England and Wales, for instance, where prices in the 
regional monopoly companies were permitted to rise faster than 
RPI, there was no separation of potentially competitive sectors 
from the network. In water, privatised in 1989, far from price 
caps ‘holding the fort’ until competition arrived (Beesley and 
Littlechild 1983), prices are still largely set by the regulator. Com-
petition has still not arrived despite some efforts in recent years 
to introduce it.
Under the benign approach in the energy market, in which the 
utility regulator promoted competition wherever feasible and 
only resorted to price controls in other markets where monopoly 
seemed inevitable, there were considerable benefits for energy 
consumers, large and small, especially after 1998 when all con-
sumers were given choice of supplier. Providing consumers with 
the power of exit from suppliers they did not like was a massive 
step forward, which no other country had taken. There was suf-
ficient rivalry to induce suppliers to reduce and then keep down 
costs and prices. Domestic consumers who switched supplier 
6 The original energy regulators (offer for electricity and ofgas for gas) were com-
bined in ofgem in 2000.
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typically obtained price reductions of about 20 per cent for gas 
and 10 per cent for electricity.7
The retreat from liberalisation
In more recent times, regulation of the energy utilities has be-
come more interventionist. Competition promotion no longer has 
the priority it had just before and just after the turn of the cen-
tury. Detailed government and regulatory interference in prices 
charged by suppliers has begun and more political interference is 
threatened. This regression towards pre-privatisation views and 
actions is best seen in the context of changing government policy 
towards the energy industries over the period since 1945.
A potted history of UK energy regulation
In the aftermath of World War II, central planning of energy was 
in vogue, in the UK as elsewhere (see also Robinson 2013, 2014). 
Coal mining, electricity production, transmission and distri-
bution and gas distribution (of manufactured gas) were in gov-
ernment hands. The oil industry was not nationalised but it was 
subject to substantial government interference.
However, as liberal market economics staged a revival in the 
last twenty years of the 20th century, UK governments retreated 
from their previous efforts to regulate energy markets. As ex-
plained above, regulators were encouraged by the privatisation 
legislation in the 1980s to promote competition outside natural 
monopoly networks and, for a time, market forces played a much 
bigger role in UK energy than they had in living memory.8
7 The National Audit office and the Comptroller and Auditor General produced re-
ports on gas and electricity liberalisation which argued that the results were gen-
erally beneficial for consumers (NAo, 1999 and 2000 and Comptroller and Auditor 
General 2003).
8 The market was not entirely freed: coal, nuclear power and renewables were subsi-
dised as explained, for example, in Robinson (2006).
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This period of liberalisation was very brief. It took time for 
energy regulators to establish the conditions for effective compe-
tition so that it was the late 1990s before the liberalised market 
came into being for all consumers and it then lasted less than 
ten years (Robinson 2014). By the early years of the 21st century 
government energy planning had staged a comeback. The Blair 
government initially supported the introduction of competition 
but, in its later stages and under Gordon Brown, Labour gov-
ernments followed in all essentials by the subsequent coalition, 
claimed that, if energy markets were allowed to operate freely, 
there would be adverse effects on the natural environment and 
on energy security. Government must intervene to protect the 
interests of the community as a whole.9
An important consequence was that, as under nationali-
sation, government again began to play a major part in deter-
mining electricity generators’ investment programmes. Private 
generators were induced to use ‘renewables’ such as wind and 
biomass, rather than fossil fuels such as gas, and to embark 
on a new nuclear power programme, passing on the costs to 
consumers. As explained below, numerous measures were in-
troduced in an attempt to ensure that the energy market de-
veloped in line with the wishes of the government of the day. 
A competitive energy market could not survive this barrage of 
government initiatives.10
Not surprisingly in such circumstances, the objectives of the 
energy regulator, ofgem, were changed from 2008 onwards11 so 
9 A White Paper in 2007 (DTI 2007) was the first to make explicit the retreat from 
liberalisation (see Robinson 2014).
10 Robinson (2014) argues that the period of liberalisation was so brief because nei-
ther the government nor the principal players in the market wanted a competitive 
market.
11 First, under the 2008 Energy Act, then in January 2010 when revised social and en-
vironmental guidance was issued and in 2011 to align regulation with the govern-
ment’s ‘strategic policy goals’. ofgem’s principal objective is now the rather vague 
‘to protect the interests of existing and future electricity and gas consumers’.
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that it no longer gave primacy to competition promotion. An 
independent competition-promoting regulator could not com-
fortably coexist with an interventionist government. To keep 
ofgem in line, it is now constrained to bring about the govern-
ment’s stated energy strategy and policy as set out in a Strategy 
and Policy Statement (DECC 2012). The government claims that 
ofgem’s regulatory independence is not compromised since it is 
free to decide how to achieve the outcomes specified by govern-
ment (see DECC 2012, especially paragraphs 13–18). Nevertheless, 
‘independent’ regulation no longer has the same meaning as it 
did when it formed an important part of the post-privatisation 
regulatory settlement which was designed to avoid the political 
interference that had been rife under nationalisation (Robinson 
and Marshall 2006).
Ofgem and intervention in pricing
‘Fairness’ and ‘simplicity’
The actions of ofgem in the recent past are consonant with the 
new interventionist approach (Robinson 2014). Instead of en-
couraging competition in potentially competitive markets, as 
did its predecessors, it is regulating those markets and, in par-
ticular, trying to micro-manage prices. For example, in 2009 
ofgem introduced a new licence condition intended to ban price 
differentials between regions and between payment methods 
that were not justified by cost differences. ofgem had observed 
that prices varied between regions and that suppliers were also 
varying prices according to methods of payment and, after in-
vestigation, it judged these differentials to be ‘unfair’. The ban 
on ‘unjustified’ differentials between payment methods is still in 
force and, though the formal ban on regional differentials was 
dropped in 2012, ofgem has warned that it could take action if 
‘unjustified’ differentials return. ofgem also introduced a Simple 
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Tariffs policy in 2013 because it believed that the number of 
tariffs was so large that consumers were confused. All suppliers 
were limited to four tariffs per fuel.
As Stephen Littlechild has explained, ofgem’s new price 
policies have been damaging to consumers. They have had the 
unintended and perverse consequences of restricting consumer 
choice and raising prices. ofgem’s attempt to curb differential 
pricing, by stopping energy companies from charging differ-
ent prices to in-area and out-of-area consumers,12 resulted in a 
decline in differentials but not because of a reduction in prices. 
Differentials were reduced because out-of-area prices increased: 
customer switching consequently declined and supplier profits 
increased. Estimates vary of how much supplier profits have 
risen, but there is no doubt that the increase is considerable: ac-
cording to Littlechild, the increase was between £1 and 2 billion 
per year between 2008 and 2013 (Littlechild 2014c).
More recently, ofgem’s attempts to ‘simplify’ tariffs have 
resulted in less choice for consumers and the disappearance of 
some of the more attractive tariffs, such as those that contain no 
standing charges and those that give discounts for prompt pay-
ment. At the same time, ofgem is becoming involved in time-con-
suming decisions about actions which may transgress its ‘simple’ 
tariff rules (Littlechild 2014b). These kinds of efforts to persuade 
or force suppliers to provide only the tariffs the regulator thinks 
are desirable are only too likely to allow suppliers to discard 
those tariffs that are less profitable.
The change in ofgem’s approach is extremely significant. The 
rationale of gas and electricity regulation in the first twenty years 
or so after gas privatisation was that the regulator should avoid 
the traditional approach (which had proved so detrimental to 
consumers under nationalisation) in which the regulator works 
12 ‘In-area’ refers to former incumbents when operating in their ‘home regions’, where-
as ‘out-of-area’ refers to their operating as entrants to other regions.
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out what outcomes are desirable, including for prices, and then 
attempts to impose them on the industry. Instead, the regulator 
should accept that desirable outcomes are unknowable and can 
be achieved only by the forces of competition: therefore, wher-
ever possible, the regulator’s task is to remove entry barriers and 
promote competition, leaving outcomes beneficial to consumers 
to emerge from the competitive process. ofgem’s approach in the 
last few years has moved back towards the traditional, discred-
ited approach in which the regulator imposes its view of what is 
desirable. No longer is it actively promoting competition: instead, 
it is trying to interfere in industry decisions, including those 
about tariffs and, in the process, raising prices and the profits of 
suppliers.13
ofgem’s actions suggest a lack of understanding about how 
markets supply information and how consumers make choices 
when product attributes are complex. In any market where the 
products of different suppliers are physically the same, as in both 
gas and electricity, innovation and competition will concentrate 
on other aspects of the products such as service standards and 
prices. Although tariffs may proliferate and consumers may find 
it hard and time-consuming to make price comparisons unaided, 
a natural outcome is the emergence of price comparison web-
sites, of which there are several in the energy field, which help 
consumers determine the best deals for them and make supplier 
switching straightforward. It seems patronising to assume that 
consumers can only make decisions if the regulator acts on their 
behalf to narrow their field of choice. Moreover, such actions will 
surely restrict innovation in tariffs, which seems a curious thing 
to do at a time when ‘smart meters’ are at last coming into use 
(Littlechild 2014b).
13 An unintended consequence of the growth of price controls and other regulatory 
intervention may be to increase the opportunities for capture of the regulator by 
the industry. Capture is unlikely to be an issue when the regulator’s prime aim is to 
promote competition.
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Proposed government retail price controls
As regards direct government price controls, as distinct from 
price controls by regulators, they have generally been eschewed 
in recent years, in energy and elsewhere. However, energy mar-
ket suppliers (especially the ‘Big Six’) have become unpopular 
because they have increased prices considerably (though during 
a period of rising wholesale prices and expensive interventions 
by both government and ofgem) and because of billing and other 
customer service problems. In such circumstances, there will 
appear to be votes in political action that curbs the activities of 
the energy companies, including placing restraints on the prices 
they can charge. It was in that context, in the autumn of 2013, 
that the call for energy price controls was led by Ed Miliband, 
leader of the Labour Party, when he promised a two-year price 
freeze on gas and electricity prices (apparently for both house-
holds and businesses) if Labour was elected to government. other 
political leaders responded, though with different proposals: Sir 
John Major, former Conservative Prime Minister, called for a 
windfall tax on the energy suppliers and David Cameron decided 
to reduce some of the ‘green’ levies on the suppliers so as to keep 
prices down (Robinson 2014).
The consequences of government energy price 
controls
The general case against price controls was outlined at the begin-
ning of this chapter. In general, if the controls were effective they 
would have demand-increasing, supply-reducing effects, leading 
to excess demand at the imposed price level. In the case of the UK 
energy market, price controls would be introduced into a market 
already subject to significant damaging actions by government 
and regulator.
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The impact effect
The impact effect is uncertain because of the different ways sup-
pliers might react. A price cap in the form of a freeze announced 
long in advance, as in the case of the Miliband proposal, gives 
suppliers an incentive to begin the freeze at as high a base as 
possible. Therefore, they may want to increase retail prices (or 
to fail to reduce them if world energy prices decline (see, for 
example, RWE 2014)) before the freeze takes effect. Conceivably, 
therefore, pre-emptive action might render an attempted freeze 
ineffective in the sense that prices are no lower than they would 
have been without it. Prices could even be higher if companies 
buy electricity and gas a long way ahead to avoid the effects of 
a freeze. other possible pre-emptive actions include voluntary 
supplier price freezes,14 perhaps in the hope of escaping political 
action, though any such freeze is likely to allow leeway against 
unexpected developments in costs and world energy prices.
The compatibility of floors and ceilings
The compatibility of a retail price cap with changes in input 
prices is another awkward issue which could affect the extent 
to which a cap is binding. If, for instance, world energy prices 
rose considerably, would the cap have to be specifically lifted to 
avoid a sharp squeeze on supplier profits? or would there be an 
automatic ‘pass-through’ provision for input price increases? 
Even if world prices remain stable, a problem could arise because 
the government’s own interventionist measures, including the 
carbon price floor (see below), will over the next few years raise 
the prices paid by energy suppliers for their inputs. Clearly, a cap 
on output prices does not sit easily with a (rising) floor for input 
14 one supplier, SSE, has already announced such a freeze until 2016.
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prices. It is unclear how a government which had imposed a price 
cap would deal with a situation in which supplier profits were 
being squeezed because of its own earlier measures.
The consequences of holding down prices
If we assume, despite the uncertainty about prices with and 
without a freeze, that prices are held below the level which would 
otherwise have prevailed, then, if Labour were elected, there 
could be some near-term shortages as demand is increased and 
supply falls short. Current profitability would be squeezed and, 
depending on expectations about future prices, there would 
most likely be a significant adverse effect on investment incen-
tives, which could be serious given the circumstances of the 
UK energy market, where there are already concerns about the 
adequacy of electricity generating capacity in very cold weather 
conditions, caused primarily not by market forces but by govern-
ment action.15
At the time of privatisation, fears were expressed that elec-
tricity and gas suppliers would not invest for the future once they 
were no longer under state control. Such fears proved unjustified, 
as might have been expected: companies have a strong incentive 
to invest if they perceive profitable investment opportunities 
resulting from incipient capacity shortages. The power shortages 
and voltage reductions common under nationalisation became 
rarities after privatisation. However, as explained above, in re-
cent years government has again begun to intrude on investment 
decisions, particularly those concerning power stations, press-
ing supply companies to invest in generation from low-carbon 
energy sources favoured by government. The ostensible objec-
tive has been to combat future anthropogenic global warming, 
15 See, for example, Royal Academy of Engineering (2013). ofgem (2014) is more 
sanguine because it believes that the electricity market reforms now being imple-
mented will reduce the risk of supply interruptions.
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though governments have also claimed that energy security will 
be improved.16
The effect of government action to promote favoured 
fuels17
Among the measures introduced are a carbon price floor of £16 
per tonne, rising to £18 per tonne in 2016 (much higher rates than 
under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme) in an attempt to stim-
ulate low-carbon energy sources;18 powers to introduce ‘feed-in 
tariffs’, under the 2013 Energy Act, with a ‘contracts-for-differ-
ences’ system centred on a relatively high, above-market ‘strike 
price’ intended to increase the profitability of low-carbon gen-
erators and thereby encourage them to invest; and emissions 
performance standards for new power stations to ensure that 
they keep emissions within the limits that government thinks 
desirable. These measures are in addition to the regime the gov-
ernment has operated for some years under which generators 
must have ‘renewable obligation certificates’ to show that they 
are installing the amounts of renewable capacity required by 
government. Nuclear power too is favoured, as it has been in the 
past: the coalition government, after long negotiations, agreed to 
pay EDF about twice the current price for the electricity it gener-
ates from a new nuclear station at Hinkley in Somerset for about 
35 years (DECC 2013). In addition, obligations have been imposed 
on energy companies (the costs of which they recover in prices, 
thus imposing them on all consumers), intended to encourage 
consumers to use non-fossil sources and to cut energy use.
16 For a critical analysis of whether policy will achieve these objectives, see Robinson 
(2014)
17 More detail is in Robinson (2014).
18 The original plan was to raise the price to £30 per tonne by 2020, but in 2014 the 
2016–20 price was capped at £18 per tonne.
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As regards natural gas, the generating source the generators 
themselves would most likely have preferred, governments have 
blown hot and cold so that potential investors have been uncer-
tain about the official attitude: in a politicised market, that is 
enough to deter investment. At the same time, the government 
has undertaken a ‘reform’ of the wholesale electricity market, 
which has involved protracted discussions and caused consid-
erable uncertainty, particularly about a ‘capacity mechanism’, 
which would not have been necessary had markets been allowed 
to operate. Another very significant intervention has been imple-
mentation of the EU’s Large Combustion Plants Directive (LCPD), 
designed to reduce emissions, which has resulted in the prema-
ture closure of a considerable amount of coal-fired electricity 
capacity (and some oil plant).
In such a politicised environment it is not surprising that, 
while coal and oil plant has been closing because of the LCPD, 
there has been little investment in new plant other than in the 
types favoured by government. Table 9 shows the change in 
Table 9 UK electrical generating plant capacity: major power 
producers* (MW)
End 2010 End 2013
Change, 
2010–13
Coal 23,085 20,336 –2,749
Oil 3,638  1,370 –2,268
Mixed/dual fired 6,116  1,180 –4,936
Combined cycle gas turbines 31,724 32,967 +1,243
Nuclear 10,865  9,906 –959
Hydro 4,135  4,136 +1
Wind 1,867 3,905 +2,038
Other (including other renewables) 2,002 2,705 +703
Total 83,432 76,505 –6,927
* Maximum allowed export capacity on to transmission system. Small-scale hydro, wind and solar 
photovoltaics capacities are shown derated to allow for their intermittency.
Source: DECC, Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2014, Table 5.6.
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generating capacity of the major UK generators from end 2010 
to end 2013. Capacity at conventional steam stations (coal, oil 
and mixed/dual-fired) has declined by about 10,000 MW over the 
three years and nuclear capacity has fallen by nearly 1,000 MW. 
These declines have been only partly offset by a small increase of 
just over 1,000 MW in combined cycle gas turbines and around 
3,000 MW of wind and other renewables. The reduction in total 
capacity has therefore been almost 7,000 MW.
There are further reductions in conventional steam plant to 
come because of EU directives. Between mid 2013 and end 2015 
over 4,000 MW of such plant will probably be shut down and 
more may close thereafter under a subsequent directive (Royal 
Academy of Engineering 2013).
Creating uncertainty
Government and regulatory action has already created consid-
erable uncertainty in the energy market, which has led to an 
environment unfavourable to new investment.19 The threat of a 
retail price cap has added to this uncertainty. If the threat be-
comes a reality, the effect would depend on how it affected sup-
pliers’ expectations not just about prices but about government 
policy in general. Even if the freeze is temporary, suppliers are 
likely to assume that a government which had introduced one 
freeze might introduce another or take other comparable action. 
Enhanced political uncertainty would raise their cost of capital, 
further dampening investment and reducing supply relative to 
demand. Consequently, a cap might well have a perverse effect, 
tipping a market where suppliers are already reluctant to invest 
into future shortages, leading eventually to higher and not lower 
prices.
19 The effects of uncertainty, including regulatory uncertainty, on investment are 
analysed in Baker et al. (2013). See also www.policyuncertainty.com for measures 
of policy uncertainty in major economies.
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Conclusions
Discussion of price capping reveals the paradoxes and inconsist-
encies of policy towards the energy industries. While politicians 
appear keen to keep down energy prices, both government and 
regulator have in recent years pursued policies that have in-
creased prices and reduced competition. Government promotion 
of renewables and nuclear power has raised the costs of gener-
ation and ofgem’s efforts at ‘simpler’ and ‘fairer’ pricing have 
increased retail prices. Introducing a price cap into a managed 
market where the incentive to invest has already been damaged 
by government policy is unlikely to keep prices down, except pos-
sibly in the very short term. It is indeed more likely to give them 
another upward twist as well as compromising security of energy 
supply.
The symptoms politicians and regulators are trying to address 
arise from the apparent lack of competition in gas and electricity. 
As UK energy has reverted from a liberalised to a managed mar-
ket in which competition seems weak, particularly in the domes-
tic sector, suppliers have felt able to raise prices to households 
and small business (albeit at a time of rising world energy prices 
and government-imposed ‘green’ charges), confident that their 
‘rivals’ would follow. The competitive process, so effective early 
this century, has been attenuated. The blame rests largely on suc-
cessive governments which have tried to fix the market in favour 
of certain energy sources, aided by a regulator which no longer 
operates independently but is subservient to government.
In a recognition of this evident lack of competition in gas and 
electricity markets, in June 2014 an investigation by the Com-
petition and Markets Authority was launched after a reference 
made by ofgem (CMA 2014). The investigation is potentially 
very wide-ranging since it relates to ‘the supply and acquisi-
tion of energy in Great Britain’ but, as far as retail markets are 
concerned, it relates only to households and small business, 
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excluding supplies to large businesses where ofgem evidently 
thinks competition is effective.20 All such competition inquiries 
face fundamental problems in that they tend to take a ‘snapshot’ 
view of the relevant market: it is very difficult for them to address 
the more pertinent question of whether or not they can perceive a 
competitive process which is operating over time. It will be espe-
cially difficult for the CMA to deal with a case in which the main 
culprits for the lack of competition appear to be the government 
and the energy regulator. Its investigation will find it hard to 
resolve the fundamental problems afflicting the energy market. 
What seems to be required now is simple to state but may be very 
difficult to implement because of the loss of face which would 
be involved. Instead of more and more intervention, including 
interference in pricing decisions by government and regulator, it 
would be more appropriate to reinstate a genuinely independent 
regulator which gives priority to promoting competition and 
avoids detailed meddling with prices.
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7 REGULATION OF RAIL FARES
Richard Wellings
Introduction
Britain’s railway industry was privatised in the mid 1990s. The 
nominal transfer of ownership to the private sector did not, how-
ever, mean an end to state control. Intervention took three key 
forms. Firstly, the sector remained heavily dependent on gov-
ernment subsidies. Indeed, the amount of taxpayer support rose 
significantly in real terms during the decade after privatisation, 
to roughly treble the levels during the 1980s. State funding for 
the heavy-rail network as a whole is currently running at approx-
imately £6 billion per year, with about 40 per cent of industry 
spending funded by the taxpayer.1 Secondly, the government 
imposed a complex artificial structure on the industry, partly 
in response to European Commission ‘open access’ rules.2 Frag-
mentation was favoured over vertical integration, with separate 
companies owning the track and operating the trains. Finally, 
the government imposed strict regulations on the railways. These 
market interventions permeate the sector and include complex 
franchising rules for train operating companies and price con-
trols on a high proportion of fares.
1 This figure includes non-Network Rail spending on the heavy-rail network, in-
cluding Transport for London spending on the Crossrail project and London over-
ground. It does not include London Underground, other subway systems or light 
rail/tram systems. See DFT (2014a) for indicative estimates.
2 See, for example, Directive 91/440/EEC.
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This chapter examines the economic impact of the latter on 
Britain’s railways. The analysis takes into account the interaction 
of fare regulation with the other policies summarised above, as well 
as wider trends in British transport policy. The first section sets out 
the scope of fare regulation, examining the types of journey that 
are affected. The economic consequences are then analysed. In the 
context of the negative effects on efficiency, widely acknowledged 
within the industry, the government’s stated rationales for price 
controls are assessed. It is concluded that the arguments for fare 
regulation are weak and that the self-interested behaviour of pol-
icymakers and rail firms explains the continued imposition of these 
economically damaging interventions in the transport market.
The scope of fare regulation
Regulated fares make up approximately 50 per cent of passenger 
revenue on the heavy-rail network. While the precise rules are 
complicated and intricate (see Butcher 2014), the main market 
segments that have been subject to price controls are as follows:
• All season tickets to, from and within London zones 1–6.
• oyster pay-as-you-go peak and off-peak fares for journeys 
within London zones 1–6.
• Anytime day singles and returns for journeys to any London 
zones 1–6 station from a defined suburban area, roughly 
35–50 miles from central London.
• Anytime day singles and returns within London.
• off-peak, walk-up ‘saver’ fares for long-distance journeys 
(both the price and the time restrictions on these fares are 
regulated).
• Various weekly season tickets that are not covered by other 
fare regulations.
• Commuter fares and some off-peak fares in areas under 
the jurisdiction of Passenger Transport Executives and 
equivalent bodies.
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Increases in these fares are limited by inflation-linked price 
formulae determined by central government (the vast majority of 
the regulated market) or the relevant regional transport agency. 
Before 2004, the government set regulated fares at the July Retail 
Prices Index (RPI) minus 1 per cent, resulting in below-inflation 
rises. From 2004 to 2013, the change was set by the government 
at July RPI plus 1 per cent. However, in December 2013, the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer announced that the 2014 rise would be in 
line with the RPI (ibid.: 3).
The economic impact of fare regulation
Economic theory suggests price ceilings lead to shortages since 
they encourage more demand than would occur at the market 
price while reducing supply. In the passenger rail market this 
effect is manifested in overcrowding on many of the routes on 
which fares are regulated, with supplied capacity insufficient to 
cope with the artificially inflated demand at certain times of day. 
More broadly, price controls can be expected to limit entrepre-
neurship, innovation and market segmentation in the rail indus-
try, since, for example, the scope for offering passengers different 
trade-offs between price and quality of service is constrained 
(see Starkie 2013).
However, such analysis is complicated by the high degree of 
state control over the sector, with key decisions on resource allo-
cation subject to political interference and bureaucratic central 
planning. Thus fare regulation should also be assessed in terms 
of its impact on the incentives facing the government actors who 
have largely supplanted commercial decision-making on the 
railways.
Many of the effects of price controls are already well known 
within the rail industry (see McNulty 2011). For example, off-peak 
saver fares are responsible for severe overcrowding on some ser-
vices at the end of the evening peak. Instead of a gradual drop in 
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prices as demand subsides, as would occur under market con-
ditions, the regulation creates a cliff edge with a big fall in fare 
levels immediately after the departure times when saver fares 
become valid (typically around 7 p.m.). There is a particularly se-
vere problem with ‘artificial demand peaks’ on Friday evenings on 
some long-distance services to the north and Scotland. Reports 
describe sardine-like conditions and hundreds of passengers left 
on the platform.3 Fare regulation creates the perverse situation 
where there is often substantial spare capacity on the peak ser-
vices that leave at the most convenient times, but overcrowding 
on less convenient services that depart later in the evening. The 
role of the price mechanism in allocating capacity efficiently is 
undermined.
A similar problem afflicts regulated commuter routes. In this 
case, fare regulation means that passengers travelling at the very 
busiest peak times typically pay the same as those commuting 
during the shoulders of the peak. once again, the result is severe 
overcrowding on some services. Train operators are prevented 
from using the price mechanism to make better use of capacity 
by incentivising passengers to shift to quieter services. The mar-
ginal cost of each additional passenger may be very high on over-
crowded trains, but regulation means fares cannot reflect this. 
The government recently considered introducing higher-rate 
‘super-peak’ fares to address this problem – still a form of price 
control but a better approximation for market pricing. But this 
was rejected, apparently for political reasons (DfT 2013: 20):
Allowing train operators to charge a premium in the ‘super 
peak’ … would boost efficient capacity utilisation, which in the 
medium to longer term could help curb overall fare rises.
3 For example, ‘Rail firms push for budget airline-style fares to beat off-peak over-
crowding’, The Guardian, 7 November 2010.
F L AW S A N D C E I L I NGS R EGU L AT IoN oF R A I L FA R E S
122
 In the short-term however this would result in additional 
fare rises for some passengers and in the current climate with 
other pressures on household budgets that is not something we 
can accept. We have decided against super peak pricing as we 
believe it simply would not be right to impose a further burden 
on hard-pressed commuters at this time. We have listened to 
passengers… [emphasis in original]
This kind of fare regulation also tends to narrow the gap be-
tween peak and off-peak fares,4 exacerbating overcrowding prob-
lems by reducing the financial incentives for travellers to use 
trains with spare capacity. Indeed, a greater difference between 
peak and off-peak fares would incentivise employers to shift 
their schedules to reduce the travel costs of their employees and 
customers. For example, universities could start their lectures 
later in the morning. By providing such incentives, market pric-
ing delivers much more efficient use of existing capacity. This is 
important not just for commuters standing in packed carriages 
but also for taxpayers and the wider economy.
The marginal cost of a journey is particularly high when not 
just the train is full, but the infrastructure itself has reached 
capacity. The provision of new heavy-rail capacity is typically 
extremely expensive, as demonstrated by recent schemes such 
Crossrail. Moreover, the new infrastructure is typically not com-
mercially viable, forcing taxpayers to fund a high proportion of 
the budgets. And price controls also make it more difficult to re-
claim the costs of new infrastructure from the major beneficiar-
ies – i.e. commuters on the busiest peak-time services – as would 
happen in a commercial investment, thus making subsidies from 
the taxpayer much more likely. Accordingly, the combination of 
price controls and state subsidy turns the allocation of resources 
4 In contrast to the regulation of off-peak ‘saver’ fares on intercity services, which 
tends artificially to widen the gap immediately before and after peak periods.
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on the railways into a political rather than a commercial pro-
cess. Fare regulations generate problems of overcrowding which 
in turn put pressure on policymakers to provide additional 
infrastructure.
Indexation to the general inflation rate
A further problem with the current system of fare regulation is 
its indexation to the Retail Prices Index (RPI). There is no par-
ticular reason to expect rail industry costs to rise in line with 
general price inflation. The prices of goods and services within 
different sectors rise at different rates. For example, in recent 
years there have been significant price falls in sectors such as 
computer hardware, due to rapid innovation and the removal of 
trade barriers. Falling prices in these sectors will lower the RPI. 
of course, this means that prices in other sectors will be rising at 
a faster rate than the aggregate figure. If rail industry costs were 
to increase faster than general inflation, but fares were pegged 
to RPI, government would be obliged to make up the difference 
at taxpayers’ expense, assuming a given level of service, etc. The 
opposite could also occur, for example, if there were major prod-
uctivity improvements on the railways, although in general this 
would be less objectionable since the effect would be to reduce 
the forced contribution of taxpayers. Nevertheless, it can be seen 
that the reliance of price controls on aggregate inflation indexes 
disrupts the market relationship between industry costs and 
fare levels leading to a misallocation of resources.
The rationale for fare regulation
The above discussion confirms that the well-known economic 
costs of price controls are pervasive in the rail sector. In this 
context, the government’s own arguments for fare regulation de-
serve scrutiny. A key question is whether there are valid economic 
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justifications for the price controls or whether their imposition 
reflects political considerations.
Post-privatisation controls on London commuter fares appear 
to have been driven by fears about the potential ‘market power’ of 
operators on these routes (SRA 2003). According to the Depart-
ment for Transport (2012: 18):
London commuters were considered to be a ‘captive market’ 
with no realistic alternative to the train for travelling into Lon-
don. It was considered that this group of passengers needed to 
be protected against the risk of possible exploitation by train 
operators, who exercise a de facto monopoly position on com-
muting routes into London from many locations.
According to this argument, recent transport policies appear 
to have strengthened the case for regulation (ibid.):
[C]ommuting into London by car has become slower and more 
expensive. As a result, the capital’s commuters are even more 
captive to rail than when fares regulation was first established. 
So it is clear that we need to continue to use regulation to pro-
tect commuters from possible exploitation.
Arguments about ‘market power’ have also been used to jus-
tify regulation in the PTE areas and around other major cities. 
Train operators are said to operate in a semi-monopoly position 
leading to a presumption in favour of protecting commuters by 
controlling the structure and level of fares.
Even outside the travel-to-work areas of the major conurba-
tions, a case for regulation has been made on the grounds that 
passengers need protection against possible exploitation by op-
erators where they have no realistic alternative to the train. The 
regulation of intercity ‘saver’ fares widens the rationale further 
still (ibid.: 20):
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Given the uncertainty as to how the newly privatised train oper-
ating companies would act, it was considered prudent to regu-
late to ensure that an affordably priced walk-up fare continued 
to be available for long-distance travel during the off-peak 
… This was to ensure that rail continued to offer an affordable 
alternative to the private car for such trips, reflecting the wider 
social benefits of leisure-related travel such as visiting family 
and friends.
A critique of the case for fare regulation
The above case for price controls can be challenged on a number 
of grounds. A general point is that market-power issues do not 
necessarily justify state intervention. Regulation is far from cost-
less and is prone to economic calculation problems and capture 
by special interests. Thus the costs of intervention may exceed 
the alleged costs of the original ‘market failure’ (Demsetz 1969).
In any case, the market power of rail firms would seem to be 
greatly exaggerated by the government. Although sunk costs 
and planning restrictions make it very difficult for new entrants 
to build competing infrastructure, rail is just one element in a 
diverse market for mobility that now includes low-cost virtual 
options such as video-conferencing and home-working. Trans-
port markets are therefore highly contestable and competition 
would act as a check on any rail firm seeking to take advantage 
of its ‘market power’. This is particularly obvious outside the 
London commuter belt where rail accounts for a very small pro-
portion of journeys.5 one might also consider the extent to which 
any increase in the ‘market power’ of rail firms is the result of 
government policies imposed since the mid 1990s, which have 
deliberately discouraged competing modes such as the private 
motor car (Wellings 2006). Low-cost transport modes seen in the 
5 In Britain as a whole, rail accounts for only 3 per cent of trips (DfT 2014b).
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developing world, such as shared taxis and private minibuses, 
have also effectively been prohibited in the UK.
Within Greater London itself there is clearly substantial 
contestability, even in the context of the state suppression of 
many low-cost options. Heavy rail competes with London Under-
ground services in much of the capital. There is also an extensive 
bus network offering relatively cheap fares to the main employ-
ment hubs. While the congestion charge and parking fees make 
driving too costly for many commuters, there are other private 
options. A high proportion of the city’s population lives within 
practical cycling distance of the central area, while motorbikes 
offer another fast and low-cost alternative. Some travellers might 
choose a combination of modes to make savings through com-
petition – for example, by driving from their home to a nearby 
tube station, bus route or a railway operated by a different train 
company.
Many of the above options are also available to longer-distance 
commuters travelling into central London from well outside the 
city boundary. In addition, it should be noted that there is a large 
and thriving commuter coaching industry already operating in 
competition with the railways. Journey times are typically slower 
but stops may be more convenient and fares are around 40 per 
lower than rail (Starkie 2013: 52). Coaches also offer pre-booked 
seats and wi-fi, enabling passengers to work during their trip 
(difficult on an overcrowded train).
In the longer term, train fares will of course affect the lo-
cational decisions of households. High prices will incentivise 
employees to move closer to work, even if this means living in 
less spacious housing or a less desirable area. Alternatively, 
households might move to a transport corridor in which cheaper 
journeys are available, for example, one served by a cheaper train 
operating company or low-cost commuter coaches.
Finally, improvements in communications technology mean 
that a high proportion of commuters now have the option of 
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working from home for at least some of the week. At the margin, 
higher fares would incentivise some workers to make fewer jour-
neys. overall there has been an 18 per cent fall in the number of 
commuter trips per person in England since the mid 1990s, a de-
velopment which might partly be explained by such innovations 
(DfT 2014b).
The various alternatives available to commuters effectively 
lower the revenue-maximising level of fares that can be charged 
by train companies, and, to use the government’s terminology, 
severely limit their ‘market power’.
If the economic rationale for regulating commuter fares is 
weak, it is weaker still for off-peak, long-distance journeys. There 
is ample spare capacity on the relevant train services and opera-
tors have strong incentives to offer low-cost tickets to reflect the 
very low marginal cost of additional passengers. This is indeed 
what happened after privatisation, with very cheap pre-booked 
off-peak fares becoming widely available. It seems likely that in 
the absence of regulation, some firms would also have offered 
low-cost tickets bought at stations immediately prior to travel 
or even on the train, albeit on a more restricted range of services.
Furthermore, the market for intercity travel is clearly highly 
contestable, with a very high rate of car ownership among the 
socio-economic groups who most frequently make such journeys. 
Extensive route networks are operated by coach firms such as 
National Express and Megabus, which offer fares as low as £1.50 
for long-distance trips,6 while many routes are also served by 
airlines. In addition, there is competition between rail firms on 
many routes. For example, a passenger travelling from London 
to Birmingham could choose Virgin Trains, Chiltern Railways 
or London Midland services. Yorkshire can be reached using 
East Coast, East Midlands Trains, Grand Central or Hull Trains. 
Modal combinations further increase the choice available to 
6 See https://www.megabus.com/.
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travellers, for instance, by enabling them to drive part of a jour-
ney then take the remainder by train.
Incentives for fare regulation
Given the contestability of transport markets, even in the Lon-
don commuter market but particularly on long-distance inter-
city journeys, an analysis of fare regulation should also examine 
alternative explanations for the imposition of price controls. A 
plausible hypothesis is that regulation has been driven primarily 
by the self-interest of key actors in the development of rail policy.
In the early 1990s rail privatisation was deeply unpopular and 
faced strong opposition among backbench Conservative MPs. 
There were fears that steep fare hikes could result in the loss of 
marginal constituencies, particularly in the London commuter 
belt, where rail commands a significant market share.
Accordingly, fare regulation may be better understood as 
a political policy rather than an economic one. It was arguably 
designed to counter opponents’ claims that privatisation would 
negatively affect the lives of key voting groups and fears it would 
deepen the unpopularity of an already weak government. Price 
controls were just one element of this risk-averse policy agenda, 
which also, for example, imposed regulations that made it very 
difficult for the industry to close even the most heavily loss-mak-
ing lines.
Wolmar (2001: 68) quotes one senior British Rail official:
I came across a number of confidential privatisation papers 
circulating about fare levels … These, when leaked (and they all 
implied fare rises and a loss of multi-operator tickets), were, I 
think, instrumental in forcing the Tory government to regulate 
real fares downward, reversing the trend they had applied to BR.
He continues (ibid.: 68–69):
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[F]ares regulation was one of the great victories for opponents 
of the privatisation. The original plan had been to regulate fares 
only where train operators had a virtual monopoly – such as on 
the London commuter routes … but ministers were keen to make 
privatisation more palatable and eventually, late in the process, 
a scheme to regulate season tickets, savers and some other fares 
was implemented as a sop to passengers. It was a marked rever-
sal from BR’s policy of using fares to restrict growth but, as with 
all aspects of privatisation, the implications for the economics 
of the railway were not thought through.
A rent-seeking coalition against taxpayers
Arguably the decision to introduce and persist with these pol-
icies has not just been the result of politicians seeking to ‘buy 
votes’. After privatisation, the range of special interest groups 
with a stake in the rail industry – and hence government sub-
sidies – expanded significantly to include various commercial 
entities such as train operating companies, lawyers, consultants 
and banks. As public choice theory explains, small, concentrated 
interest groups have far stronger incentives to devote resources 
to influencing policy than dispersed groups such as taxpayers. 
They also face fewer organisational problems and can more easily 
prevent free-riding (olson 1965).
While fare regulation is a source of significant inefficiencies 
in the rail sector, various special interests benefit from its ex-
istence and the resulting market distortions. Clearly, subsets of 
passengers perceive benefits from the arrangement, to the extent 
that it reduces their travel costs. Yet costs are imposed on those 
passengers who would prefer to pay higher fares in order to avoid 
overcrowding and associated delays. And travellers are inevit-
ably ignorant of the potential benefits from the entrepreneurship, 
innovation and market segmentation that are hindered by the 
regulations.
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The rail industry itself is a major beneficiary. Price controls in-
crease demand, particularly during peak periods, creating artifi-
cial capacity problems that are eventually ‘solved’ by large-scale 
state spending on railway infrastructure and new rolling stock. 
Such taxpayer support provides substantial financial gains to 
interests such as Network Rail officials, DfT bureaucrats, various 
consultancies, engineering firms and train manufacturers.
Thus it may be hypothesised that fare regulation and the re-
sulting disbursement of state funds sustains a ‘distributional co-
alition’ of special interests who gain financially from the current 
regulatory system. According to olson (1982: 44), distributional 
coalitions are ‘overwhelmingly oriented to struggles over the dis-
tribution of income and wealth rather than to the production of 
additional output’. In other words they are engaged in ‘rent-seek-
ing’ behaviour, extracting resources from the wider population 
through preferential subsidies and regulation. Such a group has 
‘little or no incentive to make any significant sacrifices in the in-
terest of the society; it can best serve its members’ interests by 
striving to seize a large share of society’s production for them. 
This will be expedient, moreover, even if the social costs of the 
change in the distribution exceed the amount redistributed by a 
huge multiple’ (ibid.).
While a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is clear that the rail industry commits substantial resources 
to rent-seeking activities. For example, lobbying for the High 
Speed  2 rail project has been undertaken by special interests 
such as engineering firms, train manufacturers and transport 
bureaucracies (see Wellings 2013). Claims that the southern 
West Coast Main Line – which carries, among other traffic, 
 regulated-fare commuter services – will soon be full, have 
been central to the public relations campaign for the new line. 
Proponents ignore the potential for more flexible pricing and 
market segmentation to make more intensive use of existing 
infrastructure.
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Similarly, price controls have successfully been promoted 
through the Fair Fares Now campaign run by the Campaign for 
Better Transport, which calls for ‘cheaper – affordable rail fares, 
including peak times and turn-up-and-go tickets’, regulated 
fares to ‘fall gradually, over time to the European average’ and 
for the ‘high premium paid for flexibility and peak-time travel’ 
to be reduced.7 Such policies are clearly a recipe for higher sub-
sidies from the taxpayer and would benefit significantly the 
distributional coalition represented by the rail lobby. And while 
the connection between the funding of organisations and their 
campaigning activity is not always clear cut, it is nevertheless 
the case that the Campaign for Better Transport is supported fi-
nancially by major players in the sector. In the post-privatisation 
era, supporters have included several train operating companies, 
as well as various government agencies.8
Another influential organisation, Passenger Focus, which has 
campaigned in support of fare regulation and opposed more 
flexibility in pricing, is sponsored directly by the Department 
of Transport (DfT), ostensibly in order to represent the interests 
of passengers. In 2013–14, the organisation received £4,930,000 
‘grant in aid’ from the DfT (Passenger Focus 2014: 15). Thus the 
government is effectively using taxpayers’ money to lobby itself 
(Snowdon 2012). Government officials employed to direct the rail 
industry are of course an important component of the distribu-
tional coalition.
However, it should be pointed out that there are constraints 
on such redistribution, for example in terms of the overall level 
of public spending and debt, as well as the voting power of tax-
payers. While the incentives for the latter to engage in debates on 
the level of rail subsidy are very weak indeed, they may exhibit 
7 http://www.bettertransport.org.uk/fair-fares-now (accessed 10 March 2015).
8 See Campaign for Better Transport Charitable Trust Report and Financial State-
ments, various years, and Transport 2000 Annual Review, various years.
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dissatisfaction with the overall level of taxation. And the rail lob-
by has to compete with numerous other distributional coalitions 
for state funds. Within government, HM Treasury constrains the 
budgets of state bureaucracies, including the various transport 
agencies.
Phasing out price controls
Fare regulation is partly responsible for the major problems fac-
ing Britain’s railways. It distorts patterns of demand, leading to 
overcrowding on some routes at certain times of day, while at the 
same time hindering use of the price mechanism to make better 
use of existing capacity. In turn, these inefficiencies create politi-
cal pressure for the government to fund expensive infrastructure 
enhancements. Price controls have thus played an important role 
in sustaining high levels of taxpayer support for the sector and 
the misallocation of investment towards poor-value rail schemes.
There is therefore a strong economic case for phasing out fare 
regulation completely or, at the very least, giving train operat-
ing companies far more flexibility in pricing. In particular, the 
introduction of ‘super-peak’ fares that charged passengers more 
for travelling during the very busiest periods, would flatten peak 
demand, thereby addressing overcrowding problems at low cost. 
Greater fare flexibility would also create possibilities for greater 
market segmentation, for example, by allowing train operators 
to introduce cut-price, high-capacity carriages (Starkie 2013: 
48–52). And deregulation would enable rail firms to make in-
frastructure enhancements on a commercial basis, since they 
would be free to charge passengers higher fares for an improved 
service. Accordingly, the level of taxpayer subsidy could be low-
ered substantially with beneficial effects for the wider economy.
Phasing out price controls therefore has the potential to re-
duce significantly the dependence of the rail industry on govern-
ment support and perhaps to remove it entirely on some parts 
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of the network.9 This would change dramatically the incentive 
structures facing the firms in the sector. Their profits would de-
pend to a far greater extent on the services they offered to their 
customers. The absence of subsidies would reduce the returns 
from rent-seeking behaviour.10 Thus the removal of fare regu-
lation has the potential to break up the distributional coalition 
that extracts resources from taxpayers and the wider economy.
Yet key elements of this coalition would potentially suffer 
substantial losses from such a policy shift, in particular, those 
firms and officials involved in the planning and construction of 
state-funded infrastructure enhancements. And, as happened 
during the privatisation process, reform could be obstructed 
by risk-averse politicians fearful of losing support from certain 
segments of the passenger population. In this respect it is telling 
that ministers recently decided to reject proposals for more flex-
ible pricing.11 Although the economic case for deregulating fares 
is very strong indeed, significant reform is unlikely while special 
interests continue to have a disproportionate influence over rail 
policy.
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8 PRICE CEILINGS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
Philip Booth and Stephen Davies
Controls and ceilings on the quantity and cost of credit are 
probably the oldest form of price control. They are also among 
the most damaging. often, as in the Islamic world or classical 
Greece, the very idea of lending money with interest attached 
is condemned as unnatural or impious. This was also, of course, 
the position of early Christians. However, so great is the need for 
credit in any functioning economy beyond subsistence level that, 
in practice, lending at interest still happens no matter what the 
theologians and philosophers may argue. What tends to happen, 
as with the medieval anti-usury laws, is that a ban on ‘excessive’ 
interest substitutes for a ban on all interest. In other words, there 
is a ceiling set on the level of interest that may be charged for a 
loan. This is quite simply a price cap and, like all such caps, it has 
economically damaging and disruptive effects.
Moreover, because of the central role of money in exchange 
and in economic activity in general, and given the central place 
of credit in facilitating growth and innovation, price ceilings on 
credit have impacts that are more extensive and harmful than 
those imposed on other aspects of economic life. In particular, 
because for every debtor there is also a creditor, interest rate 
caps have far reaching impacts on investment returns in general. 
As well as being a limit on charges to borrowers, they necessarily 
limit returns to certain kinds of investment and, indirectly, some 
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The most common form of interest ceiling is a cap on the level 
or amount of interest that can be charged to a borrower. Some-
times, limitations of this kind are imposed in general, on all kinds 
of loans and credit and on all borrowers, as for example during 
the Middle Ages in Europe (at least in theory). More often, caps 
are imposed on specific kinds of loan or credit. In these cases 
the restrictions are typically applied to credit products that are 
disproportionately used – or thought to be used – by people on 
low or irregular incomes. The usual goal of a ceiling on interest 
is to protect borrowers on low incomes from the consequences 
of their own lack of financial literacy (i.e. an information asym-
metry). However, this intention is usually portrayed as being a 
matter of protecting low-income borrowers against so-called 
‘predatory’ lenders.
The first part of this chapter will examine interest rate caps, 
which are being reintroduced in Britain. The second part will 
examine caps on charges for other financial products, specifi-
cally caps on pension charges, which are also being introduced 
in the UK. Though pensions are not widely studied by finance 
academics and often attract little public interest, pension fund 
assets total around 140 per cent of national income in the UK. 
Thus this new policy is of considerable importance.
Interest ceilings in post-war Britain
Historically, limits on credit in the UK, including price ceilings, 
were primarily a tool of macroeconomic management. The goal of 
these was, in fact, different from the goals of the interest controls 
described in the introduction: it was to reduce effective aggre-
gate demand by restricting access to credit. The most common 
form these controls took was a restriction on the total quantity of 
lending by financial institutions relative to the amount they had 
lent at an earlier date. As Table 10 shows, controls of this kind 
were imposed regularly between 1961 and the early 1970s.
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Table 10 Lending ceilings as a per cent of existing lending levels in 
post-war Britain
Description of control
Date Clearing banks Other banks Larger finance houses
July 1961 100% of June 1961 level
100% of June 1961 
level
100% of June 1961 
level
October 1962 Ceiling removed Ceiling removed Ceiling removed
May 1965 105% of March 1965 level
105% of March 1965 
level
105% of March 1965 
level
April 1967 Ceiling removed No change No change
November 1967 100% of November 1967 level
100% of November 
1967 level
100% of October 1967 
level
May 1968 104% of November 1967 level
104% of November 
1967 level No change
November 1968 98% of November 1967 level
102% of November 
1967 level
98% of October 1967 
level
April 1970 105% of March 1970 level
107% of March 1970 
level
105% of March 1970 
level
March 1971 107.5% of March 1970 level
109.5% of March 
1970 level
107.5% of March 1970 
level
Chancellors also imposed and removed stringent restrictions 
on the availability and scope of hire purchase. At the same time, 
Chancellors used direct controls and pressure via the Bank of 
England to limit the upward movement of interest rates in re-
sponse to a reduction in the supply of credit relative to the de-
mand for it. In other words, the price control was imposed to try 
to mitigate the consequences of a directly engineered shortage of 
supply by government. This attempt to control credit and inter-
est rates was all in the context of extensive private regulation in 
the shape of a cartel among clearing banks and another among 
building societies in which these institutions did not compete 
with one another over deposit charges and interest rates.
one result was a lack of innovation in financial services, 
although this began to change towards the end of the 1960s. 
The main effect of the controls was a shortage of credit. The 
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shortage could often be dramatic – mortgage ‘famines’ such as 
the one that occurred at the end of the 1970s were a recurring 
phenomenon.
In 1971 many of the controls on credit expansion were re-
moved, with the aim of increasing competition in the banking 
sector (although building societies were unaffected). At the same 
time, interest rates were still kept low. The result was a sharp ex-
pansion in credit with bank lending to the private sector increas-
ing by 33 per cent in 1973. one response was the so-called ‘corset’ 
or Supplementary Special Deposits Scheme, which forced banks 
to place extra non-interest-bearing deposits with the Bank of 
England – this was imposed three times between 1973 and 1979. 
However, just as a real-life corset leads to a sudden expansion of 
pent up flesh when removed, so each episode of this scheme was 
followed by a sudden surge in lending.
After the 1979 election there was a general move away from 
caps on credit that had been such a major feature of post-war 
policy. Governments of both parties encouraged innovation in 
the financial services sector relying on interest rates set by the 
central bank as the main instrument for controlling credit de-
mand and supply. In other words, explicit controls on the price of 
credit were abandoned.
The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s led to a great expansion 
of existing kinds of credit and credit-issuing institutions. At the 
same time there was a great deal of product innovation and the 
market became much more competitive and innovative. The car-
tels and private agreements that had regulated most consumer 
credit before the late 1980s were swept away and it became much 
easier for new players to enter the market. The Financial Conduct 
Authority now estimates that there are no fewer than 50,000 
firms that come under its remit and firms both enter and leave 
the market with far greater frequency than in the past.1
1 http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/firm-types (accessed 10 March 2015).
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Interest caps on pay-day lending
one area where innovation was most dramatic was in the mar-
ket for short-term credit or pay-day loans. Short-term credit 
has been a staple feature of British life for a long time. The best 
known form was pawnbroking, where short-term credit was se-
cured against an asset (the ‘pledge’) that was deposited with the 
pawnbroker and forfeited if the loan was not repaid. Unsecured 
short-term credit by contrast was typically provided informally 
by money lenders. Since 2000, and especially since 2006, there 
has been rapid growth in the use of this kind of unsecured credit. 
There has also been significant innovation in this area and it 
is now offered by firms with established business structures 
using online application and credit checking, which speeds up 
the process, provides greater anonymity and can be combined 
with direct deposit of the loan into the applicant’s bank account. 
All of this has made this kind of credit much more attractive to 
borrowers. It is this form of credit that has led to proposals for 
interest rate caps for the first time in the UK since the early 1980s. 
It is also subject to price control in other countries.
The purposes of short-term credit
Short-term credit has two main purposes. The first is to pro-
vide a way of dealing with a cash-flow problem where there are 
short-term demands for money that are due before anticipated 
income will arrive. The second, more controversial, use is to 
provide repeated short-term supplements to income for people 
who either have erratic incomes or who have ‘lumpy’ expendi-
ture that does not match up smoothly with their income flow 
and who also do not have enough savings to deal with this prob-
lem. Short-term credit should not be used to finance purchases 
or pay other debts – other forms of finance are more appropri-
ate in those cases.
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Short-term lenders of unsecured credit are therefore meeting 
a genuine need and the kinds of innovations that have been seen 
since the 1990s are ones that help to fit the product more closely 
to consumers’ desires. However, they have attracted a great deal 
of hostility and this has led to a move to cap the cost of this type 
of credit. Some of the complaints against short-term lenders 
relate to straightforward bad business practice, such as wrong-
fully sending out letters to customers that claimed to be legal 
demands for repayment when in fact they were not. These kinds 
of action should be the subject of other forms of law or regulation 
and, in any case, have no bearing on the nature of the product per 
se or its cost.
However, many of the complaints do not relate to such mat-
ters. one common subject of complaint is the annual percentage 
rate,2 known as the APR, of short-term credit, which is often 
calculated at being well over 1,000 per cent. However, this is a 
misleading measure of the cost of the loan, because the term of 
the loan is both short and fixed and the charge attached to the 
loan is more in the nature of a fee for service. So a charge of £20 
for a £100 two-week loan would be translated into an extremely 
high APR, but much of that charge will relate to the set-up costs 
of the loan as well as compensation for the risk of non-repayment. 
It is unreasonable to compound and annualise such charges. 
Comparing the APR from a consumer credit product with the 
interest rate on long-term loans is like comparing the cost of a 
hotel with that of renting a house and working out that the hotel 
is much more expensive by multiplying the nightly rate by 365 – 
the point is that hotels and permanent or long-stay residences 
are completely different products.
Another charge against the lenders is that the bulk of the 
profit made by companies in this sector comes from people who 
are unable to repay their loans on time and who roll them over, 
2 Technically, approximate to the effective annualised rate of interest on the product.
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incurring repeated charges and very high repayment costs. 
Certainly, a high proportion of people who take out short-term 
credit do indeed roll it over. However, the charge rate for out-
right default is no higher for this kind of credit than for others 
– in the US it runs at 3.2 per cent of total receivable payments for 
a typical lender.3 This is because most borrowers do not actu-
ally roll over the loan repeatedly and the rollover figures are a 
product of the very short terms of the typical advance – in other 
words, the borrower wished to borrow for two or three months 
initially and does so by rolling over a one-month loan. At the 
end of the two or three months, most borrowers repay in full. 
What is found is that many customers use short-term credit re-
peatedly rather than roll over a single loan – in the UK the aver-
age customer takes out credit of this kind six times in a year 
(the historical usage of pawnbrokers in British working-class 
communities also shows this pattern). Ultimately, this is as a 
result of a combination of low wages (reflecting low product-
ivity) and artificially high living costs, particularly for energy 
and housing.4 Short-term credit is enabling people to deal with 
this situation, which would otherwise have much more serious 
consequences such as defaults on utility bills and mortgages or 
rent.
At the same time, a large number of people who take out con-
sumer credit loans are not on low incomes. A Competition and 
Markets Authority survey found, for example, that: three in ten 
pay-day loan customers have an average annual income of more 
than £36,000; more than half could have used an alternative 
form of credit; pay-day loan customers are more likely to be in 
work than the population as a whole; and pay-day loan custom-
ers have similar levels of education as the population as a whole. 
3 See page 5 of http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1299704/000104746912002 
758/a2208026z10-k.htm. (accessed 10 March 2015).
4 http://www.r3.org.uk/index.cfm?page=1114&element=19650 (accessed 10 March 
2015).
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Such people will generally be using consumer credit pragmati-
cally and are not necessarily especially vulnerable.5
Proposed price controls in UK consumer credit markets
From 2010 onwards, political pressure grew for controls to be 
imposed on this type of credit, particularly price controls in the 
form of caps on interest charges and the total amount repayable. 
Following an office of Fair Trading (oFT) report and pressure 
from organisations such as Compass and an early day motion in 
the House of Commons, the newly formed Financial Conduct Au-
thority (FCA) announced in July 2014 that it would impose caps 
of this kind with effect from January 2015.6 This decision was 
confirmed on 11 November 2014. Rather than setting a cap on 
the APR (the model used in Australia), the FCA has decreed that, 
for new loans, and for loans that are rolled over, interest and fees 
combined must not exceed 0.8 per cent per day of the amount 
borrowed while default fees are capped at £15 for any one loan. 
The total cost of a loan must not exceed the actual amount bor-
rowed (so if £100 is borrowed, the lender cannot require repay-
ment of more than £200). All of this is in addition to other kinds 
of regulation already announced such as limits on the number of 
allowed rollovers, which will themselves raise business costs and 
reduce profit margins significantly.7
The FCA argues in its preliminary paper that it has consid-
ered various options and has rejected calls for a cap at a level 
that would make almost all lending of this kind uneconomic. 
5 https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5329df8aed915d0e5d000339/14 
0131_payday_lending_tns_survey_report_.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).
6 For the initial consultation paper, see http://www.fca.org.uk/news/cp13-10-consu 
mer-credit-detailed-proposals (accessed 10 March 2015). The final proposals are at 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/cp14-10-proposals-for-a-price-cap-on-high-cost-sh 
ort-term-credit (accessed 10 March 2015).
7 http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28305886 (accessed 10 March 2015).
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However, it also estimates that the caps it has imposed will re-
duce the revenue of the 200 firms in this area by £420 million 
(42 per cent).8 This will inevitably have a dramatic effect. In fact, 
the FCA itself states that, in the five months between February 
and July of 2014 (in anticipation of the initial announcement), the 
number of loans and the amount borrowed fell by 35 per cent.
The impact of charge caps
The most obvious impact of charge caps is that firms will with-
draw from the market and that access to short-term credit will be 
reduced. The remaining lenders may then tighten their require-
ments so as to reduce their exposure – in other words, if costs are 
capped, margins will be maintained by only serving the better 
credit risks. The FCA said in November that it expected 99 per 
cent of the firms operating in the sector to go out of business en-
tirely or withdraw from this type of lending.9 The result will be, as 
was the case in the 1960s and 1970s, a credit shortage for certain 
classes of borrower. Again, the FCA itself estimates that between 
7 per cent and 11 per cent of existing borrowers will be unable to 
gain short-term credit in the future (some 70,000  people).10 This 
is, of course, only an estimate and the methodology used means 
that any departure from this figure is likely to be in the direction 
of higher numbers rather than lower.
A common argument is that consumer credit interest caps 
will lead to an increase in outright illegal money lending by 
seriously unsavoury people who are unlikely to bother with 
8 This and other details can be found in the full text of the consultation paper 
at http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/consultation-papers/cp14-10 (ac-
cessed 10 March 2015).
9 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-11/u-k-s-fca-to-introduce-2015-price 
-cap-on-payday-lenders.html (accessed 10 March 2015).
10 http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-confirms-price-cap-rules-for-payday-lenders (ac-
cessed 10 March 2015).
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even the pretence of legal action to recover bad debts. However, 
evidence from the US is that, while this does happen, it is a 
less significant consequence than one might expect (see Mayer 
2012). It is more probable that people will turn to informal so-
cial networks or family to fund their needs. This means, though, 
that people who are in stable social or familial networks will be 
less severely affected while the bulk of the impact will be felt 
by the vulnerable and socially isolated. Moreover, people are 
unlikely to be able to use connections of this kind for regular or 
repeated access to short-term credit. Given that most users of 
pay-day loans are employed, this means that problems caused 
by the combination of low pay and high living costs are likely to 
become more frequent and acute. The most likely effects down 
the line will be higher rates of default on items such as rent or 
energy bills and potentially poorer credit records for the least 
well off, making it more difficult for them to obtain cheap credit 
in the future.11
Another effect of this cap is that, in addition to reducing both 
the number of firms and the overall amount of credit being sup-
plied, it will remove much of the incentive to innovate because it 
will reduce the likelihood of new entrants to the market pioneer-
ing novel practices such as online applications and evaluations. 
Instead, it will consolidate the position of larger players and 
leave them less vulnerable to challenge. The most likely outcome 
is an oligopolistic market – the FCA anticipates that there will be 
about four large lenders left.
In general, as well as reducing the total amount of credit avail-
able, there will be a reduction in the range of products. In par-
ticular, the move that was already taking place towards longer 
terms for loans (that would deal with the problem of missed 
payments and rollovers identified earlier) will almost certainly 
11 https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5329df8aed915d0e5d000339/14 
0131_payday_lending_tns_survey_report_.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).
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be cut short by the limitation of default charges to a flat rate of 
£15 per loan. In other kinds of credit that have more than one 
payment due (such as credit cards) the usual practice is to have a 
non-payment fee for each instance of a missed payment and this 
is a more accurate reflection of business costs.
The concern about the impact of charge caps is not simply 
speculative. The evidence suggests that charge caps on con-
sumer credit have significant economic and social detriment. A 
report for the then Department of Trade and Industry (Policis 
2004) found that, in France and Germany, which both have in-
terest rate caps, between 20 and 25 per cent of people who had 
trouble with debts experienced complete financial breakdown 
compared with 4 per cent in the UK. Financial breakdown of this 
kind is often accompanied by subsequent difficulties in obtain-
ing housing, employment and the purchase of essentials such 
as food. Furthermore, the proportion of those who are credit 
impaired and who use illegal loans was reported to be tiny in 
the UK – around 3 per cent – while it was around 10 per cent in 
Germany. Those who cannot get credit, in markets where there 
are interest rate caps, tend to turn to even more expensive or 
less desirable sources of finance. These may incur much higher 
explicit charges or may involve the use of mail order to purchase 
essentials at much higher prices. Morgan and Strain (2008) in a 
study for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found very un-
desirable effects from consumer credit restrictions (of a much 
more draconian type than those proposed in the UK) in some US 
states. They conclude (page 26):
Georgians and North Carolinians do not seem better off since 
their states outlawed payday credit: they have bounced more 
checks, complained more about lenders and debt collectors, and 
have filed for Chapter 7 (‘no asset’) bankruptcy at a higher rate. 
The increase in bounced checks represents a potentially huge 
transfer from depositors to banks and credit unions. Banning 
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payday loans did not save Georgian households $154 million per 
year … it cost them millions per year in returned check fees …
[our findings are] consistent with the … hypothesis that payday 
credit is cheaper than the bounce ‘protection’ that earns mil-
lions for credit unions and banks. Forcing households to replace 
costly credit with even costlier credit is bound to make them 
worse off.
The most serious feature of the FCA’s paper, however, is their 
explicit statement that they are considering extending these 
kinds of price ceilings to other kinds of personal credit such as 
credit cards and unsecured loans. Indeed, it is interesting to note 
that short-term consumer credit products can often be better 
value than temporary bank overdrafts. There is a real danger that 
price controls on one form of credit that is currently unpopular 
with a political elite which seldom uses it will lead to a more 
widespread adoption of price ceilings on credit in general.
Charge caps on pensions
In the last year or so, politicians have been involved in a ‘bidding 
war’ to cap the cost of pension fund management. Despite UK 
pensions minister Steve Webb saying in 2013 that he would not 
cap charges,12 while arguing that to do so would be like capping 
the price of a tin of baked beans, he changed his mind in 2014. 
Webb launched a consultation on widespread charge caps before 
deciding upon a cap of 0.75 per cent of funds under management 
for pensions built up under the auto-enrolment scheme.13 It is 
12 http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/pensions/article-2267536/Steve-Webb-Cap 
ping-pension-charges-like-capping-price-baked-beans.html (accessed 10 March 
2015).
13 This is a special pensions sub-market, which is likely to grow rapidly over time. It re-
lates to pensions accumulated under an arrangement whereby people are assumed 
to be members of a particular type of defined contribution pension scheme unless 
they actively opt out.
PR IC E C E I L I NGS I N F I N A NC I A L M A R K ETS
147
government policy to review this charge cap in 2017 and, poten-
tially, to include other costs of pension fund management within 
the cap.14 Very shortly after Webb’s announcement, the opposi-
tion Labour Party responded by promising that an initial 0.75 
per cent cap would be reduced to 0.5 per cent in the course of a 
parliament.15 It is worth noting in passing that proposed charge 
caps are always set at round numbers, which suggests that they 
are driven by the need for politicians to obtain headlines rather 
than by some attempt at determining a charge cap at which the 
costs of the cap may be less than the benefits.
Market prices or politicians’ preferences?
There are obvious dangers in having the price of any product 
determined by politicians rather than by the market process. 
Politicians may believe that they act as independent arbiters in 
the public interest but the bidding war in relation to pension 
charge caps suggests otherwise. To begin with, politicians or 
regulators cannot know what the ‘correct’ level of charges should 
be. Secondly, politicians and others in the political process are 
not disinterested. They may well act in their own interests rather 
than in the general public interest. This, in turn, may reflect the 
positioning by rent-seeking interest groups within the political 
process (see Tullock (2006) for a discussion of rent seeking).
one such interest group is incumbent providers of pensions. A 
charge cap can reduce the threat from new entrants to the market 
who could have developed more innovative products with charg-
ing structures that contravene the charge cap. For example, when 
Steve Webb’s initial proposal for a 0.75 per cent charge cap was 
announced, Legal and General, one of the biggest incumbent in-
surers in the market argued that the cap was too high and should 
14 http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/news-and-analysis/pensions/govt-to-cap-pen 
sion-charges-at-075-from-april-2015/2008491.article (accessed 10 March 2015).
15 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26086488 (accessed 10 March 2015).
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be reduced to 0.5 per cent.16 Phil Loney, Chief Executive of a much 
smaller and mutual company, Royal London, noted that, after the 
announcement of the 0.75 per cent charge cap proposal, there was 
no fall in the share price of larger insurance companies and that 
the proposed ceiling would become a norm (in effect, both a floor 
and a ceiling) when the process of competition could have led to 
lower charges in the long term in the absence of a cap.17
Charge caps also lead to redistribution between different 
types of pension scheme members. Given that it is generally not 
more expensive to manage larger than smaller funds, a cap set 
at a given percentage of the value of a pension fund will tend 
to benefit savers with smaller funds. Thus, savers with smaller 
funds become another potential rent-seeking group in the polit-
ical process.
Although there is evidence that large firms and trade bodies 
regularly meet government,18 there is no clear evidence of large-
scale lobbying in relation to (or indeed significant interest in) 
this issue. What would appear to be more plausible is that pol-
iticians are responding to what are sometimes termed ‘expres-
sive interests’. These constitute ill-informed or irrational general 
views along the lines suggested by, for example, Caplan (2007).19 
If the vast majority of the population is ignorant of the impact 
of regulation on charges, then politicians may get applause from 
expressive interests by appealing to people who believe they may 
benefit from a charge cap but who do not fully understand the 
implications. The general public may well believe that there are 
benefits from simplicity which a uniform capped charge will 
bring without being aware of the more subtle problems to which 
16 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25132782 (accessed 10 March 2015).
17 http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/opinion/phil-loney-steve-webbs-pension-cha 
rge-cap-is-bad-economics/2008826.article (accessed 10 March 2015).
18 http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/2013436.article (accessed 10 March 2015).
19 The phrase ‘expressive interests’ was originally used by Brennan and Lomasky 
(1993).
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it may give rise. Indeed, strong consumer support for simple 
charging structures has been demonstrated in energy markets 
(see ofgem 2011). The benefit of market competition which leads 
to differentiated products with different pricing structures may 
not be something that consumers welcome in the abstract – and 
is something that the industry may well oppose too if competi-
tion can be restricted by a uniform, regulated charging structure.
This response to voters would certainly explain the fact that, 
as soon as the possibility of charge caps was announced, there 
was a ‘bidding war’ between the government and opposition to 
design ‘harsher’ measures. This culminated in pensions minister 
Steve Webb saying: ‘We are going to put charges in a vice – and 
we will tighten the pressure year after year.’20
There are therefore clear disadvantages of using the political 
process to determine charges. The outcome may be irrational, 
or it may involve politicians responding to the interests of rent 
seekers, or both. There is also a danger that, once a regulatory 
role is established in this field, there are few constraints on its 
expansion. For example, soon after the announcement regard-
ing pension fund charge caps, the government announced that 
it would also ban charges for advice and the provision of special 
discounts to active members still contributing to their pension 
funds.21 It seems likely that the whole structure of prices in this 
market will become controlled by the political process respond-
ing to rent-seeking and expressive interests.
Problems caused by charge caps in fund management
(a) Price stickiness. Proponents of price regulation (for example, of 
minimum wages) often point to price stickiness within markets 
20 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/insurers-warn-over-govern 
ment-cap-on-pension-plan-charges-9220147.html (accessed 10 March 2015).
21 Ibid.
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for a justification for intervention. This is a well-known theoret-
ical feature of oligopolistic markets covered in standard text-
books, though it is a difficult feature to investigate empirically. 
oligopolists may fear that, if they raise prices, others will not fol-
low and, given the intense competition between a few big players, 
demand will be elastic. on the other hand, if they lower prices, 
other firms may well follow and thus demand will be inelastic 
when an individual firm moves prices in a downward direction. 
Individual firms may always lose from moving prices from cur-
rent levels in either direction: this can lead to price stickiness.
As noted above, it is possible for large incumbents in the 
pension management market to operate at a level of costs below 
the forthcoming charge cap. Imposing a ceiling on charges may 
institutionalise that level of charges and make it even less likely 
that a large firm in an oligopolistic market will reduce charges. A 
charge ceiling could exacerbate the very problem it is designed to 
solve and certainly provides no further incentive for incumbents 
to move their charges below the cap. This is not just theoretical 
nit picking from opponents of charge caps; the government’s of-
fice of Fair Trading itself said: ‘Set too high, a cap can become a 
target for providers’ (oFT 2014: 26).
(b) Charge caps and market entry. As noted, a charge cap may 
prevent new entry into the market and it is often new entrants 
that transform markets and bring hugely increased benefits for 
customers from innovation. Given the benefits of scale in fund 
management and the cost of raising capital for new entrants, it is 
difficult for a new entrant to compete directly with incumbents. 
New entrants will often have to compete on the basis of their 
novel features such as providing ‘ethical’ investments, fund man-
agement strategies that change with a member’s age, bespoke 
services, and so on. In the first few years, new entrants may then 
not be able to set charges within a cap. A permanent oligopoly 
characterised by an absence of innovation may result. Again, as 
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some respondents to the oFT consultation stated (Department 
for Work and Pensions 2014: 45): ‘Furthermore, a default fund 
charge cap may act as an entry barrier to new providers, which, 
combined with the possible withdrawal of some providers, may 
result in an oligopoly’, and ‘we do see issues for the DC market if 
a cap is introduced at a level that could act as a barrier to entry. 
The DWP should ensure that the cap that is introduced does not 
promote imperfect competition by introducing barriers to entry’. 
once again, the problem with a charge cap is that politicians do 
not know what the ‘right’ level of charge should be and, if they 
did know it, they would have few incentives to set the cap at that 
level.
(c) Charge caps and withdrawal from the market. A charge cap, de-
fined as a percentage of funds under management, may well make 
selling business to low-paid people or people who otherwise have 
small savings unprofitable, leaving these markets unserved. Fur-
thermore, the cost of administering a new contribution that is 
made to a fund is greater than the cost of managing money that 
has previously been invested. This may lead to pension providers 
targeting only those customers who will make the largest con-
tributions or who make contributions for a long period of time 
(probably younger-to-middle-aged members). Indeed, pensions 
expert Ros Altman has noted that the government’s own pension 
vehicle set up for the management of contributions through its 
auto-enrolment scheme would not be compliant with the charge 
cap:
The charge structure of the taxpayer-backed NEST scheme does 
not properly fit with the aims of a simple charge cap. For a charge 
cap to work most effectively, customers must be able to easily 
compare schemes with each other. Two-tier charge models make 
this difficult. NEST has an initial contribution charge of 1.8% 
plus a 0.3% AMC annual fee, while NoW: pensions charges an 
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£18 initial fee, plus 0.3% AMC – these cannot easily be compared 
with schemes that have a TER [total expense ratio] of 0.5%. The 
Pensions Policy Institute calculates that older workers in NEST 
are particularly disadvantaged. Those who are auto-enrolled at 
age 60 and contribute until their state pension age will pay far 
more in charges with NEST than with a 0.75% cap. As it is older 
workers who will retire first under auto-enrolment, it is disap-
pointing that reform of NEST’s charges has not been included.22
But different products of a similar generic type rarely cost 
exactly the same; and costs are different in respect of consumers 
with different sized funds or where members expect to be con-
tributing for a short period of time. Uniform charges where costs 
are not uniform is a recipe for highly distorted markets with 
many parts of the population left under-served.
Indeed, the 2013 DWP Charges Survey noted that scheme size 
was one of the main factors determining charges.23 However, the 
DWP argues that members of different size schemes should face 
the same levels of charges. In other words, the government seeks 
to make cross subsidies in the pensions market compulsory. This 
is a policy that seems designed to lead to pension providers with-
drawing either explicitly or implicitly (through targeted market-
ing) from those parts of the market that currently serve smaller 
employers and less-well-off and some older employees. Indeed, 
the government argued in its own consultation on charge caps 
that members of smaller schemes would benefit most because 
members of larger schemes enjoyed lower charges (DWP 2014: 
57). If larger schemes enjoy lower charges because they are in-
trinsically cheaper to manage, imposing charge caps will simply 
22 http://pensionsandsavings.com/pensions/pension-charge-cap-another-piece-of 
-the-jigsaw/ (accessed 10 March 2015).
23 https://w w w.gov.uk/government/publications/def ined-contribution-pen 
sion-schemes-landscape-and-charges-survey-2013 (accessed 10 March 2015).
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distort the market and could lead to poor-quality provision or no 
provision at all for some groups.
In fact, the 2013 DWP Charges Survey would suggest that 
the market behaves in a rational way and produces the result 
that would be expected in a market with workable competition. 
According to the survey, the key determinants of the annual 
management charge were the size of the scheme (bigger schemes 
had significantly lower charges); the level of commission; the 
level of contributions; and the age of the scheme (older schemes 
had higher charges as innovation and competitive pressure 
have since driven down costs and charges). Why are price caps 
to be introduced in a market that seems to be functioning well? 
Furthermore, why are price caps to be structured in a way that 
will encourage cross subsidies and reduce competition? The an-
swer to this question, once again, is that politicians wish to set 
charges on pension scheme investment funds in order to seek 
applause from expressive interests who lack the information and 
incentives to assess the costs and benefits of the policy.
(d) Charge caps and ‘whack a mole’. Charges on pension funds can 
cover the provision of a number of services provided by the pen-
sion company. Typically, as noted, costs are much higher when a 
pension product has just been sold. Traditionally, providers have 
tried to recoup these ‘set-up’ costs through a level annual charge, 
where the charge is higher than their costs in later years and 
lower than their costs in earlier years. If such an annual charge 
is capped at an uneconomic level, providers might well try to 
charge employers who set up pension schemes separately for the 
initial services they provide (for example, set-up costs, costs of 
advice, initial administration, and so on). once again, this prob-
lem was noted by the government (DWP 2014: 45):
Another theme that emerged in several responses was the 
risk of more frequent ‘employer charges’. often providers offer 
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middleware services to employers free of charge, and build the 
cost of these into the members’ charges. Following the introduc-
tion of a default fund charge cap, providers may shift responsi-
bility for these costs onto employers.
The document went on to note that the existence of such 
changes may mean that, once an employer had set up a fund, 
they might be unwilling to switch providers even if it was in the 
best interests of members to do so, as employers would have to 
incur these initial set-up costs again. This could then reduce 
competition as the DWP itself noted.
Anticipating that a charge cap on pension products might 
lead to employers being charged directly for particular services, 
the government indicated that such charges might be banned. 
The next step could then be to charge employees directly, but it 
is hardly likely that, if charges levied on employers would not be 
tolerated by the government, direct charges on employees would 
be. Thus regulation begets further regulation.
The same – and related – issues arise with regard to the struc-
ture of investment funds. If charges are capped, it is less likely that 
niche investment categories, which are expensive to manage, will 
be offered to members of pension funds, even if they provide sig-
nificant benefits. Alternatively, pension providers may offer funds 
with different structures that hide charges. For example, a fund 
investing in real estate may incur high charges, but these could 
be hidden by using a fund which invests in real estate investment 
companies. Very low charges could be charged by the fund while 
the real estate investment companies themselves incur high man-
agement costs. Such devices to repackage charges could be used in 
other niche areas of investment management such as internation-
al equity investment in emerging markets, infrastructure funds 
and private equity. Surely they would then attract regulation too.
The government has also indicated that it will ban firms that 
reward persistent savings behaviour by giving discounts to active 
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members who are still paying contributions. This would seem to 
be a difficult policy to justify. In terms of its possible impacts, it 
is worth noting that switching in electricity markets has fallen by 
50 per cent since the energy regulator banned selective discounts 
in 2008.24 The result of the policy of banning selective discounts 
in energy markets was that charges rose for the minority but did 
not fall for the majority, and competition was undermined.
When regulation distorts the market and undermines com-
petition, both consumers and service providers will respond. 
Politicians will then respond to the attempts to avoid simple 
regulation by introducing more complex and comprehensive 
regulation.
Conclusion
Price regulation in financial markets does not have an illustri-
ous history. Proposals for ceilings on charges have recently been 
developed for large areas of the UK’s already heavily regulated 
consumer finance markets. There are many undesirable con-
sequences of such regulation. For example, the evidence suggests 
that vulnerable consumers can be driven underground. In the 
market for pensions, charge caps could impede competition and 
create price stickiness so that price ceilings simultaneously be-
come floors. Politically regulated charges can be determined by 
vested interests, rent-seeking groups and politicians seeking the 
short-term appreciation of voter groups who are (rationally) not 
well informed about the issues.
There is evidence that these areas of consumer financial mar-
kets work well without charge caps. Furthermore, certainly in 
the case of pensions, other actions could be taken to lower costs 
by increasing competition. For example, McClymont and Tarrant 
24 Evidence to House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Select Committee. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenergy/108/ 
108vw23.htm (accessed 10 March 2015).
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(2013) have, along with an industry trade body, the National As-
sociation of Pension Funds, proposed that trust-based pension 
schemes should be able to scale up to achieve economies of scale 
and develop forms of governance so that members are repre-
sented more effectively.25 Existing and forthcoming government 
regulation already pushes up the costs of pensions and custom-
ers would benefit from liberalisation. For example, the forthcom-
ing EU regulation of insurers, known as Solvency II, could reduce 
pension annuities by between 5 and 20 per cent, dwarfing any 
benefits from charge caps, even if caps have the benefits their 
proponents suggest.
If new regulations in relation to charges were to be intro-
duced, they could take the form of a very simple requirement on 
employers to explain to employees why their pension provider 
was significantly more expensive than the National Employment 
Savings Trust26 if it were so. This would be a simple measure that 
would improve information flows and competition. It would also 
be a stable measure that would not lead to pressure for further 
regulation. While the authors do not believe that such regula-
tion is necessary, it would certainly be better than alternative 
proposals.
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9 UNIVERSITY PRICE CONTROLS
Steven Schwartz
I believe there’s something out there watching over us. Unfortu-
nately, it’s the government.
Woody Allen
In 1998, the government set undergraduate university fees at 
£1,000 per year.1 If prices increased in line with inflation, the fee 
today (late 2014) would be £1,537. Instead, the average university 
charges almost five times this amount (£8,647) (Paton 2013).2 
This stratospheric price rise would constitute a strong argument 
for government-mandated controls except for one problem – the 
government did control university fees over the entire 16-year 
period. And it still does. Without government price ceilings, uni-
versity fees would probably have soared even higher. Vice-chan-
cellors certainly wanted them to. Even now, they claim that the 
£9,000 price ceiling is below the market rate (some say it is below 
their costs).3 Yet, the same vice-chancellors are preparing to 
increase their student numbers by 30,000 (Graham 2013). Irra-
tional? Incomprehensible? Perverse? Welcome to the  topsy-turvy 
world of higher education.
1 In the UK, responsibility for universities has been devolved to the individual coun-
tries. This chapter focuses on public universities in England with a few references to 
other UK countries, to universities further afield and to for-profit institutions.
2 In 2015, the average fee will rise to £8,830.
3 Andrew Hamilton, oxford Vice-Chancellor’s oration (2013).
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The aim of this chapter is to explain why university price con-
trols have been so ineffective. Along the way, we will take a Willie 
Wonka tour through the arcane world of higher education. Like 
Charlie in the chocolate factory, you will be amazed, puzzled and 
sometimes a little frightened by what you see.
Higher education is a business
Visit a UK university and you are bound to see impressive build-
ings (both new and ancient). At some point, you may also encoun-
ter a decorative crest which looks like a medieval coat of arms. 
The crest is usually accompanied by a motto, normally in English 
but sometimes rendered in Latin, Gaelic or Welsh. The formal 
buildings, crests and mottoes combine to convey a seriousness of 
purpose, a sense of history and an aura of prestige.
To judge by their mottoes, universities have noble aims (for 
example, ‘truth lies open to all’; ‘let us seek higher things’; and 
‘for the common good’). These are platitudes, of course, but there 
is truth in them – universities are vital social institutions. They 
educate the next generation of leaders; their research deepens 
our understanding of our world; and they promote social mobil-
ity by giving people from all walks of life a chance to realise their 
full intellectual potential.
Their purposes are lofty and worthwhile, but it is important 
to keep in mind that universities are also businesses. They pur-
chase equipment, consume supplies and employ labour to create 
products and services, which they sell at a price. Costs constrain 
the volume and quality of their output, and revenues influence 
which services and products they provide (Winston 1999). If their 
income fails to exceed their expenditures, then universities even-
tually go bankrupt. In short, universities display the characteris-
tics of a normal business.
University income comes from a variety of sources: govern-
ment subsidies; student fees; philanthropic donations; research 
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contracts; commercial patents; branch campuses in foreign coun-
tries; credentialing; spin-out companies; property development; 
consulting; investment returns; and an array of sub-businesses 
(catering, conferences, accommodation, souvenir T-shirts). These 
revenues can add up – Cambridge University’s yearly income is 
around £1.4 billion4 – yet few universities make profits. This is 
not bad management; it is entirely deliberate. Except for a small 
number of proprietary institutions, universities – both public 
and private – are not-for-profit enterprises. This status not only 
gives them generous tax advantages, but it also makes universi-
ties attractive to philanthropists (who is going to donate money 
to BP, HSBC or Apple?). Non-profit status is also good for public 
relations. Students, parents and even business leaders seem to 
trust not-for-profit institutions more than they trust profit-mak-
ing ones (Rose-Ackerman 1996).
Although they are not-for-profit businesses, successful universi-
ties make money. Cambridge University finished the 2012 financial 
year with a ‘surplus’ of more than £70 million.5 Unlike profit-mak-
ing businesses, universities do not distribute their surpluses to 
shareholders. Instead, they use them to improve teaching, conduct 
research, construct new facilities, purchase equipment and award 
bursaries to needy students. Universities also use their surpluses 
to provide staff with higher salaries, managers with better perks 
and students with more lavish facilities. Just because an institu-
tion is not-for-profit does not mean that no one benefits.
University price controls are ubiquitous
The problems caused by price controls have been known since 
biblical times (Schuettinger and Butler 1979). If a price floor is 
4 University of Cambridge (2013) Reports and financial statements for the year ended 
31 July.
5 University of Cambridge, op. cit.
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set too high, there will be surpluses. If a price ceiling is set too 
low, there will be shortages. This is the conventional wisdom. 
Unfortunately, when it comes to universities, the conventional 
wisdom is widely ignored. In England, the government imposes a 
price ceiling of £9,000 per year on the fees paid by home and EU 
undergraduates in public universities. Most universities charge 
the full £9,000 and, as already noted, the average charge is only 
a little lower (£8,647).6 Too low, say universities, yet there is no 
shortage of places.
Price controls are not unique to England. They apply to public 
university fees in Australia, Canada, the US, most European and 
South American countries and most Asian countries as well.7 
Some countries, including the UK, also apply price controls to 
the fees charged by private higher education providers ( Estrada 
2014).8 In the US, President obama has proposed tying federal 
government grants and subsidies to the tuition fees charged by 
private universities (the higher the fee, the lower the subsidy). 
This is an indirect way of controlling their prices.9
Why do governments seek to control university tuition fees? 
There are two answers to this question: the first is political and 
the second is economic. Let us start with the politics.
The politics of price controls
Thirty years ago, higher education was the preserve of a small 
elite (Bolton 2012). Today it is perceived as a necessity for anyone 
6 The maximum fee for part-time students is £6,750.
7 In the US and Canada, state and provincial governments rather than the central 
government set university tuition prices. In England and Australia, tuition fees are 
controlled by the central government.
8 In England, students seeking access to government loans, who are studying with 
private higher education providers, cannot be charged more than £6,000 per year.
9 The White House Fact Sheet on the President’s Plan to Make College More Affordable: A 
Better Bargain for the Middle Class (2013). Washington, DC: The White House.
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seeking a well-paid career. With so many people affected, any 
fee increase instantly becomes a political hot potato. President 
obama summarised the politics of university prices in a recent 
speech at the University of Buffalo.10 Noting that American uni-
versity tuition fees tripled over the last 30 years while family in-
comes rose only 16 per cent, he went on to say:
At a time when a higher education has never been more impor-
tant or more expensive, too many students are facing a choice 
that they should never have to make: Either they say no to col-
lege and pay the price for not getting a degree – and that’s a price 
that lasts a lifetime – or you do what it takes to go to college, but 
then you run the risk that you won’t be able to pay it off because 
you’ve got so much debt.11
Soaring tuition fees, increasing debt and historically high 
levels of unemployment among graduates have combined to 
make voters unhappy – and no politician likes to do that. When 
the English university fee ceiling jumped from £3,290 to £9,000, 
the backlash delivered a blow to the Liberal Democrats from 
which they never recovered.12 This is a salutary lesson for any pol-
itician. Governments set price ceilings to show voters that they 
‘feel their pain’.
Despite the ferocious reaction that always accompanies 
fee increases, students do not seem to be particularly deterred 
by higher prices. A year after the £9,000 fee ceiling was intro-
duced, university applications dropped a little but the numbers 
quickly bounced back to near record levels (Grove 2014; Paton 
2014). Students seem to be relatively insensitive to university 
10 The White House Blog, 22 August 2013. President obama explains his plan to com-
bat rising college costs.
11 Ibid.
12 Kingston students ditch Lib-Dems after tuition fee hike. (2012). River. 25 october.
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price increases. There are three reasons for their apparent 
insouciance.
Students are not required to pay their fees up front.13 The gov-
ernment lends students the money to pay their fees; these loans 
are repaid years later once graduates are working. Postponing 
payment appears to mute price signals (Chapman et al. 2014). 
The second reason that students seem insensitive to price rises is 
their tendency to view a higher tuition fee as a proxy for a higher 
quality education. That is, for many students, higher education 
is a ‘Veblen good’ for which demand increases in line with price 
(Veblen 1957; Fisher 1993). The third reason is the lack of cheaper 
alternatives. When they were given the opportunity to increase 
tuition fees, practically all universities raised their fees to the 
maximum (£9,000). Students who preferred to pay less had no-
where to go.
As discussed in the next section, the ‘income-contingent’ loan 
system has many advantages, but it also has the potential to in-
crease costs. Avoiding such an increase in costs was the second 
reason that government set price ceilings in the UK – and why 
governments do so more generally.
Containing the effects of moral hazard
Universities are the ‘marshaling yards for life’s gravy train’ (Ellis 
1995). Graduates get the best jobs and make the highest sala-
ries. Because of the personal benefits they receive, it is fair that 
students fund at least part of the cost of their education. This 
presents a problem for bright students from low-income back-
grounds. If they wish to study, they must borrow the money. But 
banks are reluctant to make student loans. As Bruce Chapman 
13 Australian experience shows that students do not simply ignore university prices. 
When they were given a discount for paying their fees up front (not taking out a 
loan) many Australians chose to save the money and forgo the debt. This is not an 
option in the British system.
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points out, slavery has long been abolished, so there is no collat-
eral for banks to sell should a graduate default (Chapman 2011: 
86). Banks will only make loans to students if some creditworthy 
entity (usually the government) provides them with a guarantee. 
This is what happens in the US. As an alternative, the govern-
ment could borrow on its own credit and use the money to make 
student loans: this is the English system. However, government 
loans are not just for students from low-income backgrounds; 
all students are eligible. Graduates repay their loans once their 
income reaches an earnings threshold (currently £21,000).
These ‘income-contingent’ loans are arguably an efficient, 
fair and attractive solution to the reluctance of banks to invest 
in human capital (Chapman 2005). Unlike traditional mort-
gage-style loans, it is impossible to default on an income-con-
tingent loan because repayments are matched to a graduate’s 
income. Those who lose their jobs, take time off to have children 
or never reach the earnings threshold have no obligation to make 
payments. In addition, the government writes off all unpaid stu-
dent loans after 30 years.
Income-contingent loans make access to higher education de-
pendent on whether students can benefit rather than whether they 
have the upfront capital. However, they also have a downside. If 
graduates never earn enough money to repay their fees, taxpayers 
absorb the loss. In tough economic times, these losses can mount 
up. Current estimates suggest that 45 per cent of English student 
loans will be written off as uncollectable, and there are £10 billion 
in student loans made every year (Bolton 2014).
Although they serve a worthy social purpose, income-con-
tingent loans also provide many opportunities for moral hazard 
(encouragement to take risks while somebody else bears the con-
sequences) (Chapman 2005). For example, because universities 
receive their fees up front and are not responsible for collecting 
loan repayments, they may be tempted to admit academically 
marginal students. After all, it is not the universities but the 
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taxpayers that will have to bear the losses. Universities would be 
much more careful about whom they admit and which courses 
they offer if they were making student loans than if the govern-
ment guarantees loans.
Moral hazard also applies to students. The loan system en-
courages students to borrow more than they would if loan repay-
ments were not income-contingent. This is because the govern-
ment is taking most of the risk. If graduates benefit from their 
education and reach the income threshold, they repay their loans. 
If they never reach the income threshold, they are not required to 
make repayments, and the government absorbs the loss. Imagine 
offering loans to stock market speculators on similar terms. If 
their investments are successful, they repay their loan and keep 
the profit; if their investments collapse, the taxpayer makes good 
their losses. Who wouldn’t accept such a deal?
The income-contingent loan system insulates universities and 
students from losses while the government (on behalf of the tax-
payer) bears most of the risk. No wonder governments feel they 
need to mandate price ceilings.
The story so far
English universities are businesses (albeit mostly not-for- profit) 
whose prices are mandated by the government for political rea-
sons and as a way of mitigating the moral hazard that arises 
from the income-contingent loan scheme. Unfortunately, the 
government’s efforts to control prices have so far been largely 
futile. Despite 16 years of government-mandated tuition fee con-
trol, university fees managed to increase much faster than the 
rate of inflation. Governments continually increased the price 
‘ceiling’ while, at the same time, they reduced direct subsidies 
to universities. They hoped to lower the cost to the taxpayer by 
placing more of the costs on students. Unfortunately, this has not 
worked because taxpayers absorb unpaid loans. The government 
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has merely traded direct subsidies to universities for subsidies to 
students saving little money in the process.
Under any funding regime, savings are notoriously hard to 
make because universities suffer from the economic malaise 
known as the cost disease (Bowen 2012).
The cost disease in universities
Although advanced technology can be found all around univer-
sities, it has had little effect on university work. Stuck in the 19th 
century, higher education is a pre-industrial industry in which 
academics handcraft bespoke courses, deliver them to students 
and assess their learning (Schejbal 2012). Lectures and tutorials 
remain ubiquitous. This is why every university has a multitude 
of lecture theatres, and considerable administrative effort goes 
into deciding who gets to use each one, and when. Except for Fri-
day afternoons, lecture theatres are heavily booked and lecturers 
are always demanding that more be built.
over the years, the acoustics of lecture theatres has improved, 
digital projectors have been installed, and air conditioning has 
made them more comfortable but – as far as teaching is con-
cerned – productivity gains have come mainly from increasing 
class sizes. As for its core teaching method, it still takes one hour 
to deliver a one-hour lecture just as it did in the Middle Ages, 
when our oldest universities were founded.
over the centuries, productivity has surged in most parts of 
the economy, driving salaries ever higher. To attract academics 
from alternative occupations, their wages rose as well. There 
is still a considerable range of academic salaries, especially in 
the US, where ‘adjuncts’ and ‘non-tenure-track’ academics earn 
only one-quarter of the salary of a tenured professor (Curtis 
and Thornton 2014). However, all academic salaries – even the 
low ones – rise in proportion to salaries in the general economy. 
Because salaries generally rise faster than inflation, the cost of 
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running a university also rises faster than inflation. The bottom 
line is that universities require more money in real terms each 
year to do exactly the same thing they did the year before.
This phenomenon is a version of Baumol’s ‘cost disease,’ named 
after the economist who first wrote about it (Baumol and Bowen 
1966). It applies to the performing arts (it takes the same number 
of musicians the same amount of time to play Beethoven’s fifth 
symphony today as it did in 1808 when it was first performed). It 
also applies to barbers, tailors and other labour-intensive indus-
tries including higher education.
Ever-increasing costs drive universities to find new sources 
of income – by enrolling more non-EU foreign students (who are 
happy to pay more than the price ceiling), from investments, li-
cences, patents and donations. If the income from these sources 
is still not sufficient to support all the university’s activities, 
vice-chancellors pressure the government to raise the price ceil-
ing. Most governments eventually agree.
To complicate matters further, prices are not the only aspect of 
university finance controlled by the government. Governments of 
all political persuasions have tinkered with every aspect of higher 
education, burying universities under dense sedimentary layers of 
conflicting rules and regulations. The government not only con-
trols prices, it also controls the output of each individual university.
It does this through a complicated quota system, which limits 
the number of students that universities may admit. The quota 
does not apply to all students, only to ‘home’ (British) and EU un-
dergraduates whose A-level marks are lower than one A and two 
Bs. (In 2013, the quota only applied to students whose marks were 
lower than two As and one B.) There is no limit to the number of 
students with one A and two Bs that a university may admit. The 
government has announced that it will add 30,000 extra students 
to the undergraduate home and EU quota for the 2014–15 aca-
demic year, and quotas will be abolished altogether in 2015–16 
(Graham 2013).
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When governments do not interfere, university fees 
reflect market forces
Undergraduate students who come from countries outside the EU 
are not subject to a quota or a price ceiling. Universities can enrol 
as many such students as they wish, and charge them whatever 
they like. Under these unconstrained conditions, all universities 
charge students from non-EU countries more than the £9,000 
maximum that applies to home and EU students. Australian uni-
versities behave similarly – they charge international students 
higher fees than they charge domestic students whose fees are 
subject to price ceilings (Norton 2013a). It seems safe to conclude 
that the £9,000 ceiling is lower than the market-clearing rate.
Also, as we would expect in an unfettered market, different 
universities charge different prices for their courses. At University 
College London, for example, fees range from £15,200 for arts to 
£29,000 for medicine. Liverpool University’s non-EU student fee 
starts at £12,000 for arts courses. The University of Greenwich 
charges non-EU students a minimum of £10,359 while the Univer-
sity of Bedfordshire’s international student fees start at £9,750 only 
a little more than the price ceiling for home students. The pattern 
seems clear. When higher education prices and places are unreg-
ulated, tuition fees are determined by the demand for the subject 
(which is why arts degrees are usually the least expensive) and the 
perceived quality of the institution. In short, without government 
interference, university prices obey market forces.14
Before we conclude that lifting quotas would lead to home 
and EU students paying prices similar to those paid by non-EU 
students, we should note one complication. International stu-
dents pay their fees up front, which means that the amount they 
can pay is constrained by their budgets. Because home students 
have access to an income-contingent loan, they do not feel quite 
14 Unregulated fees for postgraduates in Australia show a similar pattern.
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the same budget pressure. This is one of the reasons why students 
were undeterred when prices increased to £9,000.
When the Australian government announced that price 
ceilings would be lifted, the University of Western Australia im-
mediately announced that its tuition fees would double. English 
universities would no doubt behave similarly. They know from 
previous experience that most students will not be put off by the 
higher price tag. If they never earn enough to repay their loans, 
the taxpayer will absorb the loss. With no price ceiling, these 
losses could be huge.
Have price controls created a shortage of 
student places?
Assessing the effect of price ceilings on supply is complicated be-
cause it is difficult to determine if any shortage of student places 
is the result of price controls or quotas, or both.
At present, the best data we have to tease apart the effects of 
quotas from the effects of price controls comes from Australia. 
The Australian government began to ease enrolment caps in 
2008, but retained price controls (Norton 2013b). Despite a price 
ceiling that was well below the ‘market’ price paid by interna-
tional students, university enrolments grew by 13 per cent and 
some institutions increased their intake by 20 per cent or more 
(Norton 2013b). The same phenomenon occurred in England. 
Universities enthusiastically increased their undergraduate ad-
missions by 30,000 in 2014–15, even though price ceilings remain 
below the non-EU student price.
But why should lifting quotas result in an increase in student 
admissions when the price ceiling is set below the market price 
and may even be lower than the university’s costs (Grove 2014; 
Hamilton, op. cit.)? To understand this apparently irrational 
behaviour, we must enquire more deeply into what motivates 
universities.
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Universities are motivated by prestige
As we have already noted, university buildings, crests and mot-
toes are designed to confer prestige. Indeed, the competition for 
prestige permeates the whole institution. Universities compete 
at different levels – the elite compete with one another while 
lower-ranked universities compete among themselves. But, 
whatever their level, all universities compete. Their common aim 
is to ‘pursue excellence’ by continually improving their services, 
research and facilities (Clotfelter 1996). Because it is notoriously 
difficult to measure excellence in any absolute way, universities 
are forced to rely on relative excellence – an institution’s stand-
ing in relation to others. An entire industry has evolved just for 
this purpose. It involves the production of university rankings or 
‘league tables’.
Higher education leaders have numerous complaints about 
league tables. Nevertheless, all vice-chancellors prefer to see 
their universities rise up the rankings – and use their positions 
in publicity. The result is that universities around the world are 
engaged in a ‘perpetual arms race’ for prestige (Stocum 2013). 
Despite huge differences in resources, size and age, all universi-
ties are busily trying to ‘get to the next level’ (Toma 2008).
Getting to the next level requires attracting the best students 
and the most illustrious staff. Universities want the best students 
because, unlike the customers of a normal business, students 
bring more than just money to the transaction (Winston 1999). 
They also help the university to achieve its educational goals. Stu-
dents do not learn only from academics, they also learn from one 
another. By working together on academic projects, participat-
ing in clubs and sporting teams and by studying together for ex-
aminations, students help one another to learn about leadership, 
teamwork, tolerance and how to communicate across cultural 
boundaries. By admitting high-quality students, who are likely 
to excel in their careers after leaving university, universities also 
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provide their graduates with a valuable network of influential 
contacts.
Not surprisingly, elite universities are the first choice of 
high-achieving students. Because they receive many applications, 
leading universities can be very choosy about which applicants 
they admit. Under the quota system, good students who miss out 
on their first-choice university are forced to accept an offer from 
their second-, third- or even fourth-choice institution. The result 
is that every university, no matter how unpopular or low quality, 
exercises some level of selectivity.
This has started to change with the lifting of the quotas on 
students with high A-level grades. Not surprisingly, most of these 
high-achieving students wind up in the elite universities. Elite 
universities are willing to expand their intake of top students be-
cause this increases their prestige.15 All universities charge fees 
at or near the maximum because no institution wishes to appear 
cheap or inferior because, as already mentioned, a university’s 
fees are often taken to reflect its quality.
The expansion of elite universities leaves fewer high-per-
forming students for lower-ranked institutions. When quotas 
disappear entirely in 2015–16, the process of differentiation will 
accelerate. Elite institutions will take an even higher proportion 
of the high-performing students, forcing modestly ranked uni-
versities to be less selective and lower their entry standards. This 
is precisely what has happened in Australia since undergraduate 
quotas were eased (Norton 2013b).
High-performing academics – those with scholarly reputa-
tions – also contribute to institutional prestige. This is why uni-
versities pay well-known academics higher than average salaries 
and assign them smaller than average teaching loads. Successful 
15 Expansion is not an option for oxford and Cambridge, whose intakes are con-
strained by the availability of college places. Elite universities may focus entirely 
on top students while shrinking their numbers of other students. This will enhance 
their exclusivity and allow them to charge higher prices.
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researchers also have preferential access to specialised equip-
ment, university-paid research assistants, paid sabbaticals and, 
in some cases, jobs for their partners.
Because a university’s reputation, particularly its standing in 
international league tables, is determined by its scholarly output, 
prestigious universities aspire to increase the quality and quan-
tity of their research.16 Except for a few research powerhouses, 
most universities are unable to fund their research from grants, 
donations and contracts alone. These institutions are forced to 
divert some of their student fee income to supporting research.
When vice-chancellors claim that the £9,000 price ceiling 
is below their costs, they do not mean that it costs more than 
£9,000 per year to teach a student in commerce or accounting 
or psychology or other popular subjects. They are referring to 
the cost of teaching these subjects plus the subsidy that goes to 
support academic research. There is no limit to the size of this 
subsidy – research opportunities are endless, and there is no ceil-
ing on excellence. This is why universities, engaged in an arms 
race for prestige, spend so much on research. It is the best way to 
move up the league tables.
Putting it all together: the effects of price controls 
on universities
Universities are highly regulated, largely not-for-profit, busi-
nesses. They are subject to politically motivated price ceilings, 
which are also intended to limit the opportunities for moral haz-
ard that arise from the income-contingent loan system. However, 
a combination of the cost disease, the arms race for prestige and 
16 As universities are ‘schools’, you might expect them to be judged on their teaching 
and learning. However, the main international league tables, such as the one pro-
duced by the Times Higher or the World Ranking of Universities, rely most heavily 
on measures of research performance.
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the perception that a university’s quality is reflected in its fees 
combine to render price controls largely futile.
What seems irrational behaviour on the part of universities 
– expanding student numbers at a price vice-chancellors claim 
is below costs – turns out not to be so mysterious after all. The 
‘costs’ to which they refer include research subsidies. Any price 
ceiling for university fees will always be below ‘costs’ because 
research expenditures have no limit.
In reality, the marginal cost of an additional student in most 
subjects is low; it is not hard to squeeze another undergraduate 
into a lecture theatre. Some elite universities are happy to expand 
the enrolments of high-performing students because these stu-
dents bring greater prestige. Lower-ranked institutions are also 
happy to expand enrolments. Their students may have less stellar 
A-level marks than those attracted to the elite universities, but 
they bring funds that can be used to fuel the battle for prestige.
History has shown that university price controls have not 
kept prices from rising. Eliminating price ceilings and quotas for 
home and EU students would produce market-related price and 
quality differentiation, just as it has for non-EU students. Recog-
nising this, the Australian government announced in May 2014 
that it would seek parliamentary approval to lift all price con-
trols on domestic student fees while making income-contingent 
loans available to any home student admitted by a university (as 
noted above, quotas had already been lifted).
With no quotas and no price ceilings, Australian universities 
will be able to enrol as many domestic students as they wish and 
charge whatever price they can get away with. Because higher 
education is a Veblen good and the government provides loans to 
all students, elite universities will have the opportunity to benefit 
at taxpayers’ expense. Modestly ranked universities, on the other 
hand, may succumb to moral hazard and admit unprepared stu-
dents whose fees they get to keep even if graduates never make 
enough money to repay their loans.
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To prevent price gouging and unrestrained admissions, uni-
versities must be made to bear at least some of the risk of unpaid 
loans. They could, for example, be required to repay a proportion 
of the unpaid loans of their graduates.
To make students more price-sensitive, income-contingent 
loans should not be written off after 30 years and attempts 
should be made to recover them from deceased estates. Serious 
attempts should also be made to recover debts from students 
who leave the country – if not while they are abroad than when 
they return home. Passport checks should be able to achieve this.
As this chapter is being written, a hostile Australian parlia-
ment is preparing to reject the lifting of university price controls 
(at least for now). Because the Australian government did not 
propose the parallel changes to the loan system suggested above, 
it may end up thankful that it did not get what it wished for.
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10 MINIMUM UNIT PRICING
Christopher Snowdon
What is minimum pricing?
Minimum unit pricing (MUP) creates a floor price below which 
retailers cannot sell a unit of alcohol. A unit of alcohol is 10 ml 
of pure ethanol and there are two to three units in a typical pint 
of beer. At the 50p rate advocated by public health campaigners, 
it would be illegal to sell a can of standard strength lager below 
£1.00, a bottle of wine below £5.25 and a bottle of spirits below 
£14.00.1
Supporters of the policy say that minimum pricing is prefer-
able to tax rises because it directly targets the cheapest alcohol 
that tends to be bought by the heaviest drinkers. They argue that 
tax rises are frequently not passed on to the customer because 
the drinks industry absorbs the costs (although Leicester (2011: 
22) finds evidence that alcohol taxes, on average, are passed on 
with interest) and they say that that minimum pricing targets 
problem drinkers while having little impact on ‘responsible 
drinkers’.
Since Britain has some of the highest rates of alcohol duty in 
the world, MUP is seen as a way of tackling excessive drinking 
without raising the price of premium beverages or penalising 
those who drink in pubs and restaurants. By contrast, oppo-
nents of the policy argue that cheap alcohol is disproportionately 
1 Based on 5 per cent, 14 per cent and 40 per cent alcohol by volume respectively.
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purchased by people on low incomes and that MUP is therefore 
discriminatory and regressive.
Minimum unit pricing of alcohol is the subject of fierce po-
litical debate in the UK. The Scottish government has passed 
legislation to implement such a policy, though implementation 
is currently stalled pending a reference to the European Court 
of Justice. The UK government has considered and rejected the 
policy, though it is still very firmly in the ministerial in-tray of 
potential policy options and could easily be revived.
Theoretical evidence
The system of minimum pricing proposed in Britain does not 
currently exist anywhere in the world, although a somewhat 
similar scheme operates in the state alcohol monopolies of some 
Canadian provinces. In the absence of real world evidence, a pre-
dictive model created by researchers at Sheffield University has 
assumed a remarkable degree of influence in the debate about 
whether minimum pricing ‘works’.
The Sheffield Alcohol Pricing Model (SAPM) first estimated 
the consequences of minimum pricing in 2008 and has produced 
several updated projections for England and Scotland in the 
years since. Its combined output now runs to many hundreds of 
pages and is the source of some highly specific claims, including 
the prediction that minimum pricing in Scotland will save 63 
lives in its first year, while in England it will ‘save 3,393 lives and 
reduce hospital admissions by 97,900’ (after ten years) (Rae 2012).
The Sheffield model is fed with price elasticity estimates, 
crime figures and health data in an effort to predict the effect 
of minimum pricing on alcohol consumption, health outcomes, 
crime, productivity and consumer spending. The first version 
of the model predicted that a 40p minimum unit price would 
reduce alcohol consumption by 2.6 per cent at a cost of £21.52 
per drinker per annum, leading to 1,381 fewer alcohol-related 
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deaths per annum after a decade (Brennan et al. 2008: 112, 114). 
The most recent version projects that a 45p minimum price will 
reduce consumption by 1.6 per cent at a cost of £2.12 per drinker, 
reducing deaths by 860 per annum after a decade.
Minimum pricing is portrayed as a more targeted interven-
tion than alcohol tax hikes because it only raises the price of 
the cheaper drinks that are disproportionately purchased by 
‘hazardous’ and ‘harmful’ drinkers (the two categories are sep-
arate in the SAPM; the latter being the heaviest drinkers). The 
success of the policy therefore depends on the extent to which 
the heaviest consumers reduce their alcohol intake. In economic 
terms, this depends on their elasticity of demand, but price elas-
ticities are neither derived from, nor designed for, situations in 
which the price of the cheapest products alter while the rest of 
the category remains the same. The lack of real world evidence 
necessarily requires untested assumptions about how own-price 
and cross-price elasticities2 would interact in this unusual scen-
ario. Some degree of uncertainty is therefore inevitable, but there 
are several questionable assumptions in the SAPM that lead to a 
probable exaggeration of the benefits and an underestimation of 
the costs.
Firstly, the price elasticities in the model are high and have 
become higher since the first edition was published. In the first 
SAPM, the own-price elasticity of beer was –0.53, implying that a 
10 per cent price rise would reduce consumption by 5.3 per cent, 
but by 2014 this had nearly doubled to –0.98, meaning that the 
same price rise would reduce consumption by nearly 10 per cent. 
Wine also became more elastic, although spirits became dra-
matically less elastic, falling from –0.62 to just –0.08. The price 
2 The own-price elasticity measures how much the demand for a product changes 
when its price changes. The cross-price elasticity measures how much the demand 
for a product changes when the price of a rival product changes (e.g. butter and 
margarine) or the price of a complementary product changes (e.g. tonic water and 
gin).
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elasticity of cider was left out of earlier versions of the SAPM but 
when it was later introduced it was assumed to have a very elastic 
demand of –1.27. The figures for beer and cider, in particular, are 
at the higher end of estimates found in the economic literature. 
The meta-analyses of Fogarty (2006), Gallet (2007), Wagenaar et 
al. (2009) and Nelson (2014) all report own-price elasticities for 
beer lower than –0.5, for example. The assumption that drinkers 
are highly price sensitive means that price rises in the SAPM have 
a more profound effect on alcohol consumption – and, therefore, 
on health – than would otherwise be expected.
Secondly, the Sheffield researchers assume that heavy and 
harmful drinkers are more price sensitive than moderate drink-
ers. This, again, represents a divergence from the mainstream 
economic literature. Most empirical work confirms the common 
sense view that heavy consumers have a relatively inelastic de-
mand for alcohol and that the most dependent drinkers may have 
‘perfectly price inelastic demands’ (Manning et al. 1995). The same 
is true of the other group that minimum pricing intends to tar-
get – teenagers – who are ‘least responsive to price’ (Gallet 2007: 
133). Moderate consumers, by contrast, are more price sensitive 
(Wagenaar et al. 2009). The Sheffield researchers are aware of this 
literature but ultimately choose to ignore it, instead basing their 
model on the reverse hypothesis that heavy drinkers are more 
price sensitive than average (Brennan et al. 2008: 51).
Thirdly, the SAPM makes no distinction between high and 
low strength beverages when estimating the elasticity of de-
mand. This is critically important in the case of cider and beer. 
High strength white cider and Somerset scrumpy are, to all in-
tents and purposes, different products. Similarly, Special Brew 
and real ale, while both being classed as beer, are qualitatively 
different in terms of strength, use and customer demographic. 
The high strength variants of beer and cider are heavily associ-
ated with alcoholics, who, by definition, have an inelastic de-
mand. However, in the absence of accurate price elasticities for 
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high strength varieties, the SAPM relies on estimates based on 
average strength products. It assumes that the price elasticity 
of super strength lager is identical to that of a craft ale and vice 
versa.
The perverse consequences of constructing the model in this 
way can be illustrated by the fact that a heavy and dependent 
drinker who consumes high strength cider is considered by the 
SAPM to be more likely than any other drinker to reduce their 
consumption as a result of minimum pricing. This runs counter 
to a significant body of evidence showing that such drinkers 
have an elasticity of demand for alcohol that is ‘not significantly 
different from zero’ (Purshouse et al. 2009: 76).
The Sheffield model is an extremely thorough piece of work in 
many respects. It includes a vast number of figures on all sorts 
of different variables, often calculated to several decimal places, 
but a model is only as good as the assumptions that are fed into 
it and many of the assumptions in the SAPM are highly ques-
tionable. The mathematical precision of the Sheffield estimates, 
along with their confident presentation to the media over sev-
eral years, has given the impression that they are only a hair’s 
breadth from being hard evidence. In fact, they are flawed and 
highly speculative.
Real world evidence
A study from British Columbia, where a form of minimum pric-
ing has been in place for many years, purported to show that 
the policy successfully reduces the number of alcohol-related 
deaths (Zhao et al. 2013). It claimed that a 10 per cent hike in the 
minimum price had led to a sensational 32 per cent decline in al-
cohol-related mortality. Although touted as real world evidence, 
this was also an extrapolation based on a computer model and 
its headline finding is not supported by data from the Canadian 
government.
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The minimum price for 
beer and spirits increased 
in British Columbia several 
times in the first decade of 
this century3 and the study’s 
authors claimed that there 
was a large drop in wholly 
alcohol-attributable deaths 
in 2006–7 (Stockwell 2013). 
However, official statistics 
show that the alcohol mor-
tality rate rose from 26 per 
100,000 persons to 28 per 
100,000 persons between 
2002 and 2008. As Figure 12 shows, neither mortality (solid line) 
nor per capita alcohol consumption (dotted line) fell as a result of 
the increases in the minimum price. Rates of alcohol-related mor-
bidity also rose (from 375 to 457 per 100,000 persons) (CARBC n.d.).
Between 2002 and 2011, the number of deaths directly attrib-
uted to alcohol in British Columbia rose from 315 to 443 per 
annum, with the largest annual death rates occurring after the 
minimum price rises of 2006 (see Figure 13) (CARBC 2013: 2). 
Between 2006 and 2008, when most of the minimum price rises 
occurred, the number of deaths rose from 383 to a peak of 448 
per annum. Moreover, the rate of hospitalisations for both alco-
hol-related ailments and acute intoxication rose during this dec-
ade (Vallance et al. 2012). According to the Centre for Addictions 
for BC, ‘Alcohol consumption in BC has been above the Canadian 
3 Minimum price increases between 2002 and 2009:
 Spirits: August 2004 (4.2 per cent), September 2006 (4.9 per cent), January 2008 
(3.5 per cent) and April 2009 (4.5 per cent).
 Packaged beer: May 2006 (15.7 per cent) and January 2008 (2 per cent).
 Draft beer: May 2006 (6.3 per cent) and January 2008 (1.8 per cent).
 other beverages: No change.
Figure 12 Alcohol-related mortality 
and alcohol consumption in British 
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average for the last decade. 
The rates of hospitalizations 
in BC for conditions related 
to alcohol have shown a 
significant increase since 
2002, reflecting an overall 
increase in alcohol con-
sumption in the province’ 
(Thompson et al. 2013: 2).
In sum, every indicator 
suggests that alcohol- related 
health problems worsened 
somewhat during the period 
covered by the study. Whatever methods the study’s authors used 
to construct their model, the results bear no resemblance to the 
recorded facts. There was never a 32 per cent decline in mortality, 
or anything close to it. Nor, indeed, was there ever a 10 per cent 
rise in the minimum price; most of the price rises only slightly ex-
ceeded the rate of inflation. British Columbia saw trivial changes 
in real prices, alcohol-related mortality and alcohol consumption. 
Although the study inspired newspaper reports that stated as fact 
that ‘between 2002 and 2009 deaths described as “wholly alco-
hol attributable” fell by 32 per cent following a 10 per cent rise in 
average minimum prices’ as well as absurd headlines such as ‘30p 
added to cost of pint “can cut alcohol deaths by a third” ’ (Buckland 
2013; Metro 2013), the practical experience of British Columbia tells 
us very little about the efficacy of minimum pricing.
Financial costs
The Sheffield model uses cross-price elasticities to estimate what 
substitution effects will be created by minimum pricing within 
the legal alcohol category. The model projects the extent to which 
MUP will make people switch from cider to spirits, for example, 
Figure 13 Deaths in British Columbia 
that were directly attributed to alcohol 
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but it does not account for drinkers switching to illicit alcohol, 
homemade alcohol or buying alcohol abroad. It does not factor in 
possible switching from alcohol to illegal drugs. Nor does it tell 
us about the impact of drinkers cutting their household budget 
for other products, such as food and heating, in order to maintain 
their alcohol intake. Unintended consequences such as these are 
as difficult to predict as the intended consequences on health, 
but one outcome is almost certain: the nation’s expenditure on 
alcohol will rise under a minimum pricing regime.
The extent to which overall expenditure on alcohol will in-
crease depends on the elasticity of demand and it is likely that 
the financial burden will fall most heavily on low-income groups, 
who are more likely to purchase the targeted products. Concerns 
about MUP being regressive led Gordon Brown to reject mini-
mum pricing when he was prime minister (Hencke and Sparrow 
2009) and they have been raised by politicians from all parties 
ever since. The Australian National Health Prevention Agency 
twice rejected minimum pricing on the basis that the substitu-
tion effects are unknown and the costs are likely to outweigh the 
benefits (ANPHA 2012, 2013). The agency plausibly concluded 
that ‘total expenditure on alcohol is likely to increase’ under 
MUP (ANPHA 2013: 10). The New Zealand government has come 
to the same conclusion (Ministry of Justice 2014).
After the Westminster government rejected minimum pricing 
in 2013, the Sheffield team published a revised model in The Lan-
cet, which predicted that the financial impact on low-income and 
moderate drinkers was less than previously thought (Holmes et 
al. 2014). The 2010 version of the SAPM estimated that a 45p min-
imum price would cost drinkers an average of £29.30 per year 
(Purshouse et al. 2010). The 2014 model, by contrast, claimed that 
the average cost per drinker would be just £2.12 per year.
The most striking difference between the 2014 model and earl-
ier editions is the projected impact on ‘harmful’ drinkers. The 
2010 SAPM predicted that minimum pricing would cost these 
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consumers, who purchase approximately ten units a day, £137.40 
per year. By contrast, the 2014 model claimed that the same 45p 
minimum price would save them £4.01 per year. Harmful drink-
ers on low incomes did best of all from the new projections, sav-
ing £34.63 per year.
The claim that drinkers will save money as a result of higher 
prices is counterintuitive and probably wrong. Although it is 
plausible that higher prices might make drinkers cut down 
their intake somewhat, it is difficult to imagine them deciding 
to spend less money on alcohol overall. Even if heavy drinkers 
do not maintain their alcohol intake by spending more on alco-
hol – they already spend £2,685 per year according to the SAPM 
– there is no obvious reason to think that they would actually 
reduce their alcohol budget. The 2014 model was only able to 
show savings for some drinkers by relying on exceptionally high 
price elasticities for beer and cider. The researchers note that ‘as 
off-trade cider accounts for a sufficiently large proportion of the 
alcohol spend by “low-income male harmful drinkers”, the high 
elasticity of this beverage type leads to these consumers’ overall 
spending on alcohol falling under a 45p MUP’ (Meng et al. 2013: 
79). As discussed above, it is questionable whether these drinkers 
are as price sensitive as the SAPM assumes.
Low-income moderate drinkers – the group which politicians 
express the greatest concern for – went essentially untouched in 
the 2014 model, paying a mere 4p a year more (Holmes et al. 2014: 
3). Moderate drinkers as a whole were only projected to spend an 
extra 78p more per year, in contrast to the £8.70 projected in 2010. 
This led to headlines such as ‘Minimum pricing would have “lit-
tle impact” on moderate drinkers’ (Harrington 2014), but, again, 
this requires some peculiar assumptions. In the SAPM, a ‘mod-
erate drinker’ is someone who drinks just 5.5 units per week, the 
equivalent of two pints of lager. A low-income moderate drinker 
consumes even less, 4.6 units. This is a fraction of the govern-
ment’s rather austere recommendations for healthy drinking (21 
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units per week for a man) and more accurately describes a very 
light drinker rather than a moderate drinker.
Moreover, the 2014 model based its projections on a 45p unit 
price despite campaigners having long since moved on to a more 
punitive 50p unit, as endorsed by the Scottish government. The im-
pact of a more realistic 50p price would be more severe on drinkers 
across the board. In 2011, when the campaign for a 50p minimum 
price was in full flow, the average price paid per unit for beer, ci-
der, spirits and alcopops by ‘moderate’, ‘hazardous’ and ‘harmful’ 
drinkers alike was less than 50p, with the exception of spirits con-
sumed by moderate drinkers. 60 per cent of beer, 77 per cent of 
cider, 41 per cent of wine and 60 per cent of spirits were being sold 
at less than 50p per unit (ibid.: 29). only wine was bought at an 
average of more than 50p per unit (Meng et al. 2013: 32).
By focusing on an unrealistically low 45p unit, the 2014 SAPM 
assumes that only 23 per cent of alcohol is sold below the mini-
mum price and that only one in eight units purchased by moderate 
drinkers will be made more expensive by the policy. Nevertheless, 
even a 45p unit would ‘directly affect the vast majority of off-li-
cence alcohol consumers’ (Leicester 2011: 3) and a 50p unit price 
would increase the financial cost threefold (Meng et al. 2013: 12).
The claim that minimum pricing will have a negligible impact 
on moderate consumers therefore relies on a misleading defi-
nition of moderate consumption and an unrealistic minimum 
price. The manner in which minimum pricing ceased to be costly 
and suddenly became cost-saving for several population subsets 
in 2014 raises questions about the integrity of the model, while 
the claim that minimum pricing is not regressive, which is highly 
questionable at the 45p rate, is quite untenable at the 50p rate.
Welfare costs and benefits
If a drinker buys 10 units of alcohol per week at 46p per unit, 
he spends £4.60 per week. If the government mandates a 50p 
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minimum unit, he will need to spend £5.00 per week to maintain 
his intake. Minimum pricing will therefore cost him an extra 40p 
per week. If, however, the higher prices make him reduce his con-
sumption to 9 units per week, he will spend £4.50 per week and 
could therefore be said to be saving 10p per week.
This example illustrates how campaigners make claims about 
minimum pricing benefiting drinkers, but it is fallacious because 
it does not acknowledge the drinker’s loss of consumer surplus. In 
the example above, the drinker is coerced into losing the benefit 
he enjoys from his tenth unit of alcohol. He might be saving 10p 
a week, but his prior purchasing decision reveals that he would 
rather have the benefit of the extra unit of alcohol. Minimum 
pricing has relieved him of a consumer surplus and burdened 
him with a deadweight loss. The drinker cannot win (unless he is 
wealthy enough to never buy alcohol below 50p per unit). Either 
he maintains his preferred level of drinking and suffers a finan-
cial loss, or he reduces his drinking and suffers a welfare loss.
In our example, the drinker does not even enjoy any health ben-
efits since his pre-intervention drinking habits were well within 
any reasonable guidelines. In the case of those who consume alco-
hol at ‘hazardous’ or ‘harmful’ levels, minimum pricing advocates 
assume that drinkers would benefit more from reducing their 
consumption than from maintaining it, but they cannot possibly 
know this and, in a free society, it is not their decision to make.
The financial costs of minimum pricing are real, even if cam-
paigners understate them. The welfare costs are simply ignored 
and, as Jamie Whyte notes, a cost–benefit analysis that does not 
include the benefits people receive from drinking is no analysis 
at all (Whyte 2013: 37):
All consumption has both costs and benefits. Provided con-
sumers are not completely price-inelastic, consumption will 
decline if prices increase and the costs resulting from consump-
tion will also decrease. We know this in advance of any research. 
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So, if we choose to ignore the loss of benefits that also comes 
from reduced consumption, we know in advance the result we 
will get; we know the policy will appear to produce a benefit. 
There is no need to invest energy in working out precise price 
elasticities, the sensitivity of disease and crime to alcohol con-
sumption, and so on. It is all a bluff. The moment researchers 
decided to ignore the lost benefits of alcohol consumption, their 
‘result’ was assured.
Although the authors of Sheffield model do not attempt to 
evaluate welfare costs, they do briefly acknowledge their exist-
ence, saying: ‘If, as argued by some commentators, reductions in 
consumption itself induced by policy are negative effects, then 
our results suggest a minimum unit price has a mixture of re-
gressive (consumption) and progressive (health outcomes) ef-
fects’ (Holmes et al. 2014: 9). This is true, but the regressive effects 
are not included in the model.
Neither the health benefits nor the pleasure of drinking can 
be monetised (or, rather, they can only be monetised in a manner 
that is so arbitrary as to be practically useless). As New Zealand’s 
Ministry of Justice noted in a report that rejected minimum pric-
ing, it is not possible ‘to quantify all of the positive externalities 
alcohol consumption may generate, such as social lubrication ef-
fects and the building of social capital’ (Ministry of Justice 2014: 
9) and so, for all its faults, the SAPM should not be criticised for 
failing to measure the unmeasurable. It provides estimates of 
how much more (or less) drinkers will spend under a minimum 
pricing regime and it estimates what savings, if any, there will 
be to the health service. It does not - and cannot - tell us whether 
the welfare costs that result from less drinking exceed the health 
benefits. Those who campaign for minimum pricing are either 
unaware of the welfare costs or else feel that they are a price 
worth paying for the putative health benefits. This is a subjective 
judgement. It is not, as is often claimed, ‘evidence-based policy’.
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An estimate of lives saved in a partial equilibrium model can 
never, on its own, justify the implementation of a given policy. If 
the sole aim of alcohol policy was to reduce consumption, there 
would be no limits to how high prices were set. A 50p minimum 
unit price is no more ‘evidence-based’ than a 20p minimum 
price, a 70p minimum price, or no minimum price at all. The 
Sheffield model includes estimates of what would happen under 
a whole range of possible interventions, up to and including a 70p 
minimum price in off-licences and a £1 minimum price in pubs. 
Unsurprisingly, the model finds that the health benefits rise as 
the prices rise, but the fact that campaigners and politicians 
are not (yet) calling for a 70p minimum price or a floor price in 
pubs demonstrates that they are aware that economic decisions 
involve trade-offs. The mathematical precision of the SAPM tells 
us nothing about what should be done. It is merely an elaborate 
exploration of the law of demand.
The windfall fallacy
Evidence from the SAPM suggests that a 50p minimum unit 
price will result in English drinkers spending in the region of 
£250 million more on alcohol each year (although this is likely 
to be an underestimate, for the reasons given above).4 There is a 
common belief that this money will be a ‘windfall’ for retailers 
and producers. In truth, the policy is likely to make people poorer 
without making anybody richer.
To understand why, take an example in which there are three 
brands of beer. For the sake of simplicity, let us say that they 
each contain one unit of alcohol. The bottom end brand, Budget, 
retails at 35p. The mid-range brand, Average, retails at 50p. The 
high end brand, Premium, retails at 60p. Premium costs more 
4 Based on 35 million drinkers spending an additional £7.20 each, as projected in 
Meng et al. (2013: 12 and 66).
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to produce and is more heavily advertised than Average. Aver-
age costs more to produce and is more heavily advertised than 
Budget. Each beer has a profit margin of 5p.
Under a 50p minimum pricing regime, the price of Budget 
must rise from 35p to 50p. on the face of it, this suggests that 
either the manufacturer or the retailer will be able to pocket 
an extra 15p profit. But who will buy Budget when the superior 
Average brand is available at the same price? Hardly anybody. 
The most likely outcome is that sales of Average rise and sales of 
Budget plummet. This is good news for the makers of Average but 
there is no net gain for the industry as a whole.
Some might assume that the makers of Average would raise 
prices to exploit the excess profits that minimum pricing has cre-
ated, but there are no excess profits in a competitive market and 
minimum pricing has not removed competition. If the price of 
Average goes up to 60p, it then has to compete with the superior 
Premium beer and will lose. Why would consumers pay 60p for 
a mid-range brand when they could have a top-end drink for the 
same price? Much better to leave Average as the market leader at 
the (new) bottom end of the market.
of course, the makers of Premium could raise their price too, 
perhaps to 75p, but this would allow a rival company to under-
cut them with a similar offering. The production and advertising 
costs of producing a top-end beer would not be affected by mini-
mum pricing and a new rival would be happy to take the same 5p 
profit margin as Premium previously did.
The same thing would happen if Average decided to lower 
its production costs in an effort to exploit drinkers who can no 
longer downgrade to Budget. Lowering production costs would 
increase Average’s profit margin, but a rival would enter the mar-
ket with a 50p offering of superior quality. Any attempt to create 
excess profits is thwarted by competition.
What about the retailers? If the government forces up the 
price of low-end brands by 15p with a mandatory minimum, 
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why shouldn’t they slap 15p on all the beers and pocket the dif-
ference? The answer, again, is competition. If it was so easy to 
generate extra profit by raising prices, they would already be 
doing so. If Tesco raises the price of its beer, people will shop at 
Asda and vice versa. As in any competitive free market, retail-
ers have an incentive to push prices down, not up. The only way 
the price of the entire beer category could increase would be 
if there was collusion between the companies, but neither the 
producers nor the retailers operate in a cartel and such collu-
sion would be illegal.
The effect of minimum pricing, therefore, will not be to create 
excess profits for industry, but to wipe out the bottom end of the 
market. The makers of Budget will either have to withdraw the 
product from sale (because no one will buy it at 50p) or ‘do a Skoda’ 
by spending more money on production and advertising (which 
would bring the profit margin back to 5p). It would no longer be a 
budget brand; minimum pricing will make budget brands extinct.
This leaves the question of what happens to the extra £250 
million (or so) that drinkers will spend as a result of minimum 
pricing. Aside from a little more VAT being paid on the sale of 
more expensive alcohol, this money will be swallowed up by the 
additional production and marketing costs that are required 
to make a mid-range product. Drinkers who prefer to purchase 
budget brands with low production costs will have to buy mid-
range brands which have higher production costs. The impact on 
industry profits is negligible; it is consumers who are denied their 
first choice preference who lose out.5
Minimum pricing and the EU
The European Union says that all trading rules ‘enacted by Mem-
ber States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, 
5 I’m grateful to Dr Eric Crampton for guiding me towards many of the observations 
in this section (see Crampton 2012).
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actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be con-
sidered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions’ (Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837). Such ‘quanti-
tative restrictions’ are illegal under Article 34 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. Case law strongly suggests 
that minimum pricing falls into this category. In a report pre-
pared for the European Commission in 2009, the RAND corpo-
ration noted that ‘minimum pricing practices have tended to be 
seen as trade-distorting by the European courts (as setting an 
artificial price floor amounts to resale price maintenance, limit-
ing and distorting price competition), and therefore not typically 
put in place in the EU’ (Rabinovich et al. 2009: 90).
Advocates of minimum pricing argue that concerns about pub-
lic health trump concerns about free trade and that an exception 
can therefore be made for a policy that aims to reduce alcohol-re-
lated ill health, but previous attempts to implement a minimum 
price for tobacco have fallen foul of EU law and it is unlikely that 
the European Commission will view alcohol as a more pressing 
case. The European Court of Justice has never accepted minimum 
pricing on such grounds in the past, partly because it believes that 
other options, such as higher taxes, could achieve the same policy 
objectives without disturbing the internal market.
A communication from the European Commission in No-
vember 2012 encouraged member states to steer clear of mini-
mum pricing since it was not compatible with EU law. Directly 
referring to Scotland’s proposed 50p per unit minimum pricing 
proposal, it said that ‘The case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (“Court of Justice”) is unequivocal to the effect 
that national legislation imposing minimum pricing in respect of 
particular products falls within the ambit of the Article 34 TFEU 
(prohibition on measures having the equivalent effect of imped-
ing imports of products).’ While the Commission expressed sym-
pathy for the reasons given by the Scottish government for push-
ing ahead with the policy, it reminded it that there are ‘doubts 
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as to its compatibility with the principle of proportionality’ and 
politely asked it to explore ‘the possibility to achieve the objec-
tive by other means less restrictive to intra-EU trade’ (European 
Commission 2012).
The European Commission said that minimum pricing could 
only be legal if it did not raise a barrier to imports and that it 
could only pass the ‘public interest’ test if there was no other way 
of achieving the goal of reducing alcohol consumption. Since it 
felt that a minimum price of 50p would have an adverse effect 
on intra-EU imports and that general tax rises on alcohol were a 
viable alternative, it concluded that minimum pricing ‘would be 
in breach of Article 34 TFEU were it to be adopted without giving 
due consideration to the above remarks’ (ibid.).
The EU has previously ruled against minimum pricing not 
only for tobacco but also for motor fuel. This case law, combined 
with the Commission’s quite explicit warning to the Scottish 
government, suggests that any campaign for minimum pricing 
for alcohol within the EU is likely to hit the legal buffers sooner 
or later.
Conclusion
Price, advertising and availability are three of the key levers of 
competition in a free market economy. Since the nineteenth 
century, temperance campaigners have encouraged the state to 
control all of these levers in the alcohol market so that the first 
can be increased and the latter can be restricted. Traditionally, 
price rises have been achieved by increasing alcohol duty – a 
policy that is always attractive to cash-strapped governments 
– but minimum pricing offers a way of controlling prices more 
directly. once introduced, it is not hard to imagine the minimum 
price being raised incrementally on a regular basis at the behest 
of ‘public health’ campaigners who will always project greater 
health benefits from higher prices.
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Advocates of minimum pricing are careful to downplay the 
financial costs of minimum pricing while ignoring the welfare 
costs altogether. Politicians and the public, however, have shown 
themselves to be more aware of the trade-offs and are more scep-
tical of theoretical modelling. A study published in the European 
Journal of Public Health (Katikireddi et al. 2013) interviewed opin-
ion-formers and decision-makers under Chatham House rules and 
found significant private doubts about the policy. one of the politi-
cians interviewed said that he refused to be ‘blinded by some study 
that’s been carried out in an ivory tower somewhere’, adding that 
‘I try to think of what I call sort of logic and human nature and my 
observation of human nature over a period of time, and I just don’t 
accept that it [minimum unit pricing] will make any great differ-
ence to people’s behaviour’ (ibid.). Similarly, an academic said of 
the projected impact of MUP that ‘to be honest, we don’t know. 
We don’t know. We’ve got models. Sheffield modelling etc, all the 
taxation stuff but we don’t know. And we don’t know what’s gonna 
happen to the very heavy, heavily dependent drinkers. We actually 
don’t know and there may be some pluses and minuses’ (ibid.).
Scepticism about minimum pricing’s ability to tackle heavy 
and binge drinking seems to be shared by the public, who 
remain concerned about the impact of higher prices on their 
own budgets (Lonsdale et al. 2012). In a study based on focus 
group responses, Banerjee et al. (2010: 55) reported that ‘this 
intervention [minimum pricing] was unpopular. It has conno-
tations of punishment, is thought to be heavy handed without 
addressing the problem effectively, and would create a financial 
impact that could not be ignored on the responsible majority 
(i.e. themselves).’
These concerns are well-founded. The modelling almost cer-
tainly over-estimates the health benefits for heavy drinkers and 
under-estimates the costs to moderate and low-income drinkers. 
Aside from the government receiving a trivial increase in VAT 
revenue, nobody will benefit financially from the policy because 
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the extra expenditure will be swallowed up in the costs of pro-
ducing more expensive alcohol for consumers who would prefer 
to buy cheaper alcohol.
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